The
Rome Laboratory

Reliability Engineer's Toolkit

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ROME LABORATORY RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT

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An Application Oriented
Guide for the
Practicing Reliability Engineer

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Quick Reference Application Index

How Do I . . . ?

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FOREWORD

The original RADC (now Rome Laboratory) Reliability Engineer's Toolkit, July 1988, proved to be a best seller among military, industry and academic reliability practitioners. Over 10,000 copies were distributed and the Toolkit and its authors received the 1989 Federal Laboratory Consortium Special Award for Excellence in Technology Transfer.

This updated version, completed in-house at the Systems Reliability Division, contains new topics on accelerated testing, thermal analysis, surface mount technology, design of experiments, hardware/software reliability, component failure modes/mechanisms, dormancy, and sneak analysis. Revisions and updates in most other areas were also made.

This revision was led by a project team consisting of Bruce Dudley, Seymour Morris, Dan Richard and myself. We acknowledge the fine support we received from technical contributors Frank Born, Tim Donovan, Barry McKinney, George Lyne, Bill Bocchi, Gretchen Bivens, Doug Holzhauer, Ed DePalma, Joe Caroli, Rich Hyle, Tom Fennell, Duane Gilmour, Joyce Jecen, Jim Ryan, Dr. Roy Stratton, Dr. Warren Debany, Dan Fayette, and Chuck Messenger. We also thank typists Elaine Baker and Wendy Stoquert and the Reliability Analysis Center's MacIntosh Whiz, Jeanne Crowell.

Your comments are always welcome. If you wish to throw bouquets, these people should receive them. If it's bricks you're heaving, aim them at Bruce, Seymour, or me at the address below.

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Introduction

Purpose

This Toolkit is intended for use by a practicing reliability and maintainability (R&M) engineer. Emphasis is placed on his or her role in the various R&M activities of an electronic systems development program. The Toolkit is not intended to be a complete tutorial or technical treatment of the R&M discipline but rather a compendium of useful R&M reference information to be used in everyday practice.

Format

The format of the Toolkit has been designed for easy reference. Five main sections are laid out to follow the normal time sequence of a military development program.

Descriptions of the "how to" of the R&M engineer's activities have been designed to take the form of figures, tables, and step-by-step procedures as opposed to paragraphs of text. Appendices are included to give a greater depth of technical coverage to some of the topics as well as to present additional useful reference information.

The Toolkit also includes a "Quick Reference Application Index" which can be used to quickly refer the R&M engineer to the portion of a section that answers specific questions. A quick reference "For More Help Appendices" index is also included for the more in-depth topics of the appendices.

Ordering information for the military documents and reports listed in the Toolkit is located in Appendix 10.

Terminology

The term "Reliability" used in the title of this document is used in the broad sense to include the field of maintainability. The content of the report addresses reliability and maintainability (R&M) because they are usually the responsibility of one government individual in a military electronics development program. In this context, testability is considered as a part of maintainability and is, therefore, inherently part of the "M" of "R&M." Where testability issues, such as development of quantitative requirements, are appropriate for separation from "M" discussion, they are and have been labeled accordingly.

Underlying Philosophy

The development and application of a successful reliability program requires a number of tasks and coordination steps. Key ingredients include:

- Aggressive Program Manager Support
- Firm and Realistic Requirements
- Effective Built-in-Test
- Failure Reporting & Corrective Action
- Thorough Technical Reviews
- Complete Verification
- Parts Control

Total Quality Management

Total Quality Management (TQM) is an approach which puts quality first as the means to long-term survival and growth. It employs teamwork to improve the processes used by an organization in providing products and services. One could argue that TQM encompasses Reliability Engineering or that Reliability Engineering encompasses many TQM activities. Either way, the reliability engineer may well get involved in TQM. For example, he/she may be asked to evaluate a contractor's TQM approach, assist process improvement teams with statistical analyses, or serve as a member of a process improvement team looking at his/her own agency's processes. It, therefore, behooves the reliability professional to have some knowledge of TQM.

Principles of TQM

- **Management Leadership:** For successful TQM, the company management must create a cultural change from authoritarian management focused on short-term goals to using the full potential of all employees for long-term benefit. This means the agency executives must be consistent, persistent and personally involved in the pursuit of quality.

- **Focus on Customer:** It is easy to appreciate the need to focus on the external customer. Less obvious is the concept of internal customer satisfaction. Reliability engineering, for example, may be asked by Design Engineering (the customer) to review a proposed design for reliability. If an incomplete or shoddy evaluation is done, the ultimate design may not meet specifications. Output suffers and so does the efficiency of the project team. A TQM oriented organization seeks to understand and delight its customers, both external and internal.

- **Constant Improvement:** It is estimated that about 25% of operating costs of a typical manufacturing agency go for rework and scrap. Service organizations pay an even higher penalty for not doing things right the first time. Reducing these costs is a potential source of vast profit. Hence, TQM agencies seek to constantly improve their processes. The usual change agent is a team with members from all offices involved in the process, and including those who actually perform the work. Besides the measurable benefits, process improvements mean fewer defects going to customers, with an unmeasurable but significant effect on the bottom line.

- **Use of Measurements and Data:** TQM agencies seek to measure quality so that improvements can be tracked. Every process will have some operational definition of quality. The overall agency progress can be measured by calculating the "cost of quality" (money spent for preventing defects, appraising quality, rework and scrap). Typically, as more money is spent on preventing defects, savings made in scrap and rework reduce the overall cost of quality. Another common approach is to score the agency using the criteria for the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award as a measure. For Government agencies, the scoring criteria for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Quality Improvement Prototype Award is used in lieu of the Malcolm Baldrige criteria. R&M engineers should use Statistical Process Control, Statistical Design of Experiments, Quality Function Deployment, Taguchi Methods, and other available quality tools.

Design of Experiments is explained in Topic T14. Statistical Process Control techniques are described in this topic.

- **Employee Involvement:** A TQM agency recognizes the value of a skilled work force cooperating to satisfy the customer. Extensive education and training programs exist. Training in job skills, quality methods, and team building techniques is widely available. Cooperation between offices is the norm (e.g. concurrent engineering). Employees on all levels are widely involved in process improvement teams. Management looks for ways of reducing the hassle created by bureaucratic rules and regulations. Employees are trusted and empowered to do their jobs.

- **Results:** In a TQM agency, improvement is continuous and measured. Image building measurements like the number of improvement teams formed, are of less value than measures of cost of quality or increase in production which show real results. Management is not concerned with filling squares, but with making worthwhile changes.

TQM Tools

- **Process Flow Chart:** A diagram showing all the major steps of a process. The diagram also shows how the various steps in the process relate to each other.

Process Flow Chart

- **Pareto Chart:** A bar graph of identified causes shown in descending order of frequency used to prioritize problems and/or data. The Pareto Principle states that a few causes typically account for most problems (20% of the serial numbered units account for 80% of the failures; 20% of the people do 80% of the work; etc.) Pareto diagrams help analyze operational data and determine modes of failure. They are especially useful when plotted before and after an improvement project or redesign to show what progress has been made.

Pareto Chart

- **Fishbone Chart:** A cause and effect diagram for analyzing problems and the factors that contribute to them, or, for analyzing the factors that result in a desired goal. Also called an Ishikawa Chart. This tool requires the listing of all possible factors contributing to a result and the subsequent detailed investigation of each factor. It is usually developed in brainstorming sessions with those that are familiar with the process in question.

Fishbone Chart

- **Control Chart:** A method of monitoring the output of a process or system through the sample measurement of a selected characteristic and the analysis of its performance over time. There are two main types: control charts for attributes (to plot percentages of "go/no go" attribute data) and control charts for variables (to plot measurements of a variable characteristic such as size or weight). Control charts identify changes in a process as indicated by drift, a shift in the average value, or, increased variability. The upper and lower control limits are based on the sample mean $(\bar{x})$, sample standard deviation (s) and the sample size (n).

Control Chart

- **Shewhart Cycle:** A method, created by Walter A. Shewhart, for attacking problems.

Shewhart Cycle

The cycle starts with the planning phase: defining the particular problem, deciding what data are needed and determining how to obtain the data; that is via test, previous history, external sources, etc. The process flow charts and Ishikawa diagrams are very useful at this point.

After planning it is necessary to do something (D on the chart); Getting the data needed, running a test, making a change, or, whatever the plan calls for.

The next step, C on the chart, is to check the results. In some instances, this would be done by a control chart. In any event the results are evaluated and causes of variation investigated. Histograms, Pareto Charts and Scattergrams can be helpful.

The last step, A, stands for Analyze and Act. What did the data in step C indicate? Based on the analysis, appropriate action is taken. This could be a process change or a decision that a new plan is needed. In any event, after you act, you go back to P and start another cycle. Even if the first trip around worked wonders, there are always more opportunities waiting to be discovered. The cycle is really a spiral going upward to better and better quality.

Reliability TQM Tasks

Many corporations have considered or utilized TQM principles. The reliability tasks most frequently used in producing a quality product are assembled in the following Pareto chart:

Pareto Chart

Department of Defense R&M Policy and Procedures

Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5000.1, Defense Acquisition (23 Feb 91), establishes management policies and procedures for acquiring systems which satisfy all aspects of user operational needs. It is based on the principles contained in the Defense Management Report to the President (prepared by the Secretary of Defense, Jul 89). DoD Directive 5000.1 cancels 63 other DoD directives and policy memorandum, and replaces them with a single reference; DoD Instruction 5000.2, Defense Acquisition Policies and Procedures (23 Feb 91). The following R&M related documents are included in these cancellations: (1) DoD Instruction 3235.1, "Test and Evaluation of System Reliability, Availability and Maintainability", 1 Feb 82, (2) DoD Instruction 4120.19, "DoD Parts Control Program", 6 Jul 89. and (3) DoD Directive 5000.40, "Reliability and Maintainability", 8 Jul 80.

DoD Instruction 5000.2 establishes an integrated framework for translating broadly stated mission needs into an affordable acquisition program that meets those needs. It defines an event oriented management process that emphasizes acquisition planning, understanding of user needs and risk management. It is several hundred pages long and has 16 separate parts covering everything from Requirements Evolution and Affordability to the Defense Acquisition Board Process. Part 6, Engineering and Manufacturing, Subsection C, Reliability and Maintainability, establishes DoD R&M policy. The basic R&M policies and procedures described in this seven page section can be summarized as follows:

Policies

- Understand user needs and requirements.

- Actively manage all contributors to system unreliability.

- Prevent design deficiencies and the use of unsuitable parts.

- Develop robust systems insensitive to use environments.

Procedures

- Define both mission and logistics R&M objectives based on operational requirements and translate them into quantitative contractual requirements.

- Perform R&M allocations, predictions, and design analysis as part of an iterative process to continually improve the design.

- Establish parts selection and component derating guidelines.

- Preserve reliability during manufacturing through an aggressive environmental stress screening program.

- Establish a failure reporting and corrective action system.

- Perform reliability growth and demonstration testing.

- Use MIL-STD-785 (Reliability Program for Systems & Equipment, Development and Production) and MIL-STD-470 (Maintainability Program for Systems & Equipment) for R&M program guidance.

This Toolkit, although not structured to address each policy and procedure per se, addresses the practical application of the procedures to the development of military electronic hardware.

For More Information

"Total Quality Improvement." Boeing Aerospace Co., PO Box 3999, Seattle WA 98124; 1987.

"Total Quality Management, A Guide For Implementation." DoD 500.51-6; OASD (P&L) TQM, Pentagon, Washington DC; February 1989.

"Total Quality Management (TQM), An Overview." RL-TR-91-305; ADA 242594; Anthony Coppola, September 1991.

"A Rome Laboratory Guide to Basic Training in TQM Analysis Techniques." RL-TR-91-29; ADA 233855; Anthony Coppola, September 1989.

DoD Directive 5000.1, "Defense Acquisition," 23 February 1991.

DoD Instruction 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Policies and Procedures," 23 February 1991.

Section R
Requirements

Contents

Related Topics

Insight

Requirement development is critical to program success. Military standards (MIL-STDs) cannot be blindly applied. Requirements must be tailored to the individual program situation considering the following:

- Mission Criticality

- Operational Environment

- Phase of Development

- Other Contract Provisions (incentives, warranties, etc.)

- Off-The-Shelf Versus Newly Designed Hardware

For More Information

MIL-STD-470	"Maintainability Program for Systems and Equipment"
MIL-STD-721	"Definition of Terms for Reliability and Maintainability"
MIL-STD-785	"Reliability Program for Systems and Equipment Development and Production"
MIL-STD-2165	"Testability Programs for Electronic Systems and Equipment"
DODD 5000.1	"Defense Acquistion"
DODI 5000.2	"Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures"
RADC-TR-89-45	"A Government Program Manager's Testability/Diagnostic Guide"
RADC-TR-90-31	"A Contractor Program Manager's Testability Diagnostic Guide"
RADC-TR-90-239	"Testability/Diagnostics Design Encyclopedia"
RL-TR-91-200	"Automated Testability Decision Tool"

Topic R1: Quantitative Reliability Requirements

Scope of Requirements

Reliability parameters expressed by operational users and ones specified in contractual documents take many forms. Tables R1-1 and R1-2 identify the characteristics of reliability parameters.

Table R1-1: Logistics (Basic) and Mission Reliability Characteristics

Logistics (Basic) Reliability	Mission Reliability
• Measure of system's ability to operate without logistics support	• Measure of system's ability to complete mission
• Recognize effects of all occurrences that demand support without regard to effect on mission	• Consider only failures that cause mission abort
• Degraded by redundancy	• Improved by redundancy
• Usually equal to or lower than mission reliability	• Usually higher than logistics reliability

Table R1-2: Operational and Contractual Reliability Characteristics

Contractual Reliability	Operational Reliability
• Used to define, measure and evaluate contractor's program	• Used to describe reliability performance when operated in planned environment
• Derived from operational needs	• Not used for contract reliability requirements (requires translation)
• Selected such that achieving them allows projected satisfaction of operational reliability	• Used to describe needed level of reliability performance
• Expressed in inherent values	
• Account only for failure events subject to contractor control	• Include combined effects of item design, quality, installation environment, maintenance policy, repair, etc.
• Include only design and manufacturing characteristics	

Contractual Reliability	Operational Reliability

• Typical terms
  -   MTBF(mean-time-between-failures)
 	
  -   Mission MTBF (sometimes also called MTBCF)
	• Typical terms
	  - MTBM (mean-time-between-maintenance)
	
	  - MTBD (mean-time-between-demand)
	
	  - MTBR (mean-time-between-removal)
	
	  - MTBCF (mean-time-between-critical-failure)

Operational Constraints

- Mission Criticality

- Availability Constraints

- Self-Sufficiency Constraints

- Attended/Unattended Operation

- Operational Environment

- Use of Off-the-shelf or Newly Designed Equipment

How to Develop Requirements

Figure R1-1 defines the general reliability requirement development process. Key points to recognize from this process are:

1.   User requirements can be expressed in a variety of forms that include combinations of mission and logistics reliability, or they may combine reliability with maintainability in the form of availability. Conversion to commonly used operational terms such as mean-time-between-maintenance (MTBM) and mean-time-between-critical-failure (MTBCF) must be made from terms such as operational availability (A_0) and break-rate, etc., to enable translation to parameters which can be specified in contracts.

An example is:

$$A_0 = \frac{MTBM}{MTBM + MDT}$$

(Solve for MTBM using mean downtime (MDT) which includes the actual repair time plus logistics delay time.)

2.   Since operational reliability measures take into account factors beyond the control of development contractors, they must be translated to contractual reliability terms for which contractors can be held accountable. (Appendix 1 provides one means of accomplishing this translation.)

3.   The process cannot end with the translation to a contractual value. Evaluation of the realism of the translated requirements is a necessary step. Questions that have to be answered are: are the requirements compatible with the available technology and do the requirements unnecessarily drive the design (conflict with system constraints such as weight and power). Addressing these issues requires reviewing previous studies and data for similar systems. Adjustment factors may be appropriate for improvement of technology and for different operating environments, duty cycles, etc. See Topic A11 for Reliability Adjustment Factors.

4.   Systems with mission critical requirements expressed by the user present difficulties in the requirement development process. Translation models don't account for the nonexponential situations that exist with redundant systems. Because the reliabilities of redundant paths are high compared to serial ones, an approximation can be made that these paths have an equivalent failure rate of zero so that only the remaining serial elements need to be translated.

5.   The requirement process involves allocation of values to lower levels. In some cases, this is an iterative process requiring several tries to satisfy all requirements. For other cases, the requirements can't be satisfied and dialogue and tradeoffs with the user are required.

6.   For cases where user needs are not specified it still makes sense to invoke at least a logistics (basic) reliability requirement. In so doing, the contractor has a degree of accountability and is likely to put more effort into designing a reliable system.

7.   Table R1-3 indicates typical ranges of MTBF for different types of electronic systems.

Table R1-3: Typical MTBF Values

Radar Systems	MTBF (Hours)
Ground Rotating Search Radar	100-200
Large Fixed Phase Array Radar	5-10
Tactical Ground Mobile Radar	50-100
Airborne Fighter Fire Control Radar	50-200
Airborne Search Radar	300-500
Airborne Identification Radar	200-2,000
Airborne Navigation Radar	300-4,500

Communications Equipment	MTBF (Hours)
Ground Radio	5,000-20,000
Portable Ground Radio	1,000-3,000
Airborne Radio	500-10,000
Ground Jammer	500-2,000

Ground Computer Equipment	MTBF (Hours)
Workstation	2,000-4,500
Personal Computer (CPU) 286/386/486	1,000-5,000
Monochrome Display	10,000-15,000
Color Display	5,000-10,000
40-100 Megabyte Hard Disk Drive	10,000-20,000
Floppy Disk/Drive	12,000-30,000
Tape Drive	7,500-12,000
CD/ROM	10,000-20,000
Keyboard	30,000-60,000
Dot Matrix, Low Speed, Printer	2,000-4,000
Impact, High Speed, Printer	3,000-12,000
Thermal Printer	10,000-20,000
Plotter	30,000-40,000
Modem	20,000-30,000
Mouse	50,000-200,000
Clock	150,000-200,000

Miscellaneous Equipment	MTBF (Hours)
Airborne Countermeasures System	50-300
Airborne Power Supply	2,000-20,000
Ground Power Supply	10,000-50,000
IEEE Bus	50,000-100,000
Ethernet	35,000-50,000

**Figure R1-1: Quantitative Reliability Requirement
Development Process**

Figure R1-1 Notes:

1. User Needs Cases

Case	Logistics Reliability	Mission Reliability	Comments
1	Specified	Specified	
2	Specified	Not specified	Delete steps D, H, I
3	Not specified	Specified	
4	Not specified	Not specified	Delete steps D, H, I

2. A 10-20% reliability improvement factor is reasonable for advancement of technology.

3. Adjustment of data to use environment may be required (see Topic A11). See Appendix 8 for R&M data sources.

4. Reliability requirements necessitating redundancy add weight, cost and power.

5. Alternate forms of user requirements should be converted to MTBM's to enable translation.

Topic R2: Quantitative Maintainability Requirements

Scope of Requirements

Unique maintainability parameters need to be specified for three basic levels of repair:

- **Organizational Level:** Repair at the system location. Usually involves replacing plug-in modules and other items with relatively short isolation and replacement times.

- **Intermediate Level:** Repair at an intermediate shop facility which has more extensive capabilities to repair lower hardware indenture levels.

- **Depot Level:** Highly specialized repair facility capable of making repairs at all hardware indenture levels. Sometimes the original equipment manufacturer.

Recent Air Force policy has promoted the concept of two level maintenance in place of the traditional three level system. Under this concept the classification is:

- **On-equipment:** Maintenance actions accomplished on complete end items.

- **Off-equipment:** In-shop maintenance actions performed on removed components.

Parameters which need to be specified vary with the level of repair being considered. Key maintainability parameters include:

- **Mean time to repair (MTTR):** Average time required to bring system from a failed state to an operational state. Strictly design dependent. Assumes maintenance personnel and spares are on hand (i.e., does not include logistics delay time). MTTR is used interchangeably with mean corrective maintenance time (Mct).

- **Mean maintenance manhours (M-MMH):** Total manpower per year (expressed in manhours) required to keep the system operating (not including logistics delay time).

- **Mean time to restore system (MTTRS):** The average time it takes to restore a system from a failed state to an operable state, including logistics delay time MTTRS = logistics delay time + MTTR). Logistics delay time includes all time to obtain spares and personnel to start the repair.

- **Preventive maintenance (PM):** Time associated with the performance of all required preventive maintenance. Usually expressed in terms of hours per year.

Operational Constraints

Basic maintainability requirements are determined through an analysis of user operational constraints. Operational constraints include:

- Operating hours per unit calendar time and/or per mission

- Downtime, maintenance time, or availability constraints

- Mobility requirements

- Attended/unattended operation

- Self-sufficiency constraints

- Reaction time

- Operational environment (e.g., chemical, biological and nuclear)

- Skill levels of maintenance personnel

- Manning

- Types of diagnostics and maintenance support equipment which can be made available or implemented (built-in test, manual test equipment, external automatic test equipment, etc.).

- Levels at which repair takes place

- Use of off-the-shelf equipment versus newly designed equipment

How to Develop Requirements

The best guidance available is to provide a range of typical values usually applied for each parameter.

Table R2-1: Typical Maintainability Values

	Organizational	Intermediate	Depot
MTTR	.5 - 1.5 hr	.5 - 3 hr	1 -4 hr
M-MMH	Note 1	Note 1	Note 1
MTTRS	1 - 8 Hrs (Note 2)	NA	NA
PM	2 - 15 hr/yr	NA	NA

Notes:

1. M-MMH depends on the number of repair visits to be made, the MTTR for each repair visit and the number of maintenance personnel required for each visit. Typical calculations of the mean maintenance manhours per year include:

    a. Immediate maintenance of a continuously operated system: M-MMH = (8760 hr/yr)/(MTBF) x (MTTR) x (maintenance personnel per repair) + (PM hours per year) x (Maintenance personnel).

    b. Delayed maintenance of a fault tolerant system: M-MMH = (number of expected repair visits) x (time for each visit) x (maintenance personnel per visit) + (PM hours per year) x (Maintenance personnel).

    c. Maintenance of a continuously operated redundant system allowed to operate until failure. M-MMH = (8760 hr/yr)/(MTBCF) x (time for each visit) x (maintenance personnel per visit) + (PM hours per year) x (Maintenance personnel).

    Time for each visit is the number of repairs to be made times the MTTR for each repair if repairs are made in series.

2. For unique systems that are highly redundant, MTTRS may be specified as the switch time.

Topic R3: Quantitative Testability/Diagnostic Requirements

Scope of Requirements

Testability/Diagnostics functions and parameters that apply to each repair level:

- **Fault Detection:** A process which discovers the existence of faults.

- **Fault Isolation:** Where a fault is known to exist, a process which identifies one or more replaceable units where the fault(s) may be located.

- **False Alarms:** An indication of a fault where no fault exists such as operator error or Built-in Test (BIT) design deficiency.

Testability/Diagnostic requirements are sometimes expressed in the form of rates or fractions such as:

- **Fraction of Faults Detected (FFD):** The quantity of faults detected by BIT or External Test Equipment (ETE) divided by the quantity of faults detected by all fault detection means (including manual).

  - **System and Equipment Level** - FFD is usually weighted by the measured or predicted failure rates of the faults or replaceable units.

  - **Microcircuit Leve**l - FFD is called **fault coverage** or **fault detection coverage**, and all faults are weighted equally. In the fault-tolerant design community, "fault coverage" almost invariably refers to fault recovery coverage. This is usually expressed as the conditional probability that, given a fault has occurred and has been detected, the system will recover.

- **Fault Isolation Resolution (FIR):** The probability that any detected fault can be isolated by BIT or ETE to an ambiguity group of size "x" or less. (Typically specified for several values of "x").

- **False Alarm Rate (FAR):** The frequency of occurrence of false alarms.

Scope of Diagnostics

- **Embedded:** Defined as any portion of the weapon system's diagnostic capability that is an integral part of the prime system.

- **External:** Any portion of the diagnostic capability that is not embedded.

- **Manual:** Testing that requires the use of technical manuals, troubleshooting procedures, and general-purpose test equipment (e.g., voltmeter) by a maintenance technician.

- **Test Program Set (TPS):** The complete collection of data and hardware necessary to test a specific Unit Under Test (UUT) on a specific Automatic Test Equipment (ATE). As a minimum, a TPS consists of:

    - Test vector sets (for a digital UUT)

    - Test application programs (software that executes on the ATE and applies the vectors under the necessary conditions)

    - Test fixtures and ATE configuration files

    - Documentation

A major element of external diagnostics involves the following:

- **Automatic Test Equipment (ATE):** The apparatus with which the actual UUT will be tested. ATE for digital UUTs has the capability to apply sequences of test vectors under specified timing, loading, and forcing conditions.

How to Develop Requirements

In theory, weapon system diagnostic requirements should be developed as an out-growth of the user developed mission and performance requirements contained in a Mission Need Statement (MNS), Operational Requirements Document (ORD) or similar type document.

The following should also be considered:

- Diagnostic capability realistically achievable with the selected hardware technology and software complexity.

- Tradeoffs involving reliability, maintainability, logistics, weight, power requirements, and system interruption.

Table R3-1: Typical Testability Values

		% Capability	Repair Level
Fault Detection (All Means)		90-100	Organizational
		100	Intermediate
		100	Depot
Fault Detection:	BIT & ETE	90-98	Organizational
	BIT & ETE	95-98	Intermediate
	BIT & ETE	95-100	Depot
Fault Isolation Resolution			
Three or fewer LRUs		100	Organizational
One LRU		90-95	Organizational
Four or fewer SRUs		100	Intermediate
One SRU		75-85	Intermediate

Notes:

LRU - Line-Replaceable Unit (e.g., Box, Power Supply, etc.)
SRU - Shop-Replaceable Unit (e.g., Circuit Card)
BIT - Built-in-Test
ETE - External Test Equipment

Topic R4: Program Phase Terminology

The R&M tasks required on a program are based on the program's development phase and intended application (ground, airborne, space, etc.).

Table R4-1: Acquisition Phase Purposes and Corresponding Scope of R&M Requirements

Acquisition Phase	Phase Purpose	Scope of the R&M Requirements
1. Research	• Expansion of knowledge in a scientific area • Paper study • Usually no hardware developed	• No structured R&M tasks
2. Exploratory Development (Concept Exploration and Definition)	• Study and analysis of a specific military problem • Consideration of alternative solutions	• Usually no structured R&M tasks. R&M tradeoff studies may be considered
3. Advanced Development (Demonstration and Validation)	• Develop hardware to solve a specific military problem	
Laboratory Test Vehicle	• Development of a system/ equipment which is not intended for operational use	• Only minimum R&M requirements are needed (e.g., data collection)
Field Use (Limited Quantity)	• Development of very small quantities (1 or 2) of specialized equipment/systems	• Moderate R&M requirements are usually specified to provide reasonable reliability and minimum logistics costs
High Potential for Further Development	• This is the category of true advanced development with the purpose of building and testing hardware for proving concepts. The hardware is not intended for operational use.	• Moderate R&M requirements are needed (e.g., R&M prediction, part derating, FRACAS, limited parts control)
Likely to Go Directly to Production	• Advanced development hardware is being developed for production prototype purposes	• Significant R&M requirements are necessary (e.g., R&M prediction, part derating, parts control, FRACAS)

4. Full Scale Development (Engineering and Manufacturing Development)
   - Develop and test a prototype model for production purposes
   - Extensive R&M requirements are considered necessary (e.g., all the above plus testing)

5. Production and Development
   - To build, test and accept operational units without degrading the capabilities previously designed into the hardware
   - Emphasis is on quality assurance and ESS tasks

Rome Laboratory experience has shown that Advanced Development programs have a range of purposes varied enough to warrant different R&M Requirements.

For the purpose of the remaining discussions on R&M task priorities (Topic R5), the four most common cases in the three most common environments (Ground, Airborne & Space) are addressed:

Advanced Development (or Demonstration and Validation): This category is the "normal" advanced development model situation above designated as "High Potential for Further Development."

Full Scale Development (or Engineering and Manufacturing Development): As described above.

Production and Development: As described above.

Off-Shelf Buys: This category can be either an advanced development model or full scale development when the equipment being acquired is already designed, or modified only slightly.

Topic R5: Reliability and Maintainability Task Application/Priorities

R&M PROGRAM TASKS	Adv Dev Model (New Design)			Full Scale Development (New Design)			Production			Off-the-Shelf Hardware			Recommended Data Items (See Notes Below)
	Gmd	Abme	Space	Gmd	Abme	Space	Gmd	Abme	Space	Gmd	Abme	Space	
Program Surveillance and Control Tasks													
• R&M&T Design Reviews	R	R	R	R	R	R				R	R	R	• DI-R-7080 & DI-MNTY-80823
• Failure Reporting & Corrective Action System (FRACAS)	E4	E5	E6	E3	E4	E5	E1	E1	E2	E1	E1	E1	• DI-RELI-80255
• Failure Review Board				O	O	R	O	O	R				• Incl in DI-R-7080
• Subcontractor Control				R	R	R	R	R	R	E3	E3	E3	• Incl in DI-R-7080
Design & Analysis Tasks													
• Part Selection and Control	E1	E1	E1	E1	E1	E1				E1	E1	E1	• DI-MIS-80071A
• Part Derating	E2	E2	E2	E2	E2	E2							• See Topic D1 • Incl in DI-R-7095
• Failure Modes, Effects & Criticality Analysis (FMECA)	O	O	E4	O	R	E4							• DI-R-7085A
• R&M&T Prediction & Allocation	E3	E4	E5	E5	E7	E6				E5	E5	E5	• DI-R-7094, 7095 & DI-MNTY-80827
• Sneak Circuit Analysis		O		O	O	R	O	O	O				• DI-R-7083
• Critical Items	O	O	O	R	O	E8							• DI-RELI-80685
• Thermal Management & Analysis	O	R	R	E3	E3	E3	E2	E2	O	E2	E2	E2	• Incl in DI-R-7095
• Effects of Storage, Handling, etc.		E3	E3	R	R	R	O	O	O				• Incl in DI-R-7095
Test & Evaluation Tasks													
• Reliability Qualification Test				E4	E6	E6							• DI-RELI-80250, 80251, 80252
• Maintainability Demo Test				E6	E8	E8							• DI-MNTY-80831, 80832
• Testability Demonstration				O	O	P				O	O	O	• DI-MNTY-80831
• Environmental Stress Screening (ESS)				P	P	P	E2	E2	E1	E4	E4	E4	• Incl in DI-RELI-80255
• Production Reliability Acceptance Tests					E3	E3	E3	E3					• DI-RELI-80251, 80252
• Reliability Growth Testing	O	O	O	O	E5	E7	O	O	O	O	O	O	• Incl in DI-R-7080

Key: E = Essential (1-Highest Priority) R= Recommended P = Plan For O = Optional

Notes:
1. See Topic R6 for a complete list of data items and delivery dates.
2. See Appendix 2 for sample statement of work and specification paragraphs.

Topic R6: Contract Data Requirements

In order for the government to receive outputs from the required contractor performed tasks, the appropriate deliverables must be specified in the Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL). The content of these CDRL items is specified by reference to standard Data Item Descriptions. The timing and frequency of the required reports must be specified in the CDRL.

Table R6-1: Data Items & Delivery Dates

	Title	Recommended Delivery Date
Reliability		
DI-R-7079	Reliability Program Plan	90 days prior to PDR
DI-R-7080	Reliability Status Report	90 days prior to PDR & bimonthly
DI-R-7083	Sneak Circuit Analysis Report	30 days prior to PDR & CDR
DI-R-7085A	FMECA Report	30 days prior to CDR
DI-R-7086	FMECA Plan	90 days prior to PDR
DI-R-7094	Reliability Block Diagram & Math Model Report	30 days prior to PDR & CDR
DI-R-7095	Reliability Prediction & Documentation of Supporting Data	30 days prior to PDR & CDR
DI-R-7100	Reliability Report for Exploratory Development Models	30 days prior to end of contract
DI-RELI-80247	Thermal Survey Report	30 days prior to PDR & after testing
DI-RELI-80248	Vibration Survey Report	90 days prior to start of testing
DI-RELI-80249	Burn-in Test Report	60 days after end of testing
DI-RELI-80250	Reliability Test Plan	90 days prior to start of testing
DI-RELI-80251	Reliability Test Procedures	30 days prior to start of testing
DI-RELI-80252	Reliability Test Report	60 days after end of testing
DI-RELI-80253	Failed Item Analysis Report	As required
DI-RELI-80254	Corrective Action Plan	30 days after end of testing

	Title	Recommended Delivery Date
DI-RELI-80255	Failure Summary & Analysis Report	Start of testing, monthly
DI-RELI-80685	Critical Item Control Plan	30 days prior to PDR
DI-MISC-80071	Part Approval Request	As Required

Maintainability

	Title	Recommended Delivery Date
DI-MNTY-80822	Maintainability Program Plan	90 days prior to PDR
DI-MNTY-80823	Maintainability Status Report	90 days prior to PDR & bimonthly
DI-MNTY-80824	Data Collection, Analysis & Corrective Action System Reports	As Required
DI-MNTY-80825	Maintainability Modeling Report	30 days prior to PDR & CDR
DI-MNTY-80826	Maintainability Allocations Report	30 days prior to PDR & CDR
DI-MNTY-80827	Maintainability Predictions Report	30 days prior to PDR & CDR
DI-MNTY-80828	Maintainability Analysis Report	30 days prior to PDR & CDR
DI-MNTY-80829	Maintainability Design Criteria Plan	90 days prior to PDR
DI-MNTY-80830	Inputs to the Detailed Maintenance Plan & Logistics Support	As required
DI-MNTY-80831	Maintainability Demonstration Test Plan	90 days prior to start of testing
DI-MNTY-80832	Maintainability Demonstration Report	30 days after end of testing

Testability

	Title	Recommended Delivery Date
DI-R-7080 & DI-RELI-80255	(See Reliability & Maintainability Data Item List)	
DI-MNTY-80831 & 80832	(See Maintainability Data Item List)	
DI-T-7198	Testability Program Plan	90 Days prior to PDR
DI-T-7199	Testability Analysis Report	30 days prior to PDR & CDR

Topic R7: R&M Information for Proposals

Proposal preparation guidance should be provided in the request for proposal (RFP) package to guide the contractor in providing the information most needed to properly evaluate the R&M area during source selection. This is part of the requirements definition process.

Depending on the scope of the R&M requirements specified, information such as the following should be requested for inclusion in the proposal:

- Preliminary R&M analysis/models and estimates of values to be achieved (to at least the line replaceable unit (LRU) level)

- Design approach (including thermal design, parts derating, and parts control)

- R&M organization and its role in the overall program

- Key R&M personnel experience

- Schedules for all R&M tasks

- Description of R&M design guidelines/criteria to be used and trade studies and testing to be performed

Note:

It is critical that qualified R&M personnel take part in the actual evaluation of technical proposals. The R&M engineer should make sure this happens by agreement with program management.

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Insight

The criteria for evaluation of contractor proposals has to match the requirements specified in the Request for Proposal (RFP). Contractors must be scored by comparing their proposals to the criteria, not to each other. R&M are generally evaluated as parts of the technical area. The total source selection process includes other nontechnical areas. Air Force policy has emphasized the importance of R&M in the source selection process.

For More Information

AFR 70-15   "Source Selection Policy and Procedures"

AFR 70-30   "Streamlined Source Selection Procedures"

Topic S1: Proposal Evaluation for Reliability and Maintainability

Understanding

- Does the contractor show understanding of the importance of designing in R&M&T in the effort?

- Does the contractor show a firm understanding of R&M&T techniques, methodology, and concepts?

- Does the contractor indicate understanding of the role of testability/diagnostics on maintainability and maintenance?

- Does the contractor understand integrated diagnostics design principles?

- Does the contractor note similar successful R&M&T efforts?

Approach

- **Management**
    - Is an R&M&T manager identified, and are his/her experience and qualifications adequate in light of the scope of the overall program?

    - Are the number and experience of R&M&T personnel assigned to the program, and the number of manhours adequate, judged in accordance with the scope of the overall program?

    - Does the R&M&T group have adequate stature and authority in the organizational framework of the program (e.g., they should not fall under direct control of the design group)?

    - Does the R&M&T group have an effective means of crosstalk and feedback of information between design engineers and higher management?

    - Does the R&M&T manager have adequate control over R&M&T for subcontractors and vendors?

    - Is the testability diagnostics function integrated into the R&M program?

      Does the contractor utilize concurrent engineering practices and is the R&M&T group represented on the team?

- **Design**
    - Are design standards, guidelines and criteria such as part derating, thermal design, modular construction, Environmental Stress Screening (ESS), and testability cited?

- Is the contractor's failure reporting and corrective action system (FRACAS) a closed loop controlled process?

- Is there a commitment to the required parts control program (e.g., MIL-M-38510, MIL-STD-883, etc.)? Are approval procedures described/proposed for nonstandard parts?

- Are system design reviews (internal and external) required regularly?

- Are tradeoff studies proposed for critical design areas?

- Is a time-phasing of R&M&T tasks provided along with key program milestones?

- Are areas of R&M&T risk identified and discussed?

- Does the contractor include consideration of software reliability?

- Does the contractor describe his plan for testability/diagnostics design and the potential impacts on reliability and maintainability?

- Does the contractor identify tools to be used to generate test vectors and other diagnostic procedures for BIT and ATE (automatic test equipment)?

- **Analysis/Test**
    - Are methods of analysis and math models presented?

    - Are the R&M&T prediction and allocation procedures described?

    - Has the time phasing of the R&M&T testing been discussed, and is it consistent with the overall program schedule?

    - Is adequate time available for the test type required (such as maximum time for sequential test)?

    - Is the ESS program consistent with the requirements in terms of methodology and scheduling?

    - Does the contractor make a commitment to predict the design requirement MTBF prior to the start of testing?

    - Are the resources (test chambers, special equipment, etc.) needed to perform all required testing identified and, is a commitment made to their availability?

Compliance

- **Design**
  - Does the contractor indicate compliance with all required military specifications for reliability, maintainability and testability?

  - Is adequate justification (models, preliminary estimates, data sources, etc.) provided to backup the claims of meeting R&M&T requirements?

  - Is there an explicit commitment to meet any ease of maintenance and preventive maintenance requirements?

  - Is there an explicit commitment to meet the Built-in-Test (BIT)/Fault-isolation Test (FIT) requirements (Fraction of Faults Detected (FFD), Fault Isolation Resolution (FIR) and False Alarm Rate (FAR))?

  - Is each equipment environmental limitation specified and do these conditions satisfy the system requirements?

  - Are all removable modules keyed?

  - Will derating requirements be adhered to and are methods of verifying derating requirements discussed?

- **Analysis/Test**
  - Is a commitment made to perform a detailed thermal analysis?

  - Will the contractor comply with all R&M&T required analyses?

  - Is there an explicit commitment to perform all required environmental stress screening?

  - Does the contractor comply with all system level R&M&T test requirements? Will the contractor demonstrate the R&M&T figures of merit (MTBF, MTTR, FFD, FIR and FAR) using the specified accept/reject criteria?

  - Does the contractor comply with the specification (or other commonly specified) failure definitions?

  - Does the contractor agree to perform thermal verification tests and derating verification tests?

- **Data**
  - Is there an explicit commitment to deliver and comply with all of the required R&M&T data items?

Contents

For More Information

MIL-STD-883	"Test Methods and Procedures for Microelectronics"
MIL-STD-965	"Parts Control Program"
MIL-STD-1521	"Technical Reviews and Audits for Systems, Equipments, and Computer Software"
MIL-HDBK-251	"Reliability/Design Thermal Applications"
MIL-HDBK-338	"Electronic Reliability Design Handbook"
MIL-HDBK-978	"NASA Parts Application Handbook"
MIL-M-38510	"Microcircuits, General Specification for"
MIL-S-19500	"Semiconductor Devices, General Specification for"
RADC-TR-82-172	"RADC Thermal Guide for Reliability Engineers"
RADC-TR-88-69	"R/M/T Design for Fault Tolerance, Program Manager's Guide"
RADC-TR-88-110	"Reliability/Maintainability/Testability Design for Dormancy"
RADC-TR-88-124	"Impact of Fiber Optics on System Reliability/Maintainability"
RL-TR-91-39	"Reliability Design for Fault Tolerant Power Supplies"
RL-TR-92-11	"Advanced Technology Component Derating"

Topic D1: Part Stress Derating

The practice of limiting electrical, thermal and mechanical stresses on parts to levels below their specified ratings is called derating. If a system is expected to be reliable, one of the major contributing factors must be a conservative design approach incorporating realistic derating of parts. Table D1-1 defines the key factors for determining the appropriate level of derating for the given system constraints. Table D1-2 indicates the specific derating factors for each part type.

Table D1-1: Part Derating Level Determination

Factors		**Score**
Reliability Challenge	• For *proven design*, achievable with standard parts/circuits	1
	• For high reliability requirements, *special design features* needed	2
	• For new design challenging the state-of-the-art, *new concept*	3
System Repair	• For *easily accessible,* quickly and economically repaired systems	1
	• For high repair cost, limited access, *high skill levels required,* very low downtimes allowable	2
	• For *nonaccessible repair,* or economically unjustifiable repairs	3
Safety	• For *routine safety* program, no expected problems	1
	• For potential system or equipment *high cost* damage	2
	• For potential *jeopardization of life* of personnel	3
Size, Weight	• For no significant design limitation, *standard practices*	1
	• For special *design features* needed, difficult requirements	2
	• For new concepts needed, severe design limitation	3
Life Cycle	• For *economical repairs,* no unusual spare part costs expected	1
	• For potentially *high repair cost* or unique cost spares	2
	• For systems that may require *complete substitution*	3

Instructions: Select score for each factor, sum and determine derating level or parameter.

Derating Level	Total Score
I	11 - 15
II	7 - 10
III	6 or less

Table D1-2: Part Derating Levels

All of the percentages provided are of the rated value for the derating parameter, unless otherwise labeled. Temperature derating is from the maximum rated.

Part Type	Derating Parameter	Derating Level I	II	III
Capacitors				
• Film, Mica, Glass	DC Voltage	50%	60%	60%
	Temp from Max Limit	10°C	10°C	10°C
• Ceramic	DC Voltage	50%	60%	60%
	Temp from Max Limit	10°C	10°C	10°C
• Electrolytic Aluminum	DC Voltage	--	--	80%
	Temp from Max Limit	--	--	20°C
• Electrolytic Tantalum	DC Voltage	50%	60%	60%
	Temp from Max Limit	20°C	20°C	20°C
• Solid Tantalum	DC Voltage	50%	60%	60%
	Max Operating Temp	85°C	85°C	85°C
• Variable Piston	DC Voltage	40%	50%	50%
	Temp from Max Limit	10°C	10°C	10°C
• Variable Ceramic	DC Voltage	30%	50%	50%
	Temp from Max Limit	10°C	10°C	10°C
Connectors				
	Voltage	50%	70%	70%
	Current	50%	70%	70%
	Insert Temp from Max Limit	50°C	25°C	25°C
Diodes				
• Signal/Switch (Axial Lead)	Forward Current	50%	65%	75%
	Reverse Voltage	70%	70%	70%
	Max Junction Temp	95°C	105°C	125°C
• Voltage Regulator	Power Dissipation	50%	60%	70%
	Max Junction Temp	95°C	105°C	125°C
• Voltage Reference	Max Junction Temp	95°C	105°C	125°C

Part Type	Derating Parameter	Derating Level		
		I	**II**	**III**
Diodes (cont'd)				
• Transient Suppressor	Power Dissipation	50%	60%	70%
	Average Current	50%	65%	75%
	Max Junction Temp	95°C	105°C	125°C
• Microwave	Power Dissipation	50%	60%	70%
	Reverse Voltage	70%	70%	70%
	Max Junction Temp	95°C	105°C	125°C
• Light Emitting Diode (LED)	Average Forward Current	50%	65%	75%
	Max Junction Temp	95°C	105°C	125°C
• Schottky/Positive Intrinsic Negative (PIN) (Axial Lead)	Power Dissipation	50%	60%	70%
	Reverse Voltage	70%	70%	70%
	Max Junction Temp	95°C	105°C	125°C
• Power Rectifier	Forward Current	50%	65%	75%
	Reverse Voltage	70%	70%	70%
	Max Junction Temp	95°C	105°C	125°C
Fiber Optics				
• Cable	Bend Radius (% of Minimum Rated)	200%	200%	200%
	Cable Tension (% Rated Tensile Strength)	50%	50%	50%
	Fiber Tension (% Proof Test)	20%	20%	20%
Inductors				
• Pulse Transformers	Operating Current	60%	60%	60%
	Dielectric Voltage	50%	50%	50%
	Temp from Max Hot Spot	40°C	25°C	15°C
• Coils	Operating Current	60%	60%	60%
	Dielectric Voltage	50%	50%	50%
	Temp from Max Hot Spot	40°C	25°C	15°C
Lamps				
• Incandescent	Voltage	94%	94%	94%
• Neon	Current	94%	94%	94%

Microcircuits: This derating criteria is based on available data and is limited to: 60,000 gates for digital devices, 10,000 transistors for linear devices, and 1 Mbit for memory devices. Microcircuits should not exceed supplier minimum or maximum rating for supply voltage, 125°C junction temperature (except GaAs), or supplier maximum.

Part Type	Derating Parameter	Derating Level		
		I	II	III
Microcircuits				
• MOS Digital	Supply Voltage	+/-3%	+/-5%	+/-5%
	Frequency (% of Max Spec)	80%	80%	80%
	Output Current	70%	75%	80%
	Fan Out	80%	80%	90%
	Max Junction Temp	80°C	110°C	125°C
• MOS Linear	Supply Voltage	+/-3%	+/-5%	+/-5%
	Input Voltage	60%	70%	70%
	Frequency (% of Max Spec)	80%	80%	80%
	Output Current	70%	75%	80%
	Fan Out	80%	80%	90%
	Max Junction Temp	85°C	110°C	125°C
• Bipolar Digital	Supply Voltage	+/-3%	+/-5%	+/-5%
	Frequency (% of Max Spec)	75%	80%	90%
	Output Current	70%	75%	80%
	Fan Out	70%	75%	80%
	Max Junction Temp	80°C	110°C	125°C
• Bipolar Linear	Supply Voltage	+/-3%	+/-5%	+/-5%
	Input Voltage	60%	70%	70%
	Frequency (% of Max Spec)	75%	80%	90%
	Output Current	70%	75%	80%
	Fan Out	70%	75%	80%
	Max Junction Temp	85°C	110°C	125°C
Microprocessors				
• MOS	Supply Voltage	+/-3%	+/-5%	+/-5%
	Frequency (% of Max Spec)	80%	80%	80%
	Output Current	70%	75%	80%
	Fan Out	80%	80%	90%
	Max Junction Temp, 8-BIT	120°C	125°C	125°C
	Max Junction Temp, 16-BIT	90°C	125°C	125°C
	Max Junction Temp, 32-BIT	60°C	100°C	125°C

Part Type	Derating Parameter	Derating Level		
		I	II	III
Microprocessors (cont'd)				
• Bipolar	Supply Voltage	+/-3%	+/-5%	+/-5%
	Frequency (% of Max Spec)	75%	80%	90%
	Output Current	70%	75%	80%
	Fan Out	70%	75%	80%
	Max Junction Temp, 8-BIT	80°C	110°C	125°C
	Max Junction Temp, 16-BIT	70°C	110°C	125°C
	Max Junction Temp, 32-BIT	60°C	100°C	125°C
Memory/PROM				
• MOS	Supply Voltage	+/-3%	+/-5%	+/-5%
	Frequency (% of Max Spec)	80%	80%	90%
	Output Current	70%	75%	80%
	Max Junction Temp	125°C	125°C	125°C
	Max Write Cycles (EEPROM)	13,000	105,000	300,000
• Bipolar	Fixed Supply Voltage	+/-3%	+/-5%	+/-5%
	Frequency (% of Max Spec)	80%	90%	95%
	Output Current	70%	75%	80%
	Max Junction Temp	125°C	125°C	125°C
Microcircuits, GaAs				
• MMIC/Digital	Max Channel Temp	90°C	125°C	150°C
Miscellaneous				
• Circuit Breakers	Current	75%	80%	80%
• Fuses	Current	50%	50%	50%
Optoelectronic Devices				
• Photo Transistor	Max Junction Temp	95°C	105°C	125°C
• Avalanche Photo Diode (APD)	Max Junction Temp	95°C	105°C	125°C
• Photo Diode, PIN (Positive Intrinsic Negative)	Reverse Voltage	70%	70%	70%
	Max Junction Temp	95°C	105°C	125°C
• Injection Laser Diode	Power Output	50%	60%	70%
	Max Junction Temp	95°C	105°C	110°C

Part Type	Derating Parameter	Derating Level		
		I	II	III
Relays				
	Resistive Load Current	50%	75%	75%
	Capacitive Load Current	50%	75%	75%
	Inductive Load Current	35%	40%	40%
	Contact Power	40%	50%	50%
	Temp from Max Limit	20°C	20°C	20°C
Resistors				
• Composition	Power Dissipation	50%	50%	50%
	Temp from Max Limit	30°C	30°C	30°C
• Film	Power Dissipation	50%	50%	50%
	Temp from Max Limit	40°C	40°C	40°C
• Variable	Power Dissipation	50%	50%	50%
	Temp from Max Limit	45°C	35°C	35°C
• Thermistor	Power Dissipation	50%	50%	50%
	Temp from Max Limit	20°C	20°C	20°C
• Wirewound Accurate	Power Dissipation	50%	50%	50%
	Temp from Max Limit	10°C	10°C	10°C
• Wirewound Power	Power Dissipation	50%	50%	50%
	Temp from Max Limit	125°C	125°C	125°C
• Thick/Thin Film	Power	50%	50%	50%
	Voltage	75%	75%	75%
	Max Operating Temp	80°C	80°C	80°C
Transistors (Power)				
• Silicon Bipolar	Power Dissipation	50%	60%	70%
	V_{ce}, Collector-Emitter Voltage	70%	75%	80%
	I_c, Collector Current	60%	65%	70%
	Breakdown Voltage	65%	85%	90%
	Max Junction Temp	95°C	125°C	135°C
• GaAs MESFET	Power Dissipation	50%	60%	70%
	Breakdown Voltage	60%	70%	70%
	Max Channel Temp	85°C	100°C	125°C
• Silicon MOSFET	Power Dissipation	50%	65%	75%
	Breakdown Voltage	60%	70%	75%
	Max Junction Temp	95°C	120°C	140°C

Part Type	Derating Parameter	Derating Level		
		I	II	III
Transistors (RF Pulse)				
• Silicon Bipolar	Power Dissipation	50%	60%	70%
	Vce, Collector-Emitter Voltage	70%	70%	70%
	I_c, Collector Current	60%	60%	60%
	Breakdown Voltage	65%	85%	90%
	Max Junction Temp	95°C	125°C	135°C
• GaAs MESFET	Power Dissipation	50%	60%	70%
	Breakdown Voltage	60%	70%	70%
	Max Channel Temp	85°C	100°C	125°C
Transistors (Thyristors)				
• SCR & TRIAC	On-State Current	50%	70%	70%
	Off-State Voltage	70%	70%	70%
	Max Junction Temp	95°C	105°C	125°C
Tubes				
	Power Output	80%	80%	80%
	Power Reflected	50%	50%	50%
	Duty Cycle	75%	75%	75%
Rotating Devices				
	Bearing Load	75%	90%	90%
	Temp from Max Limit	40°C	25°C	15°C
Surface Acoustic Wave Device (SAW)				
	Input Power from Max Limit (Freq > 500 MHz)	13dBm	13dBm	13dBm
	Input Power from Max Limit (Freq < 500 MHz)	18dBm	18dBm	18dBm
	Operating Temperature	125°C	125°C	125°C
Switches				
	Resistive Load Current	50%	75%	75%
	Capacitive Load Current	50%	75%	75%
	Inductive Load Current	35%	40%	40%
	Contact Power	40%	50%	50%

Topic D2: Thermal Design

One of the important variables in system reliability is temperature. Therefore, the thermal design of a system must be planned and evaluated. Full discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this document but it is important to point out to a reliability engineer what limitations there are for common thermal design approaches. Table D2-1 summarizes fundamental thermal design issues which should be addressed during system development. Table D2-2 summarizes the most common cooling techniques for electronics and their limitations. Analysis Topic A14 provides a basic method of estimating microcircuit junction temperatures for these cooling techniques.

Table D2-1: Thermal Design Issues

Issue	Concern
• **Thermal Requirements:** Has a thermal analysis requirement been incorporated into the system specification?	If not specified, a formal analysis probably will not be performed and there will be no possibility of independent review.
• **Cooling Allocation:** Has cooling been allocated down to each subsystem, box and LRU.	Cooling allocations should be made to the box level (or below) and refined as the thermal design matures.
• **Preliminary Thermal Analysis:** Has a preliminary analysis been performed using the manufacturer's specifications for power outputs?	This usually represents the worst case because manufacturers specify maximum power dissipations.
• **Detailed Thermal Analysis:** Has a detailed analysis been performed using actual power dissipations?	The preliminary analysis needs to be refined using actual power dissipations. Results need to feed into reliability predictions and derating analysis.
• **Thermal Analysis Assumptions:** - Have junction-to-case thermal resistance values been fully justified?	Optimistic values can have a significant effect on results. Thermal resistances from MIL-M-38510 should be used unless other values are justified.
- Does the thermal analysis make use of junction-to-ambient thermal resistances?	Junction-to-ambient values should not be used since they are highly dependent on coolant flow conditions.
- Are all modes and paths of heat transfer considered in the analysis?	The three modes are convection, conduction, and radiation. Rationale should be provided for omitting any heat transfer modes or paths.

Table D2-2: Cooling Technique Limitations

Cooling Technique	Maximum Cooling Capacity	Description
Impingement		
Free Convection		
Circuit Cards	.5 W/in^2	
Well Ventilated Box	300 W/ft^3	
Poorly Ventilated Box	100 W/ft^3	
Forced Air		
Circuit Cards	2 W/in^2	
Box	1000 W/ft^3	
Coldwall	1 W/in^2	
Flow-Through	2 W/in^2	

Example: A 9" x 5" printed circuit board using free convection cooling would be limited to about 22.5 watts.

Topic D3: Parts Control

Managing a parts control program is a highly specialized activity and does not typically fall under the system's R&M engineer's responsibility. However, because of the interrelationship of parts control and good system reliability, it is important that R&M engineers and program managers have a general understanding of the parts control discipline. Parts control questions which are often asked include:

- **Why do parts control?**

- **What are the various "tools" to accomplish parts control?**

- **What is a military specification "Mil-Spec" qualified part, a MIL-STD-883 part, a Standard Military Drawing (SMD) part, and a vendor equivalent part?**

Why do parts control? Since the invention of semiconductors, users could never be sure that a device purchased from one manufacturer would be an exact replacement for the same device obtained from another supplier. Major differences in device processing and electrical testing existed among suppliers. Because of the importance of semiconductors to military programs, the government introduced standard methods of testing and screening devices in 1968. Devices which were tested and screened to these methods were then placed on a government approval list called the qualified parts list (QPL). Through this screening and testing process, a part with known quality and performance characteristics is produced. The philosophy for assuring quality product has evolved since 1968 and now there are two methodologies in place, the original QPL program and the new Qualified Manufacturer's List (QML) program (established 1985). The QML approach defines a procedure that certifies and qualifies the manufacturing processes and materials of potential vendors as opposed to the individual qualification of devices (QPL). Hence, all devices produced and tested using the QML certified/qualified technology flow are qualified products. Part's technology flows qualified to this system are listed on the Qualified Manufacturer's List. Both Hybrids as well as monolithic microcircuits are covered under this system.

What are the various "tools" to accomplish parts control? The government has subdivided parts into three basic classifications: (1) microelectronics, (2) semiconductors (e.g. transistors, diodes, etc.) and (3) electrical parts (e.g. switches, connectors, capacitors, resistors, etc.). For each class, part specification and test method documents have been developed. Table D3-1 summarizes key documents and their content.

What is a military specification "Mil-Spec" qualified part, a MIL-STD-883 part, a Standard Military Drawing (SMD) part, and a vendor equivalent part? The primary difference in these descriptions is that each of these part classes has undergone different levels of screening and certification. Certification involves specifying and documenting the part manufacturing process. It also involves government and manufacturer agreement on a detailed part specification. This ensures consistent part quality and known performance. Table D3-2 summarizes

common classes of parts and what these classifications signify. Table D3-3 summarizes MIL-STD-883D screening procedures and is included to give the reader a feel for the wide range of tests required. These screening requirements are similar for the respective systems defined in Table D3-2. Topic A11, Table A11-1 shows the impact of the various part designations on system reliability.

Table D3-1: Key Parts Control Documents and Their Content

Document	Title	Content
MIL-M-38510	General Specification for Microcircuits	Provides detailed specification requirements in the form of "slash sheets" for several hundred of the most commonly used microcircuits. Covers screening requirements (referenced to MIL-STD-883), electrical testing, quality conformance, physical dimensions, configuration control for critical manufacturing processing steps and production line certification.
MIL-I-38535	General Specification for Integrated Circuits (Microcircuits) Manufacturing	Provides detailed specification requirements in the form of standard military drawings (SMDs). Quality assurance requirements are defined for all microcircuits built on a manufacturing line which is controlled through a manufacturer's quality management program and has been certified and qualified in accordance with the requirements specified. The manufacturing line must be a stable process flow for all microcircuits. Two levels of product assurance (including radiation hardness assurance) are provided for in this specification, avionics and space. The certification and qualification sections specified outline the requirements to be met by a manufacturer to be listed on a Qualified Manufacturer's List (QML). After listing of a technology flow on a QML, the manufacturer must continually meet or improve the established baseline of certified and qualified procedures through his quality management program and the technology review board.

Document	Title	Content
MIL-H-38534	General Specification for Hybrid Microcircuits	Provides detailed specification requirements in the form of Standard Military Drawings (SMDs) for standard hybrid products, and Source Control Drawings (SCDs) using the SMD boilerplate for custom hybrids. Covers requirements for screening (referenced to MIL-STD-883) quality conformance inspections, configuration control, rework limitations and manufacturing line certification procedures.
MIL-STD-883	Test Methods and Procedures for Microelectronics	Provides uniform methods and procedures for testing microelectronic devices. Structured into five classes of test methods: 1000 class addresses environmental tests, 2000 class addresses mechanical tests, 3000 class addresses electrical tests for digital circuits, 4000 class addresses electrical tests for linear circuits, and 5000 class addresses test procedures. The tests covered include moisture resistance, seal test, neutron irradiation, shock and acceleration tests, dimensional tests, input/output current tests, and screening test procedures to name a few. Two test levels are described: Class B (Class H, MIL-H-38534/Class Q, MIL-I-38535) and Class S (Class K, MIL-H-38534/Class V, MIL-I-38535). Class S is geared toward space qualified parts and requires a host of tests not performed on Class B parts (e.g. wafer lot acceptance, 100% nondestructive bond pull, particle impact noise detection, serialization, etc.).
MIL-S-19500	General Specification for Semiconductors	Provides detailed specification sheets establishing general and specific requirements including electrical characteristics, mechanical characteristics, qualification requirements, inspection procedures and test methods.

Document	Title	Content
MIL-STD-750	Test Methods for Semiconductor Devices	Provides uniform methods and procedures for testing semiconductors. Structured into five classes of test methods: 1000 class addresses environmental tests, 2000 class addresses mechanical characteristics, 3000 class addresses electrical characteristics, 3100 class addresses circuit performance and thermal resistance measurements, and the 3200 class addresses low frequency tests.
MIL-STD-202	Test Methods for Electronic and Electrical Parts	Provides uniform methods for testing electronic and electrical parts. Structured into three classes of test methods: 100 class addresses environmental tests, 200 class addresses physical characteristic tests and 300 class addresses electrical characteristic tests. These tests are not tied to a single part specification document as with microelectronics and semiconductors, but rather, numerous specifications for various component types.
MIL-STD-965	Parts Control Program	Provides control procedures to be used in the design and development of military equipment, including the submission, review and approval of a Program Parts Selection List. Generally, an overall guide for the implementation and management of a parts control program. The document provides for two basic management procedures. Procedure I is applicable to a majority of programs and does not make use of a formal parts control board. Procedure II requires a formal parts control board and is recommended for consideration where there is an aggregation of contractor/ subcontractors.

Table D3-2: Microelectronics Classifications and Descriptions

Part Classification	Part Classification Description
JAN or MIL-M-38510 Parts	These parts have a detailed specification (slash sheet) in MIL-M-38510 which controls all mechanical, electrical, and functional parameters of the part. Additionally, the manufacturing process flow is certified by DoD's Defense Electronics Supply Center (DESC), the devices are screened to MIL-STD-883 test method requirements, and are subjected to rigorous quality conformance testing. A manufacturer, once certified by DESC, can then qualify products to the specification and have these products listed on the qualified products list. The product specification (performance and mechanical) is contained in a M38510/0000 "slash sheet" or one part number SMD. Standardization is achieved through many manufacturers building product to the same "one part SMD" or "slash sheet" and testing them using the standard test methods found in MIL-STD-883.
QML (Qualified Manufacturers Listing) or MIL-I-38535 Parts	Device performance requirements (electrical, thermal, and mechanical) are detailed in the Standard Military Drawing (SMD). The qualifying activity or its agent certifies and qualifies the manufacturers process flows. Once certified and qualified, the manufacturer may produce multiple device types on that flow as MIL-I-38535 compliant parts. Since the process is considered qualified, individual products do not have to be qualified individually for selected quality conformance inspections, except Class V (Space) product. Where standard tests are used by the manufacturer to qualify the process, the use of American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), MIL-STD-883 or Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC) specifications are suggested. The manufacturer may also document and use new tests developed to improve quality and reliability. Manufacturers are required to identify a Technical Review Board (TRB) within their company. It is the duty of the TRB to approve all changes in the process and report to DESC on a regular basis. Changes in the process and products are reviewed annually by a team of users, the qualifying activity and the preparing activity. Progress in meeting company established yield, Statistical Process Control (SPC), and reliability goals are reported at this meeting. Parts produced under MIL-I-38535 are listed on the QML.

Part Classification	Part Classification Description
QML (Hybrids) / CH or MIL-H-38534 Parts	The requirements for a hybrid microcircuit are set forth in Standard Military Drawings (SMDs) or Source Control Drawings (SCDs). The qualifying activity qualifies the manufacturer's process flows and once certified and qualified may produce multiple device types on that flow as MIL-H-38534 compliant parts. Test methods are defined in MIL-STD-883. All major changes to the process flows require qualifying activity approval. Parts produced under this system are listed in the Qualified Manufacturer's List.
Standard Military Drawing (Class M) and MIL-STD-883 Compliant Devices	This system evolved from various manufacturer's in-house versions of Test Methods 5004 and 5005 of MIL-STD-883. It was an informal and inconsistent system in the late 70's and early 80's known as MIL equivalent, or look alikes. Manufacturers were falsely advertising these parts as equivalent to JAN parts, without basis, because most critical JAN requirements (e.g. audits, qualification, quality conformance inspection tests) were not followed. In some cases, not all the required JAN testing was being performed by the manufacturer. This resulted in the government incorporating a truth in advertising paragraph in MIL-STD-883 (i.e. Paragraph 1.2.1). This required the manufacturer to self-certify that all 1.2.1 requirements, a subset of the MIL-M-38510 requirements, were being met if advertised as meeting MIL-STD-883 requirements. DESC has begun an audit program to verify the manufacturers self compliance to MIL-STD-883, Paragraph 1.2.1 compliant product. The primary difference between Standardized Military Drawing (SMD) product and MIL-STD-883 compliant product is that SMD (Class M) sources are approved by the Defense Electronics Supply Center (DESC). DESC manages the procurement document (SMD) and approves the sources by accepting their certificate of compliance to the Paragraph 1.2.1 requirements. The MIL-STD-883 compliant product is produced to uncontrolled vendor data books and the government has no control over compliancy claims. Certification and qualification by DESC is not required for either system.

Part Classification	Part Classification Description
Vendor Equivalent Parts	Each parts supplier has a set of commercial specifications which they use for manufacturing product for general sale. Usually the product specifications are included on a data sheet which is then collected into a catalog for sale to the general public. There is a wide spectrum of quality available depending on the quality standards applied by the company. Generally, these parts have been tested to the vendor's equivalent MIL-STD-883 test methodology. The vendor may or may not modify the scope of the tests and a careful analysis is required to determine how similar the vendor's tests are to MIL-STD-883 tests.

Table D3-3: MIL-STD-883 Screening Procedure Summary

Screen	Space Application	Rqmt	General Application	Rqmt
Wafer Lot Acceptance	5007	All lots	--	--
Nondestructive Bond Pull	2023	100%	--	--
Internal Visual	2010, Test Condition A	100%	2010, Test Condition B	100%
Temperature Cycling	1010, Test Condition C	100%	1010, Test Condition C	100%
Constant Acceleration	2001, Test Condition E (Min), Y_1 Orientation Only	100%	2001, Test Condition E (Min), Y_1 Orientation Only	100%
Visual Inspection		100%		100%
Particle Impact Noise Detection (PIND)	2020, Test Condition A	100%		--
Serialization		100%		--
Pre-burn-in Electrical Parameters	Per Applicable Device Specification	100%	Per Applicable Device Specification	100%
Burn-in Test	1015 240 hrs @ 125°C (Min)	100%	1015 160 hrs @ 125°C (Min)	100%
Interim (Post-burn-in) Electrical Parameters	Per Applicable Device Specification	100%		--
Reverse Bias Burn-in	1015, Test Condition A or C, 72 hrs @ 150°C (Min)	100%		--

Screen	Space Application	Rqmt	General Application	Rqmt
Interim (Post-burn-in) Electrical Parameters	Per Applicable Device Specification	100%	Per Applicable Device Specification	100%
Percent Defective Allowable (PDA) Calculation	5% 3% Functional Parameters @ 25°C	All Lots	5%	All Lots
Final Electrical Test (a) Static Tests	Per Applicable Device Specification		Per Applicable Device Specification	
(1) 25°C (Subgroup 1, Table 1, 5005)		100%		100%
(2) Maximum and Minimum Rated Operating Temp (Subgroups 2,3, Table 1, 5005)		100%		100%
(b) Dynamic or Functional Tests (1) 25°C (Subgroup 4 or 7, Table 1, 5005)		100%		100%
(2) Minimum and Maximum Rated Operating Temp (Subgroups 5 and 6 or 8, Table 1, 5005)		100%		100%
(c) Switching Tests at 25°C (Subgroup 9, Table 1, 5005)		100%		100%
Seal (a) Fine (b) Gross	1014	100%	1014	100%
Radiographic	2012 Two Views	100%	--	--
Qualification or Quality Conformance Inspection Test Sample Selection	IAW MIL-M-38510, MIL-I-38535 and MIL-H-38534	100%	IAW MIL-M-38510, MIL-I-38535 and MIL-H-38534	
External Visual	2009	100%	2009	100%
Radiation Latch-up	1020	100%	1020	100%

Topic D4: Review Questions

Program and design reviews are key vehicles for measuring development progress and preventing costly redesigns. Participation by government individuals knowledgeable in R&M is critical to provoking discussions that bring out the issues important to R&M success. Of course, the questions to be posed to the development contractor depend on the timing of the review as indicated below. Action Items should be assigned at the reviews based on open R&M issues and the reliability engineer must follow-up to ensure that they're resolved satisfactorily.

Table D4-1: Major Program Reviews

Review	Purpose	R&M Engineers Role
System Requirements Review (SRR)	To ensure a complete understanding of system specification and statement of work requirements. This is usually done by means of a detailed expansion and review of the contractor's technical proposal.	Discuss the performance of all required R&M tasks and requirements with contractor R&M personnel. Topics such as the contractor's overall reliability program plan, data items and delivery schedule are usually discussed.
Preliminary Design Review (PDR)	To evaluate progress and technical adequacy of the selected design approach prior to the detailed design process.	Review preliminary R&M modeling, allocations and predictions to ensure adequacy in meeting R&M requirements. Discuss status of other R&M tasks such as parts control, derating, thermal design and reliability critical items.
Critical Design Review (CDR)	To ensure that the detailed design satisfies the requirements of the system specification before freezing the design for production or field testing.	Review the final reliability analysis and modeling to ensure R&M requirements are met. Discuss parts control program status and military part procurement lead time requirements. Review adequacy of the final thermal analysls and derating. Discuss R&M testing.
Test Readiness Review (TRR)	To ensure that all CDR problems have been satisfactorily resolved and to determine if the design is mature enough to start formal testing.	Review R&M test plans and procedures to ensure acceptable ground rules and compliance with requirements.
Production Readiness Review (PRR)	To review test results and determine whether or not the design is satisfactory for production.	Discuss R&M testing results and ensure any design deficiencies found during testing have been corrected. Discuss production quality assurance measures.

Table D4-2: Design Review Checklist

Question	Review Where Usually Most Applicable SRR PDR CDR TRR PRR					Remarks
R&M Management						
What are the avenues of technical interchange between the R&M group and other engineering groups (e.g., Design, Systems Engineering, ILS, Procurement, and Test and Evaluation)?	X	X				R&M engineering should participate at all engineering group meetings where R&M is effected. Easy avenues of technical interchange between the electrical design group and other groups such as thermal engineering must exist.
Does the reliability group have membership and a voice in decisions of the Material Review Board, Failure Review Board, and Engineering Change Review Board?	X	X	X	X		Membership or an option to voice an opinion is essential if the failure tracking and corrective action loop is to be completed.
Is the contractor and subcontractor(s) a member of the Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP)? What is the procedure for comparing parts on the ALERT list to parts used in the system?	X	X	X			Incoming part types should be checked against the GIDEP ALERT data base and incoming ALERTS should be checked against the system parts list. (GIDEP ALERTS are notices of deficient parts, materials or processes).
Are reliability critical items given special attention in the form of special analysis, testing or destructive laboratory evaluation?		X	X			Critical parts are usually defined by contract or by MIL-STD-785. Methods of tracking critical parts must be identified by the contractor. See Topic D5 for a critical items checklist.
Do the purchase orders require vendors to deliver specified levels of R&M&T based on allocation of higher level requirements?	X	X				Requirements should include verification by analysis or test.

Question	Review Where Usually Most Applicable					Remarks
	SRR	PDR	CDR	TRR	PRR	
Does the reliability group have access to component and failure analysis experts and how are they integrated into the program?	X	X	X			Failure analysis is essential to determine the cause and effect of failed components.
Is there adequate communication between testability design engineers and the electrical design group to ensure that testability considerations are worked into the upfront design?	X	X				
Are JAN microcircuits (MIL-M-38510 or MIL-I-38535) and semiconductors (MIL-S-19500) being used wherever possible and are procurement lead times for these devices adequate?		X	X			Part quality in order of preference: MIL-M-38510, or MIL-I-38535 devices; MIL-STD-883 Class B; MIL-STD-883 vendor equivalent; commercial hermetically sealed. JAN parts usually require longer procurement times (3 to 6 months) which sometimes causes commercial parts to be forced into the design.
Where nonstandard parts are used, are they procured via a specification control drawing (SCD) and do they have at least two suppliers? Are methods for nonstandard part approval clearly established and is there a clear understanding of what constitutes a standard and nonstandard part?	X	X	X			Specification control drawings should specify reliability, environment and testing requirements.
Has an up-to-date preferred parts selection list (PPSL) been established for use by designers?	X	X				DESC and DISC establish baseline PPSLs which should be the basis of the contractor's list.

Question	Review Where Usually Most Applicable SRR PDR CDR TRR PRR					Remarks

R&M Design

Question	SRR	PDR	CDR	TRR	PRR	Remarks
Do the R&M&T models accurately reflect the system configuration, its modes of operation, duty cycles, and implementation of fault tolerance?		X	X			
Do predictions meet numerical R&M specification requirements? Are prediction procedures in accordance with requirements?	X	X	X			If not, better cooling, part quality and/ or redundancy should be considered.
Have R&M allocations been made to the LRU level or below? Do reliability pre-dictions compare favorably to the allocation?	X	X				Weighted reliability allo-cations should be made to lower levels based on the upper test MTBF (θ_0), or similar measure.
Does the testability analysis show that numerical testability requirements will be met for the organizational, intermediate and depot repair levels?		X	X			If not, alternate design concepts must consider including more automated features.
Have tradeoff studies been performed in the areas of R&M&T?	X	X				Typical tradeoffs might include redundancy levels, weight, power, volume, complexity, acquisition cost, life cycle cost.
Has a thermal analysis been performed to ensure an adequate cooling technique is used and have the temperature results been factored into the reliability analysis?		X	X			Thermal analysis is essential to a complete program.
Has piece part placement been analyzed to ensure that high dissipating parts are placed away from heat sensitive parts?		X	X			For example, high power dissipation components such as large power resistors, diodes and transformers should be investigated.

Question	Review Where Usually Most Applicable					Remarks
	SRR	PDR	CDR	TRR	PRR	
Have methods been established to ensure that operating temperatures of off-the-shelf equipment will be within specified limits?	X	X				Reference environmental requirements in the system specification.
Do parts used in the design meet system environmental requirements?		X	X			Temperature range for most military parts is - 55°C to + 125°C. Temperature range for most commercial parts (plastic) is 0°C to 70°C.
Is there a clearly established derating criteria for all part types used in the design and is there a clear procedure for monitoring and enforcing this criteria?	X	X	X			The part derating levels are a function of program type but should be at least Level III in Topic D1.
Are temperature overheat sensors included in the system design?		X	X			
Is there a clear procedure for the identification of parts not meeting the derating criteria?	X	X	X			A tradeoff analysis should be performed on parts not meeting derating criteria to determine if a redesign to lower stress is appropriate.
Will part derating verification tests be performed?				X		Depending on system criticality, 3 to 7 percent of the system's parts should undergo stress verification. No more than 30 percent of the tested parts should be passive parts (resistors, capacitors, etc.).
Have limited life parts and preventive maintenance tasks been identified, and inspection and replacement requirements specified?		X	X			For example, inspection items may include waveguide couplers, rotary joints, switches, bearings, tubes and connectors. Typical Preventive Maintenance (PM) items include air filters, lubrication, oil changes, batteries, belts, etc.

Question	Review Where Usually Most Applicable					Remarks
	SRR	PDR	CDR	TRR	PRR	
Have single points of failure been identified, and their effects determined?		X	X			Important for identifying areas where redundancy should be implemented and to assist in ranking the most serious failure modes for establishing a critical items list.
Have compensating features been identified for those single points of failure where complete elimination of the failure mode is impractical?		X	X			Compensating features could include increased part quality, increased testability, additional screening, fail safe design provisions, etc.
Have areas where fault ambiguity may exist been identified? Have alternative methods of isolation and checkout (e.g., semi-automatic, manual, repetitive replacement, etc.) been identified for these areas?		X	X			Additional test nodes must be considered to break ambiguity groups.
For each maintenance level, has a decision been made for each item on how built-in-test, automatic test equipment, and general purpose electronic test equipment will support fault detection and isolation?		X	X			
Are features being incorporated into the testability design to control false alarms?		X	X			Typical features might include definition of test tolerances, transient monitor-ing and control, multiple run decision logic, environmental effects filtering and identification, etc.
R&M Testing Is there a failure reporting and corrective action system (FRACAS) in place, and does it account for failures occurring during all phases of testing?			X	X	X	FRACAS should include data from incoming inspection, development testing, equip-ment integration testing and R&M testing. FRACAS should be "closed loop" emphasizing corrective action.

Question	Review Where Usually Most Applicable					Remarks
	SRR	PDR	CDR	TRR	PRR	
Is there a failure analysis capability and will failures be subjected to a detailed analysis?			X	X	X	Contractor should identify criteria used to determine which failures will be analyzed.
Are subcontractors subjected to the same FRACAS requirements, and will their failure analysis reports be included with the prime contractor's reports?	X			X	X	
Does the reliability demonstration test simulate the operating profile seen in the field and will all modes of equipment operation be tested over the required environmental extremes?			X	X		The test must simulate the operational profile and modes to have valid results.
Does the maintainability and testability demonstration test simulate realistic failures and is the candidate task list sufficient to reduce bias?			X	X		Candidate lists should be four to ten times the size of the test sample.
Are relevant and nonrelevant failure definitions clear and agreed upon?			X	X		See Topic T9 for failure definitions.
Are equipment performance checks to be performed during testing clearly defined and has the information to be recorded in the test log been clearly defined and agreed upon?				X		Items such as temperature variations, start/stop of vibration, event occurrence times and a detailed description of system recovery after failure should be included as a minimum.
Do preliminary plans for ESS meet the required needs?				X	X	Temp. and random vibration are the most effective screens. At module level, perform 20 to 40 temp. cycles per module. At higher assembly levels, perform 4 to 20 cycles. (See RADC-TR-86-149, "ESS" and DOD-HDBK-344, "Environmental Stress Screening of Electronic Equipment," and Topics T1-T3 for guidance).

Topic D5: Critical Item Checklist

Major Concerns	Comments
• Has the contractor developed formal policies and procedures for identification and control?	• Policies should be distributed to design, manufacturing, inspection and test personnel.
• Are the procedures implemented at the initial design stage and do they continue through final acceptance period?	• The program has to start early so that safety related items can be minimized.
• Are periodic reviews planned to update the list and controls?	• Reviews at SRR, PDR, and CDR must be considered.
• Has an FMEA been performed on each critical item?	• Failure modes need to be identified so that control procedures can be developed.
• Are compensating features included in the design?	• Features such as safety margins, overstress testing, special checkouts should be considered.
• Does the contractor's control plan eliminate or minimize the reliability risk?	• Development of a list of critical items is only half the solution; controls such as stress tests, design margins, duty cycles, and others must be considered.
• As a minimum, are the following criticality factors considered: - Failures jeopardizing safety - Restrictions on limited useful life - Design exceeding derating limits - Single sources for parts - Historically failure prone items - Stringent tolerances for manufacturing or performance - Single failure points that disrupt mission performance	• A list of critical items, personnel responsible for monitoring and controlling, and review procedures must be established. Other application unique critical items should be identified by the procuring activity.

Topic D6: Dormancy Design Control

Dormancy design control is important in the life cycle of a weapon system because, after an equipment has been installed or stored in an arsenal, the predominant portion of its life cycle is in the dormant mode. The main problems are the lack of dormancy related design guides and control methods to maintain or assure system reliability in storage. Questions often asked and seldom answered are:

- **Most important stresses?** Mechanical, chemical, and low thermal; the synergism of these three stresses is critical.

- **Most significant failure mechanisms?** Failures related to latent manufacturing defects, corrosion , and mechanical fracture, with most failures being the result of latent manufacturing defects rather than specific aging mechanisms.

- **Types of failure?** Most failures that occur during nonoperating periods are of the same basic kind as those found in the operating mode, though precipitated at a slower rate.

- **Most important factor?** Moisture is the single most important factor affecting long term nonoperating reliability. All possible steps should be taken to eliminate it from electronic devices. Hygroscopic materials should be avoided or protected against accumulation of excess moisture.

- **Materials to avoid?** Avoid materials sensitive to cold flow and creep as well as metalized and non-metallic finishes which have flaking characteristics. Avoid the use of lubricants; if required, use dry lubricants such as graphite. Do not use teflon gaskets in lieu of conventional rubber gaskets or better yet, use silicone based rubber gaskets.

Storage Guidelines

- **Do not test the equipment:** Periodic testing results in failures rather than higher states of readiness. Historical data on missile systems that were stored and tested periodically shows that failures were introduced into the equipment as a result of the testing process. Causes of the failures were test procedures, test equipment and operator errors. Main guidelines are:

  - **Disconnect all power**

  - **Ground all units and components**

  - **Pressurize all coax waveguides:** Use nitrogen to prevent moisture and corrosion.

  - **Maintain temperature at 50°F +/- 5°F:** At least drain all equipment of water to prevent freezing or broken pipes.

  - **Control relative humidity to 50% +/- 5%:** Reduces corrosion and prevents electrostatic discharge failure.

  - **Periodically recharge batteries**

- **Protect against rodents:** Squirrels have chewed cables, mice have nested in electronic cabinets and porcupines have destroyed support structures (wood). Door/window seals, traps/poison and frequent inspection protect against these rodents.

Protective and Control Measures

Materials

- **Mechanical items:** Use proper finishes for materials, nonabsorbent materials for gasketing, sealing of lubricated surfaces and assemblies, and drain holes for water run-off.

- **Electronic and electrical items:** Use nonporous insulating materials, impregnate cut edges on plastic with moisture resistant varnish or resin, seal components with moving parts and perforate sleeving over cabled wire to avoid the accumulation of condensation.

- **Electromagnetic items:** Impregnation of windings with moisture proof varnish, encapsulation, or hermetic sealing, and use of alumina insulators.

- **Thermal items:** Use nonhygroscopic materials and hermetic sealing.

- **Finishes:** Avoidance of hygroscopic or porous materials; impregnate all capillary edges with wax, varnish or resin.

Parts

- Use parts with histories of demonstrated successful aging.

- Use only hermetically sealed semiconductors.

- Do not use semiconductors and microcircuits that contain nichrome-deposited resistors.

- Select parts that use mono-metallization to avoid galvanic corrosion.

- Do not seal chlorine or other halogen-containing materials within any circuitry components.

- Avoid the use of variable resistors, capacitors, inductors, or potentiometers.

- Avoid the use of electromechanical relays.

- Avoid attachments and connections that depend on spring action for effectiveness.

Table D6-1: Dormant Part Failure Mechanisms

Type	Mechanism	% Failure Mode	Accelerating Factor
Microcircuit			
MOS	Surface Anomolies	35-70 Degradation	Moisture, Temp.
	Wire Bond	10-20 Open	Vibration
Bipolar	Seal Defects	10-30 Degradation	Shock, Vibration
	Wire Bond	15-35 Open	Vibration
Transistor			
Signal	Contamination	15-45 Degradation	Moisture, Temp.
	Header Defects	10-30 Drift	Shock, Vibration
FET	Contamination	10-50 Degradation	Moisture, Temp.
	Corrosion	15-25 Drift	Moisture, Temp.
Diode			
Zener	Header Bond	20-40 Drift	Shock, Vibration
	Corrosion	20-40 Intermittent	Moisture, Temp.
Signal	Lead/Die Contact	15-35 Open	Shock, Vibration
	Header Bond	15-35 Drift	Shock, Vibration
Resistor			
Film	Corrosion	30-50 Drift	Moisture,Temp.
	Film Defects	15-25 Drift	Moisture,Temp.
Wirewound	Corrosion	35-50 Drift	Moisture, Temp.
	Lead Defects	10-20 Open	Shock, Vibration
Capacitor			
Ceramic	Connection	10-30 Open	Temp.,Vibration
	Corrosion	25-45 Drift	Moisture, Temp.
Tantalum	Mechanical	20-40 Short	Shock, Vibration
	Oxide Defect	15-35 Drift	Temp., Cycling
RF Coil	Lead Stress	20-40 Open	Shock, Vibration
	Insulation	40-65 Drift	Moisture, Temp.
Transformer	Insulation	40-80 Short	Moisture, Temp.
Relay	Contact Resistance	30-40 Open	Moisture, Temp.
	Contact Corrosion	40-65 Drift	Moisture

Topic D7: Surface Mount Technology (SMT) Design

SMT involves placing a component directly onto the surface of a printed circuit board (PCB) and soldering its connections in place. SMT components can be active (integrated circuits) or passive devices (resistors), and can have different lead designs as presented below.   In either case, the solder connection is both an electrical and mechanical connection, thus replacing the mechanical connection associated with plated through holes (PTH). Maximizing the integrity of SMT designs centers around minimizing the thermal and mechanical fatigue of both the component's solder connection and the board's PTHs.

Common Lead Designs

Leadless Chip Carriers (LCCs): Attaching component to board directly with solder alone.

Leaded Chip Carrier: Attaching a leaded component to board with solder.

CTE: Coefficient of Thermal Expansion is the change in length per unit length when heated through one degree. It directly effects the thermal strain and thus the stress in the solder joint.

Design Guidelines

- Use the largest allowable standard size for passive components to minimize manufacturing flaws.

- Carefully consider the application for active devices when electing to use leadless versus leaded components.

- Use special CTE matching to preclude stress cracking in LCC solder joints.

- Minimize PCB to 13" x 13" size to avoid warp and twist problems.

- Provide an adequate clearance at the board's edge in order to provide space for the board mounting and wave solder conveyor fingers.

- Locate components on a grid to ease programming of automatic dispensing or placement equipment.

- Allow proper spacing between components to account for visual inspection, rework, and engineering changes to assembly.

Topic D8: Power Supply Design Checklist

For many years power supply reliability has fallen short of expectations especially when used in adverse environments. Today the situation is even worse as power supplies are being designed to exceed three watts per cubic inch - a challenge to construction and packaging techniques and part technology.   And, since high density means more concentrated heat - the enemy of all components - power supply reliability problems will prevail. Following are design considerations and possible solutions to review:

Table D8-1: Design Checklist (New Designs)

Items to be Addressed	Solutions/Recommendations
• Transient effects - In-rush current	• Apply resistor-triac technique, thermistor technique
- High-voltage spikes	• Apply metal oxide varistor (MOV) transient voltage suppressor
- Short circuits	• Apply constant current and current foldback protection
- Switching voltage transients	• Apply snubber circuits
• Effects of AC ripple current	• Consider use of MIL-C-39006/22 capacitors
• Corrosion due to leakage	• Avoid wet slug tantalum capacitors and use plating and protective finishes
• Aluminum electrolytic capacitors	• Epoxy end-seals minimize external contamination
• Temperature stability	• Use low temperature coefficient capacitors (mica or ceramic)
• Packaging techniques	• Enhance heat transfer, control electromagnetic interference, decrease parasitic capacitance
• Saturation	• Use antisaturation diodes (Baker Clamps) in conjunction with a switching transistor
• Potentiometers	• Replace with precision fixed resistor
• Short mounting leads	• Derate the operating voltage below 50% to prevent hot spots

Items to be Addressed	Solutions/Recommendations
• Static discharge damage	• Use antistatic grounds for manufacturing and maintenance
• Field effect transistor (FET) versus bipolar device	• FET's increase switching speeds but reduce drive capability
• Junction temperatures	• Do not exceed 110°C
• Mechanical stresses	• Use of vibration isolators/shock mountings, parts spaced to prevent contact during shock & vibration
• Solder joint process	• 95%(goal) of solder joints should be made via automated process
• Cooling	• Conductive cooling to a heat exchanger is preferred

Table D8-2: Design Checklist (Commercial Designs)

Items to be Addressed	Solutions/Recommendations
• Part quality	• Vendor selects military equivalent parts • Vendor selects prescreened parts • Vendor screens/tests in-house
• Unit quality	• Vendor burns-in all units at higher temps
• Part derating	• Vendor has in-house standards
• Electrical parameters	• Vendor values exceed needs at temp extremes
• Failure analysis	• Vendor has failure tracking program
• Protection circuits	• Vendor has built-in voltage and current sensors
• Fault flags	• Vendor has built-in failure indicators
• Reliability experience	• Successful operation in similar environments

Topic D9: Part Failure Modes and Mechanisms

To properly apply electronic parts in complex and high density equipment designs, the engineer needs to know what factors are significant. With knowledge about the failure modes, mechanisms, and frequency of occurrence design changes can be instituted to eliminate or degrade the accelerating factors thereby increasing the equipment reliability. Table D9-1 presents these factors for a representative group of electronic components.   For further information on part construction and operation, consult MIL-HDBK-978B, "NASA Parts Application Handbook," or MIL-HDBK-338, "Electronic Reliability Design Handbook."

Table D9-1: Part Failure Modes and Mechanisms

Type	Failure Mechanisms	%	Failure Modes	Accelerating Factors
Microcircuits				
Digital	Oxide Defect	9	Short/Stuck High	Electric Field, Temp.
	Electromigration	6	Open/Stuck Low	Power, Temp.
	Overstress	18	Short then Open	Power
	Contamination	16	Short/Stuck High	Vibration, Shock, Moisture, Temp.
	Mechanical	17	Stuck Low	Shock, Vibration
	Elec. Parameters	33	Degraded	Temp., Power
Memory	Oxide Defect	17	Short/Stuck High	Electric Field, Temp.
	Overstress	22	Short then Open or Stuck Low	Power, Temp.
	Contamination	25	Short/Stuck High	Vibration, Shock Moisture, Temp.
	Mechanical	9	Stuck Low	Shock, Vibration
	Elec. Parameters	26	Degraded	Temp., Power
Linear	Overstress	21	Short then Open or Stuck Low	Power, Temp.
	Contamination	12	Short/Stuck High	Vibration, Shock
	Mechanical	2	Stuck Low	Shock, Vibration
	Elec. Parameters	48	Degraded	Temp., Power
	Unknown	16	Stuck High or Low	
Hybrid	Overstress	17	Short then Open	Power, Temp
	Contamination	8	Short	Vibration, Shock
	Mechanical	13	Open	Shock, Vibration
	Elec. Parameters	20	Degraded	Temp., Power
	Metallization	10	Open	Temp., Power
	Substrate Fracture	8	Open	Vibration
	Miscellaneous	23	Open	

Type	Failure Mechanisms	%	Failure Modes	Accelerating Factors
Diodes				
Signal	Elec. Parameter	48	Degraded	Temp., Power
	Die Fracture	10	Open	Vibration
	Seal Leak	3	Open	Moisture, Temp.
	Overstress	17	Short then Open	Power, Temp.
	Unknown	21	Open	
Zener	Elec. Parameter	32	Degraded	Temp., Power
	Leakage Current	7	Degraded	Power
	Mechanical	1	Open	Shock, Vibration
	Overstress	33	Short then Open	Voltage, Temp.
	Unknown	26	Open	
Transistors				
Bipolar	Overstress	54	Short then Open	Power, Temp.
	Elec. Parameters	25	Degraded	Temp., Power
	Leakage Current	10	Degraded	Power
	Miscellaneous	10	Open	
Field Effect	Overstress	51	Short then Open	Power, Temp.
	Elec. Parameters	17	Degraded	Temp., Power
	Contamination	15	Short	Vibration, Shock
	Miscellaneous	16	Open	
Resistors				
Composition	Moisture Intrusion	45	Resistance (R) Change	Moisture, Temp.
	Non-uniform Material Contamination	15	R Change, Open	Voltage/Current, Temp.
		14	R Change	Voltage/Current, Temp.
	Lead Defects	25	Open	Moisture, Temp., Voltage/Current
Film	Moisture Intrusion	31	R Change	Moisture, Temp., Contamination
	Substrate Defects	25	R Change	Temp., Voltage/Current
	Film Imperfections	25	R Change, Open	Temp., Voltage/Current
	Lead Termination	9	Open	Shock, Vibration, Temp., Voltage/Current
	Film Material Damage	9	R Change, Open	Temp., Voltage/Current

Type	Failure Mechanisms	%	Failure Modes	Accelerating Factors
Resistor (cont'd)				
Wirewound	Wire Imperfection	32	Open	Voltage/Current, Temp.
	Wire Insulation Flaw	20	R Change, Short	Voltage/Current, Temp.
	Corrosion	31	R Change, Short	Temp., Moisture
	Lead Defects	10	Open	Shock, Vibration, Voltage/Current
	Intrawinding Insulation Breakdown	6	R Change, Short	Temp., Voltage/Current
Capacitors				
Ceramic	Dielectric Breakdown	49	Short	Voltage, Temp.
	Connection Failure Surface	18	Open	Temp., Cycling
	Contamination	3	Capacitance Drift	Temp., Voltage
	Low Insulation Resistance	29	Short	Temp., Voltage
Plastic/Paper	Connection Failure	46	Open	Temp., Cycling
	Cracked Dielectric	11	Short	Temp., Voltage
	Capacitance Change	42	Degraded	Temp., Voltage
Tantalum (Nonsolid)	Loss of Electrolyte	17	Capacitance Drift	Temp., Voltage
	Leakage Current	46	Short	Voltage, Temp.
	Intermittent High Impedance	36	Open	Temp., Cycling
Inductive Devices				
Transformer	Wire Overstress	25	Open	Voltage, Current
	Faulty Leads	5	Open	Vibration, Shock
	Corroded Windings	24	Short	Moisture, Temp.
	Insulation Breakdown	25	Short	Voltage, Moisture, Temp.
	Insulation Deterioration	20	Short	Moisture, Temp.
RF Coil	Wire Overstress	37	Open	Voltage, Current
	Faulty Leads	16	Open	Vibration, Shock
	Insulation Breakdown	14	Short	Voltage, Moisture, Temp.
	Insulation Deterioration	32	Short	Moisture, Temp.

Type	Failure Mechanisms	%	Failure Modes	Accelerating Factors
Switch				
General	Contact Resistance	30	Open	Temp., Moisture, Current
	Mechanical	23	Open	Vibration, Shock
	Overstress	18	Short	Power, Temp.
	Elec. Parameters	13	Degraded	Temp., Power
	Intermittent	15	Degraded	Temp., Vibration
Relay				
General	Contact Resistance	53	Open	Temp., Moisture
	Contact Contamination	18	Open	Moisture, Temp.
	Overstress	11	Short	Current
	Intermittent	12	Degraded	Temp., Vibration
	Mechanical	5	Open	Vibration
Connector				
General	Contact Resistance	9	Resistance Change	Temp., Moisture
	Intermittent	22	Open	Vibration, Shock
	Mechanical	24	Open	Vibration, Shock
	Overstress	9	Short	Power, Contamination
	Miscellaneous	35	Open	Temp., Vibration, Wear

Topic D10: Fiber Optic Design Criteria

Fiber optics are relatively new when compared with most electronic devices. With the increased use of fiber optics comes the need to address fiber optic reliability so that preventive design measures can be instituted. This section will present specific failure modes/mechanisms and their causes and prevention to aid designers/planners in establishing a reliable system. Tables D10-1 thru D10-3 depict those failure modes/mechanisms associated with Transmitters, Receivers and Fiber & Cable. Table D10-4 presents reliability figures of merit with an 80% confidence bound except connectors.

Table D10-1: Common Failure Mechanisms (Transmitters)

Mode	Causes	Prevention
Facet Damage	Pulse width & optical power density	Apply anti-reflection coat to facets
Laser Wear-Out	Photo-Oxidation, contact degradation & crystal growth defects	Coat facets, reduce temperature & current density & use high quality materials
Laser Instability	Reflection of laser output power	Apply antireflection coat, defocus the graded index coupling element
Shorted Outputs	Whisker formation	Anticipate system lifetime & temperature solder tolerances
Dark Line Defects	Non-Radiating centers	Material selection & quality control

Table D10-2: Common Failure Mechanisms (Receivers)

Mode	Causes	Prevention
Open Circuit	Fracture of lead-bond plated contacts	Use evaporated contacts
Short or Open Circuit	Electro-Chemical oxidation, humidity	Use hermetically sealed package
Positive Intrinsic Negative (PIN) Dark Current	Accumulation of mobile ions	InGaAs or In layer grown on active region & reduce the temperature
Avalanche Photo Diode (APD) Dark Current	Thermal deterioration of the metal contact	Select an APD at 1.3μm & reduce the temperature

Table D10-3: Common Failure Mechanisms (Fiber & Cable)

Mode	Causes	Prevention
Cable Open Circuit Fracture	Stress corrosion or fatigue due to microcracks	Residual or threshold tension less than 33% of the rated proof tested tensile strength
Cable Intermittent	Hydrogen migrates into the core of the fiber	Design cables with materials that do not generate hydrogen
Cable Open Circuit Breakage	Temperature cycling, ultraviolet exposure, water & fluid immersion	Design a jacket that can prevent shrinking, cracking, swelling or splitting
Cable Opaque Circuit Inoperative	Radiation	Design to be nuclear radiation hardened

Table D10-4: Fiber Optic Component Failure Rates

Component Type	Failure Rate (10^{-6} Hrs.)	MTBF (Hrs.)
Fiber	4.35 - 5.26	210,000
Cable	1.15 - 1.81	750,000
Splices	.022 - .64	27,000,000
Connectors	# of Matings	
MIL-T-29504	1000	
MIL-C-28876	500	N/A
MIL-C-38999	500	
MIL-C-83522	500	
MIL-C-83526	1000	
FC-Style	1000	
Light Emitting Diodes (LEDS)		
AlGaAs/GaAs	.13 - .88	4,000,000
InGaAsP/InP	.78 - 1.92	850,000
AlGaAs/Si	2.08 - 8.33	320,000
Laser Diodes		
AlGaAs/GaAs	1.27 - 9.1	410,000
- 1.3μm wavelength	.79 - 9.1	620,000
InGaAsP/InP	.13 - 2.4	3,700,000
Photodetectors		
APD	.12 - 1.54	4,000,000
PIN	.57 - 3.58	1,000,000

Contents

For More Information

MIL-STD-756	"Reliability Modeling and Prediction"
MIL-STD-1629	"Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis"
MI-HDBK-217	"Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment"
MIL-HDBK-472	"Maintainability Prediction"
RADC-TR-87-55	"Predictors of Organizational-Level Testability Analysis"
RADC-TR-77-287	"A Redundancy Notebook"
RADC-TR-89-223	"Sneak Circuit Analysis for the Common Man"
RADC-TR-89-276	"Dormant Missile Test Effectiveness"
RADC-TR-89-281	"Reliability Assessment Using Finite Element Techniques"
RADC-TR-90-109	"Integration of Sneak Analysis with Design"
RL-TR-91-29	"A Rome Laboratory Guide to Basic Training in TQM Analysis Techniques"
RL-TR-91-87	" A Survey of Reliability, Maintainability, Supportability and Testability Software Tools"
RL-TR-91-155	"Computer Aided Assessment of Reliability Using Finite Element Methods"
RL-TR-92-197	"Reliability Assessment of Critical Electronic Components"

Topic A1: Reliability and Maintainability Analyses

Topic A1-1: R&M Analysis Types, Purpose and Application

Analysis Type	Purpose	Application
R&M Modeling, Allocations and Prediction	• To quantitatively evaluate the R&M of competing designs • To direct R&M related design decisions	• Perform early in the design phase • More beneficial for newly designed hardware • Applicable to all types of hardware • Maintainability analyses usually applied to organizational level of repair
• Modeling	• Identifies framework and integrates systems interrelationships for analyses and assessment	
• Allocations	• Distributes system quantitative requirements to lower levels of indenture using R&M models. Used as design goals.	
• Predictions	• Uses system models, failure rates and repair rates to estimate system R&M figures of merit • Enables tradeoffs with respect to design approaches	
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)	• Top down approach to identify effects of faults on system performance	• Can be applied when FMECA considered too expensive • Easier to apply and understand than FMECA

Analysis Type	Purpose	Application
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)	• Bottom up approach to identify single failure points and their effects • To assist in the efficient design of BIT and FIT • To establish and rank critical failures • To identify interface problems	• Perform early in the design phase • More beneficial if performed on newly designed equipment • More applicable to equipment performing critical functions (e.g., control systems)
Sneak Circuit Analysis (SCA)	• To identify system/equipment failures that are not caused by part failures • To reveal unexpected logic flows that can produce undesired results • To expose design oversights that create conditions of undesired operation	• Perform prior to CDR to maximize cost effectiveness • Mission and safety critical functions • Hardware with numerous interfaces • Systems with high testing complexities • Use selectively due to cost of performing
Worst Case Analysis (WCA)	• To evaluate circuits for tolerance to "drift" • To evaluate the simultaneous existence of all unfavorable tolerances	• Not often applied • Use selectively

Table A1-2: Summary of Failure Effects Analysis Characteristics

Analysis Type	FMECA	Criticality	Sneak	Worst Case	Fault Tree
Inductive	X				
Deductive					X
Specialized Application			X	X	
Time Dependency				X	
Advanced Math					X
Single Failures	X	X		X	X
Multiple Failures					X
External Influences			X	X	X
Any Design Stage	X	X			X
Early Design Stage	X	X			X
Late Design Stage			X	X	
Logistics Application		X			X
Testability Application	X			X	X

Topic A2: Reliability Prediction Methods

Prediction Procedure	Application	Basic Parameters of Measure	Information Required
Parts Count Technique* (MIL-HDBK-217F, Appendix A)	• Gross prediction technique • Early in design phase when detailed stress data not available	Failure Rate	• System reliability models • Number of parts as a function of general part types • Quality levels of parts • Operational environments • Duty cycles
Parts Stress Technique* (MIL-HDBK-217F, Sections 5 thru 23)	• More accurate prediction technique • When stress levels can be estimated or measured	Failure Rate	• System reliability models • Number of parts as a function of specific part types • Quality levels of parts • Operational environments • Duty cycles • Stresses applied to parts
Existing System/Equipment Data	• For off-the-shelf or modified designs • When detailed part data not available	Failure Rate	• Operating hours • Number of failures • Operational environments • Duty cycles • See Topic A6

*MIL-HDBK-217F, "Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment"

Topic A3: Maintainability Prediction Methods

Prediction* Procedure	Purpose	Application	Basic Parameters of Measure	Information Required
I	To predict flight line maintenance of airborne electronic and electro-mechanical systems involving modular replacement.	After establishment of the design concept provided that data as listed in the column entitled "Information Required" is available.	Distribution of downtimes for various elemental activities, maintenance categories, repair times, and system downtime.	(a) Location & failure rate of components (b) Number of: 　1. Replaceable components 　2. Spares 　3. Test Points (c) Duration of average mission (d) Maintenance schedules, etc.
II	To predict the maintainability of shipboard and shore electronic equipment and systems. It can also be used to predict the maintainability of mechanical systems provided that required task times and functional levels can be established.	Applicable during the final design stage.	Part A procedure: Corrective maintenance expressed as an arithmetic or geometric mean time to repair in hours. Part B procedure: Active maintenance in terms of: (a) Mean corrective maintenance time in manhours (b) Mean preventive maintenance time in manhours (c) Mean active maintenance time in terms of mean manhours per maintenance action	For corrective maintenance (Part A): (a) Packaging: to the extent that detailed hardware configurations can be established. (b) Diagnostic procedure (c) Repair methods (d) Parts listing (e) Operating stresses (f) Mounting methods (g) Functional levels at which alignment and checkout occur For active maintenance (Part B): The respective maintenance task times for corrective and preventive maintenance must have been determined.

Prediction* Procedure	Purpose	Application	Basic Parameters of Measure	Information Required
III	To predict the mean and maximum active corrective maintenance downtime for Air Force ground electronic systems and equipment. It may also be used to predict preventive maintenance downtime.	Applied during the design development and control stages.	(a) Mean and maximum active corrective downtime (95th percentile) (b) Mean and maximum preventive maintenance (c) Mean downtime	(a) Schematic diagrams (b) Physical layouts (c) Functional operation (d) Tools and test equipment (e) Maintenance aids (f) Operational and maintenance environment
IV	To predict the mean and/or total corrective and preventive maintenance downtime of systems and equipment.	Applicable throughout the design, development cycle with various degrees of detail.	(a) Mean system maintenance downtime (b) Mean corrective maintenance downtime per operational period (c) Total corrective maintenance downtime per operational period (d) Total preventive maintenance downtime per operational period	Complete system documentation portraying: (a) Functional diagrams (b) Physical layouts (c) Front panel layouts (d) End item listings with failure rates

Prediction* Procedure	Purpose	Application	Basic Parameters of Measure	Information Required
V	To predict maintainability parameters of avionics, ground and shipboard electronics at the organizational, intermediate and depot levels of maintenance.	Applied at any equipment or system level, at any level of maintenance pertinent to avionics, ground and shipboard electronics.	(a) Mean time to repair (MTTR) (b) Maximum corrective maintenance time ($M_{max}(\Phi)$) (c) Mean maintenance manhours per repair (MMH/repair) (d) Mean maintenance manhours per operating hour (MMH/OH) (e) Mean maintenance manhours per flight hour (MMH/FH)	Early Prediction (a) Primary replaceable items (b) Failure rates (c) Fault isolation strategy (d) Replacement concept (e) Packaging philosophy (f) Fault isolation resolution Detailed prediction (a) Replacement concept (b) Fault detection and isolation outputs (c) Failure rate (d) Maintenance procedure

*MIL-HDBK-472, "Maintainability Prediction of Electronic Equipment"

Topic A4: Testability Analysis Methods

Procedure	Purpose	Application	Basic Parameters of Measure	Information Required
Testability Design Rating System (TDRS) (1)	To assign a rating factor to the testability of a system	Can be used at any stage in the design Credibility factor of the result is generated based on % of criteria addressed	Testability rating between 0 & 100 Credibility factor concerning the testability rating	Input can vary depending on available data and confidence desired. As a minimum, schematics and a parts break-down should be used for credible results.
MIL-STD-2165 Testability Assessment (2)	Provides requirements for the assessment of the inherent testability of a system or equipment design	Applicable during the final design stage	A weighting factor is assigned to each item based upon its relative importance in achieving a testable product. A score is determined for each item, representing the level of testability.	Physical layout of PC boards Illustrated parts breakdown Schematic diagrams
Dependency Analysis (3)	To predict various fault detection capability metrics, and identify critical test points	Applicable during the final design stage. Can also be linked to maintenance assistance software for directing manual maintenance.	Fault isolation resolution Test point recommendations	Schematic diagrams Functional dependencies Item location, reliability, and cost are useful but not necessary

Notes:
1. Reference RL-TR-92-12, "Testability Design Rating System," (Two Volumes)
2. Testability Program for Electronic Systems and Equipments
3. "Testability Design and Assessment Tools," available from the Reliability Analysis Center, (315) 337-0900.

Topic A5: Reliability Analysis Checklist

Major Concerns	Comments
Models	
Are all functional elements included in the reliability block diagrams/model?	System design drawings/diagrams must be reviewed to be sure that the reliability model/diagram agrees with the hardware.
Are all modes of operation considered in the math model?	Duty cycles, alternate paths, degraded conditions and redundant units must be defined and modeled.
Do the math model results show that the design achieves the reliability requirement?	Unit failure rates and redundancy equations are used from the detailed part predictions in the system math model.
Allocation	
Are system reliability requirements allocated (subdivided) to useful levels?	Useful levels are defined as: equipment for subcontractors, assemblies for subcontractors, circuit boards for designers.
Does the allocation process consider complexity, design flexibility and safety margins?	Conservative values are needed to prevent reallocation at every design change.
Prediction	
Does the sum of the parts equal the value of the module or unit?	Many predictions conveniently neglect to include all the parts producing optimistic results (check for solder connections, connectors, circuit boards).
Are the environmental conditions and part quality representative of the requirements?	Optimistic quality levels and favorable environmental conditions are often assumed causing optimistic results.
Are the circuit and part temperatures defined and do they represent the design?	Temperature is the biggest driver of part failure rates; low temperature assumptions will cause optimistic results.
Are equipment, assembly, subassembly and part reliability drivers identified?	Identification is needed so that corrective actions for reliability improvement can be considered.
Are part failure rates from acceptable sources (i.e., MIL-HDBK-217)?	Use of generic failure rates require submission of backup data to provide credence in the values.
Is the level of detail for the part failure rate models sufficient to reconstruct the result?	Each component type should be sampled and failure rates completely reconstructed for accuracy.
Are critical components such as VHSIC, Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuits (MMIC), Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC) or Hybrids highlighted?	Prediction methods for advanced parts should be carefully evaluated for impact on the module and system.

Topic A6: Use of Existing Reliability Data

System development programs often make use of existing equipment (or assembly) designs, or designs adapted to a particular application. Sometimes, lack of detailed design information prevents direct prediction of the reliability of these items making use of available field and/or test failure data the only practical way to estimate their reliability. If this situation exists, the following table summarizes the information that is desired.

Table A6-1: Use of Existing Reliability Data

Information Required	Equipment Field Data	Equipment Test Data	Piece Part Data
Data collection time period	X	X	X
Number of operating hours per equipment	X	X	
Total number of part hours			X
Total number of observed maintenance actions	X		
Number of "no defect found" maintenance actions	X		
Number of induced maintenance actions	X		
Number of "hard failure" maintenance actions	X		
Number of observed failures		X	X
Number of relevant failures		X	X
Number of nonrelevant failures		X	X
Failure definition		X	X
Number of equipment or parts to which data pertains	X	X	X
Similarity of equipment of interest to equipment for which data is available	X	X	
Environmental stress associated with data	X	X	X
Type of testing		X	
Field data source	X		

Topic A7: Maintainability/Testability Analysis Checklist

Major Concerns	Comments
Are the maintainability/testability prediction techniques and data used clearly described?	
Is there a clear description of the maintenance concept and all ground rule assumptions?	Repair level, LRU/module definition, spares availability assumptions, test equipment availability assumptions, tools availability assumptions, personnel assumptions, environmental conditions.
Are worksheets provided which show how LRU repair times were arrived at?	The breakout of repair time should include: fault isolation, disassembly, interchange, reassembly and checkout.
Are step-by-step repair descriptions provided to back up repair time estimates?	
Are fault isolation time estimates realistic?	Overestimating BIT/FIT capability is the primary cause of optimistic repair time estimates.
Are fault isolation ambiguity levels considered in the analysis?	
Can repair times be reconstructed from the worksheets and is addition, subtraction, multiplication and division correct?	Checking is mundane but often results in errors and inconsistencies being found.
Are preventive maintenance tasks described?	This includes frequency, maintenance time and detailed task description.
Is all the equipment included in the prediction?	
Has the best procedure been selected to provide estimates for the testability attributes?	Because of the number of variables which effect testability and the number of different procedures available to effect analyses, there must be rationale and logic provided to explain why the particular approach was taken.
Are the numerical values of the testability attributes within specified tolerances?	
Does the test equipment, both hardware and software, meet all design requirements.	All test points should be accessible.
Are the simulation and emulation procedure to be used to simulate/emulate units of the system, for diagnostics development, reasonable and practical?	

Topic A8: FMECA Analysis Checklist

Major Concerns	Comments
● Is a system definition/description provided compatible with the system specification?	
● Are ground rules clearly stated?	● These include approach, failure definition, acceptable degradation limits, level of analysis, clear description of failure causes, etc.
● Are block diagrams provided showing functional dependencies at all equipment indenture levels?	● This diagram should graphically show what items (parts, circuit cards, sub-systems, etc.) are required for the successful operation of the next higher assembly.
● Does the failure effect analysis start at the lowest hardware level and systematically work to higher indenture levels?	● The analysis should start at the lowest level specified in the SOW (e.g. part, circuit card, subsystem, etc.)
● Are failure mode data sources fully described?	● Specifically identify data sources per MIL-HDBK-338, Para 7.3.2, include relevant data from similar systems.
● Are detailed FMECA worksheets provided? Do the worksheets clearly track from lower to higher hardware levels? Do the worksheets clearly correspond to the block diagrams? Do the worksheets provide an adequate scope of analysis?	● Worksheets should provide an item name indenture code, item function, list of item failure modes, effect on next higher assembly and system for each failure mode, and a criticality ranking. In addition, worksheets should account for multiple failure indenture levels for Class I and Class II failures.
● Are failure severity classes provided? Are specific failure definitions established?	● Typical classes are: - Catastrophic (life/death) - Critical (mission loss) - Marginal (mission degradation) - Minor (maintenance/repair)
● Are results timely?	● Analysis must be performed "during" the design phase not after the fact.
● Are results clearly summarized and are clean comprehensive recommendations provided?	● Actions for risk reduction of single point failures, critical items, areas needing BIT/FIT, etc.
● Are the results being submitted (shared) to enhance other program decisions?	● BIT design, critical parts, reliability prediction, derating, fault tolerance.

Topic A9: Redundancy Equations

Many military electronic systems readiness and availability requirements exceed the level of reliability to which a serial chain system can be practically designed. Use of high quality parts, a sound thermal design and extensive stress derating may not be enough. Fault tolerance, or the ability of a system design to tolerate a failure or degradation without system failure, is required. The most common form of fault tolerance is redundancy where additional, usually identical, units are added to a system in parallel with the other units. Because this situation is very common, the reliability equations for common redundancy situations are included below.

The following represents a sample list of specific redundancy relationships which define failure rate as a function of the specific type of redundancy employed. For a comprehensive treatment of redundancy concepts and the reliability improvements achievable through their applications see RADC-TR-77-287, "A Redundancy Notebook."

Table A9-1: Redundancy Equation Approximations Summary

Redundancy Equations	
With Repair	**Without Repair**

All units are active on-line with equal unit failure rates. (n-q) out of n required for success.

Equation 1

$$\lambda_{(n-q)/n} = \frac{n!\,(\lambda)^{q+1}}{(n-q-1)!(\mu)^{q}}$$

Equation 4

$$\lambda_{(n-q)/n} = \frac{\lambda}{\displaystyle\sum_{i=n-q}^{n}\frac{1}{i}}$$

Two active on-line units with different failure and repair rates. One of two required for success.

Equation 2

$$\lambda_{1/2} = \frac{\lambda_A\lambda_B\left[(\mu_A+\mu_B)+(\lambda_A+\lambda_B)\right]}{(\mu_A)(\mu_B)+(\mu_A+\mu_B)(\lambda_A+\lambda_B)}$$

Equation 5

$$\lambda_{1/2} = \frac{\lambda_A{}^2\lambda_B+\lambda_A\lambda_B{}^2}{\lambda_A{}^2+\lambda_B{}^2+\lambda_A\lambda_B}$$

One standby off-line unit with n active on-line units required for success. Off-line spare assumed to have a failure rate of zero. On-line units have equal failure rates.

Equation 3

$$\lambda_{n/n+1} = \frac{n\left[n\lambda+(1-P)\mu\right]\lambda}{\mu+n(P+1)\lambda}$$

Equation 6

$$\lambda_{n/n+1} = \frac{n\lambda}{P+1}$$

Key:

$\lambda_{x/y}$ is the effective failure rate of the redundant configuration where x of y units are required for success

n = number of active on-line units. n! is n factorial (e.g., 5!=5x4x3x2x1=120, 1!=1,0!=1)

λ = failure rate of an individual on-line unit (failures/hour)

q = number of on-line active units which are allowed to fail without system failure

μ = repair rate (μ=1/M_{ct}, where M_{ct} is the mean corrective maintenance time in hours)

P = probability switching mechanism will operate properly when needed (P=1 with perfect switching)

Notes:

1. Assumes all units are functional at the start
2. The approximations represent time to first failure
3. **CAUTION:** Redundancy equations for repairable systems should not be applied if delayed maintenance is used.

Example 1: A system has five active units, each with a failure rate of 220 f/10^6 hours, and only three are required for successful operation. If one unit fails, it takes an average of three hours to repair it to an active state. What is the effective failure rate of this configuration?

Solution: Substituting the following values into Equation 1:

$n = 5$

$q = 2$

$\mu = 1/3$

$\lambda_{(5-2)/5} = \lambda_{3/5}$

$$\lambda_{3/5} = \frac{5!(220 \cdot 10^{-6})^3}{(5-2-1)!(1/3)^2} = 5.75 \cdot 10^{-9} \text{ f/hour}$$

$\lambda_{3/5} = .00575 \text{ f/}10^6 \text{ hours}$

Example 2: A ground radar system has a 2 level weather channel with a failure rate of 50 f/10^6 hours and a 6 level weather channel with a failure rate of 180 f/10^6 hours. Although the 6 level channel provides more comprehensive coverage, the operation of either channel will result in acceptable system operation. What is the effective failure rate of the two channels if one of two are required and the M_{ct} is 1 hour?

Solution: Substituting the following values into Equation 2:

$\lambda_A = 50 \cdot 10^{-6}$

$\lambda_B = 180 \cdot 10^{-6}$

$\mu_A = \mu_B = 1/M_{ct} = 1$

$$\lambda_{1/2} = \frac{(50 \cdot 10^{-6})(180 \cdot 10^{-6})\left[(1+1)+(50 \cdot 10^{-6}+180 \cdot 10^{-6})\right]}{(1)(1)+(1+1)(50 \cdot 10^{-6}+180 \cdot 10^{-6})} = 1.8 \cdot 10^{-8} \text{ f/hour}$$

$\lambda_{1/2} = .018 \text{ f/}10^6 \text{ hours}$

Topic A10: Parts Count Reliability Prediction

A standard technique for predicting reliability when detailed design data such as part stress levels is not yet available is the parts count reliability prediction technique. The technique has a "built-in" assumption of average stress levels which allows prediction in the conceptual stage or source selection stage by estimation of the part types and quantities. This section contains a summary of the MIL-HDBK-217F, Notice 1 technique for eleven of the most common operational environments:

G_B	Ground Benign
G_F	Ground Fixed
G_M	Ground Mobile
N_S	Naval Sheltered
N_U	Naval Unsheltered
A_{IC}	Airborne Inhabited Cargo
A_{IF}	Airborne Inhabited Fighter
A_{UC}	Airborne Uninhabited Cargo
A_{UF}	Airborne Uninhabited Fighter
A_{RW}	Helicopter (Both Internal and External Equipment)
S_F	Space Flight

Assuming a series reliability model, the equipment failure rate can be expressed as:

$$\lambda_{EQUIP} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (N_i)(\lambda_{gi})(\pi_{Qi})$$

where

λ_{EQUIP} = total equipment failure rate (failures/10^6 hrs)

λ_{gi} = generic failure rate for the ith generic part type (failures/10^6 hrs)

π_{Qi} = quality factor for the ith generic part type

N_i = quantity of the ith generic part type

n = number of different generic part types

Table A10-1: Generic Failure Rate, λ_g (Failures/10^6 Hours) for Microcircuits

Part Type	G_B	G_F	G_M	N_S	N_U	A_{IC}	A_{IF}	A_{UC}	A_{UF}	A_{RW}	S_F
Bipolar Technology											
Gate/Logic Arrays, Digital (Ea = .4)											
1 - 100 Gates	.0036	.012	.024	.024	.035	.025	.030	.032	.049	.047	.0036
101 - 1000 Gates	.0060	.020	.038	.037	.055	.039	.048	.051	.077	.074	.0060
1001 to 3000 Gates	.011	.035	.066	.065	.097	.070	.085	.091	.14	.13	.011
3001 to 10,000 Gates	.033	.12	.22	.22	.33	.23	.28	.30	.46	.44	.033
10,001 to 30,000 Gates	.052	.17	.33	.33	.48	.34	.42	.45	.68	.65	.052
30,001 to 60,000 Gates	.075	.23	.44	.43	.63	.46	.56	.61	.90	.85	.075
Gate/Logic Arrays, Linear (Ea = .65)											
1 - 100 Transistors	.0095	.024	.039	.034	.049	.057	.062	.12	.13	.076	.0095
101 - 300 Transistors	.017	.041	.065	.054	.078	.10	.11	.22	.24	.13	.017
301 - 1000 Transistors	.033	.074	.11	.092	.13	.19	.19	.41	.44	.22	.033
1001 - 10,000 Transistors	.050	.12	.18	.15	.21	.29	.30	.63	.67	.35	.050
Programmable Logic Arrays (Ea = .4)											
Up to 200 Gates	.0061	.016	.029	.027	.040	.032	.037	.044	.061	.054	.0061
201 to 1000 Gates	.011	.028	.048	.045	.065	.054	.063	.077	.10	.089	.011
1001 to 5000 Gates	.022	.052	.087	.082	.12	.099	.11	.14	.19	.16	.022
MOS Technology											
Gate/Logic Arrays, Digital (Ea = .35)											
1 to 100 Gates	.0057	.015	.027	.027	.039	.029	.035	.039	.056	.052	.0057
101 to 1000 Gates	.010	.026	.045	.043	.062	.049	.057	.066	.092	.083	.010
1001 to 3000 Gates	.019	.047	.080	.077	.11	.088	.10	.12	.17	.15	.019
3001 to 10,000 Gates	.049	.14	.25	.24	.36	.27	.32	.36	.51	.48	.049
10,001 to 30,000 Gates	.084	.22	.39	.37	.54	.42	.49	.56	.79	.72	.084
30,001 to 60,000 Gates	.13	.31	.53	.51	.73	.59	.69	.82	1.1	.98	.13
Gate/Logic Arrays, Linear (Ea = .65)											
1 to 100 Transistors	.0095	.024	.039	.034	.049	.057	.062	.12	.13	.076	.0095
101 to 300 Transistors	.017	.041	.065	.054	.078	.10	.11	.22	.24	.13	.017
301 to 1,000 Transistors	.033	.074	.11	.092	.13	.19	.19	.41	.44	.22	.033
1001 to 10,000 Transistors	.05	.12	.18	.15	.21	.29	.30	.63	.67	.35	.05
Floating Gate Programmable Logic Array, MOS (Ea = .35)											
Up to 500 Gates	.0046	.018	.035	.035	.052	.035	.044	.044	.070	.070	.0046
501 to 2,000 Gates	.0056	.021	.042	.042	.062	.042	.052	.053	.084	.083	.0056
2001 to 5,000 Gates	.0061	.022	.043	.042	.063	.043	.054	.055	.086	.084	.0061
5001 to 20,000 Gates	.0095	.033	.064	.063	.094	.065	.080	.083	.13	.13	.0095
Microprocessors, Bipolar (Ea = .4)											
Up to 8 Bits	.028	.061	.098	.091	.13	.12	.13	.17	.22	.18	.028
Up to 16 Bits	.052	.11	.18	.16	.23	.21	.24	.32	.39	.31	.052
Up to 32 Bits	.11	.23	.36	.33	.47	.44	.49	.65	.81	.65	.11
Microprocessors, MOS (Ea = .35)											
Up to 8 Bits	.048	.089	.13	.12	.16	.16	.17	.24	.28	.22	.048
Up to 16 Bits	.093	.17	.24	.22	.29	.30	.32	.45	.52	.40	.093
Up to 32 Bits	.19	.34	.49	.45	.60	.61	.66	.90	1.1	.82	.19

Part Type	G_B	G_F	G_M	N_S	N_U	A_{IC}	A_{IF}	A_{UC}	A_{UF}	A_{RW}	S_F
MOS Technology											
Memories, ROM (Ea = .6)											
Up to 16K	.0047	.018	.036	.035	.053	.037	.045	.048	.074	.071	.0047
16K to 64K	.0059	.022	.043	.042	.063	.045	.055	.060	.090	.086	.0059
64K to 256K	.0067	.023	.045	.044	.066	.048	.059	.068	.099	.089	.0067
256K to 1 MB	.011	.036	.068	.066	.098	.075	.090	.11	.15	.14	.011
Memories, PROM, UVEPROM, EEPROM, EAPROM (Ea = .6) (NOTE: λ_{cyc} = 0 Assumed for EEPROM)											
Up to 16K	.0049	.018	.036	.036	.053	.037	.046	.049	.075	.072	.0048
16K to 64K	.0061	.022	.044	.043	.064	.046	.056	.062	.093	.087	.0062
64K to 256K	.0072	.024	.046	.045	.067	.051	.061	.073	.10	.092	.0072
256K to 1 MB	.012	.038	.071	.068	.10	.080	.095	.12	.16	.14	.012
Memories, DRAM (Ea = .6)											
Up to 16K	.0040	.014	.027	.027	.040	.029	.035	.040	.059	.055	.0040
16K to 64K	.0055	.019	.036	.034	.051	.039	.047	.056	.079	.070	.0055
64K to 256K	.0074	.023	.043	.040	.060	.049	.058	.076	.10	.084	.0074
256K to 1 MB	.011	.032	.057	.053	.077	.070	.080	.12	.15	.11	.011
Memories, SRAM, (MOS & BiMOS) (Ea = .6)											
Up to 16K	.0079	.022	.038	.034	.050	.048	.054	.083	.10	.073	.0079
16K to 64K	.014	.034	.057	.050	.073	.077	.085	.14	.17	.11	.014
64K to 256K	.023	.053	.084	.071	.10	.12	.13	.25	.27	.16	.023
256K to 1 MB	.043	.092	.14	.11	.16	.22	.23	.46	.49	.26	.043
Bipolar Technology											
Memories, ROM, PROM (Ea = .6)											
Up to 16K	.010	.028	.050	.046	.067	.062	.070	.10	.13	.096	.010
16K to 64K	.017	.043	.071	.063	.091	.095	.11	.18	.21	.14	.017
64K to 256K	.028	.065	.10	.085	.12	.15	.16	.30	.33	.19	.028
256K to 1 MB	.053	.12	.18	.15	.21	.27	.29	.56	.61	.33	.053
Memories, SRAM (Ea = .6)											
Up to 16K	.0075	.023	.043	.041	.060	.050	.058	.077	.10	.084	.0075
16K to 64K	.012	.033	.058	.054	.079	.072	.083	.12	.15	.11	.012
64K to 256K	.018	.045	.074	.065	.095	.10	.11	.19	.22	.14	.018
256K to 1 MB	.033	.079	.13	.11	.16	.18	.20	.35	.39	.24	.033
GaAs MMIC (Ea = 1.5)											
1 to 100 Elements	.0013	.0052	.010	.010	.016	.011	.013	.015	.022	.021	.0013
101 to 1000 Active Elements (Default: Driver and High Power (> 100 mW))	.0028	.011	.022	.022	.034	.023	.028	.030	.047	.045	.0028
GaAs Digital (Ea = 1.4)											
1 to 1000 Active Elements	.0066	.026	.052	.052	.078	.054	.067	.078	.12	.11	.0066
1001 to 10,000 Active Elements	.013	.050	.10	.10	.15	.10	.13	.15	.23	.20	.013

Microcircuit Quality Factors - π_Q

Description	π_Q
Class S Categories: 1. Procured in full accordance with MIL-M-38510, Class S requirements. 2. Procured in full accordance with MIL-I-38535 and Appendix B thereto (Class V). 3. Hybrids: (Procured to Class S requirements (Quality Level K) of MIL-H-38534.	.25
Class B Categories: 1. Procured in full accordance with MIL-M-38510, Class B requirements. 2. Procured in full accordance with MIL-I-38535, (Class Q). 3. Hybrids: Procured to Class B requirements (Quality Level H) of MIL-H-38534.	1.0
Class B-1 Category: Fully compliant with all requirements of paragraph 1.2.1 of MIL-STD-883 and procured to a MIL drawing, DESC drawing or other government approved documentation. (Does not include hybrids). For hybrids use custom screening section on the following page.	2.0

Microcircuit Learning Factor - π_L

Years in Production, Y	π_L
_ .1	2.0
.5	1.8
1.0	1.5
1.5	1.2
_ 2.0	1.0

$\pi_L = .01 \exp(5.35 - .35Y)$

Y = Years generic device type has been in production

Microcircuit Quality Factors (cont'd): π_Q Calculation for Custom Screening Programs

Group	MIL-STD-883 Screen/Test (Note 3)	Point Valuation
1*	TM 1010 (Temperature Cycle, Cond B Minimum) and TM 2001 (Constant Acceleration, Cond B Minimum) and TM 5004 (or 5008 for Hybrids) (Final Electricals @ Temp Extremes) and TM 1014 (Seal Test, Cond A, B, or C) and TM 2009 (External Visual)	50
2*	TM 1010 (Temperature Cycle, Cond B Minimum) or TM 2001 (Constant Acceleration, Cond B Minimum) TM 5004 (or 5008 for Hybrids) (Final Electricals @ Temp Extremes) and TM 1014 (Seal Test, Cond A, B, or C) and TM 2009 (External Visual)	37
3	Pre-Burn in Electricals TM 1015 (Burn-in B-Level/S-Level) and TM 5004 (or 5008 for Hybrids) (Post Burn-in Electricals @ Temp Extremes)	30 (B Level) 36 (S Level)
4*	TM 2020 Pind (Particle Impact Noise Detection)	11
5	TM 5004 (or 5008 for Hybrids) (Final Electricals @ Temperature Extremes)	11 (Note 1)
6	TM 2010/17 (Internal Visual)	7
7*	TM 1014 (Seal Test, Cond A, B, or C)	7 (Note 2)
8	TM 2012 (Radiography)	7
9	TM 2009 (External Visual)	7 (Note 2)
10	TM 5007/5013 (GaAs) (Wafer Acceptance)	1
11	TM 2023 (Non-Destructive Bond Pull)	1

$$\pi_Q = 2 + \frac{87}{\sum Point\,Valuations}$$

*ΝΟΤ ΑΠΠΡΟΠΡΙΑΤΕ ΦΟΡ ΠΛΑΣΤΙΧ ΠΑΡΤΣ

NOTES:
1. Point valuation only assigned if used independent of Groups 1, 2 or 3.
2. Point valuation only assigned if used independent of Groups 1 or 2.
3. Sequencing of tests within groups 1, 2 and 3 must be followed.
4. TM refers to the MIL-STD-883 Test Method.
5. Nonhermetic parts should be used only in controlled environments (i.e., G_B and other temperature/humidity controlled environments).

EXAMPLES:
1. Mfg. performs Group 1 test and Class B burn-in: $\pi_Q = 2 + \frac{87}{50+30} = 3.1$
2. Mfg. performs internal visual test, seal test and final electrical test: $\pi = 2 + = 5.5$

Other Commercial or Unknown Screening Levels	$\pi_Q = 10$

Table A10-2: Generic Failure Rate - λ_g (Failures/10^6 Hours) for Discrete Semiconductors

Part Type	G_B	G_F	G_M	N_S	N_U	A_{IC}	A_{IF}	A_{UC}	A_{UF}	A_{RW}	S_F
DIODES											
General Purpose Analog	.0036	.028	.049	.043	.10	.092	.21	.20	.44	.17	.0018
Switching	.00094	.0075	.013	.011	.027	.024	.054	.054	.12	.045	.00047
Fast Recovery Pwr. Rectifier	.065	.52	.89	.78	1.9	1.7	3.7	3.7	8.0	3.1	.032
Power Rectifier/ Schottky Pwr.	.0028	.022	.039	.034	.082	.073	.16	.16	.35	.13	.0014
Transient Suppressor/Varistor	.0029	.023	.040	.035	.084	.075	.17	.17	.36	.14	.0015
Voltage Ref/Reg. (Avalanche and Zener)	.0033	.024	.039	.035	.082	.066	.15	.13	.27	.12	.0016
Current Regulator	.0056	.040	.066	.060	.14	.11	.25	.22	.46	.21	.0028
Si Impatt (f ≤ 35 GHz)	.86	2.8	8.9	5.6	20	11	14	36	62	44	.43
Gunn/Bulk Effect	.31	.76	2.1	1.5	4.6	2.0	2.5	4.5	7.6	7.9	.16
Tunnel and Back	.004	.0096	.027	.019	.058	.025	.032	.057	.097	.10	.002
PIN	.028	.068	.19	.14	.41	.18	.22	.40	.69	.71	.014
Schottky Barrier and Point Contact (200 MHz ≤ f ≤ 35 GHz)	.047	.11	.31	.23	.68	.30	.37	.67	1.1	1.2	.023
Varactor	.0043	.010	.029	.021	.063	.028	.034	.062	.11	.11	.0022
Thyristor/SCR	.0025	.020	.034	.030	.072	.064	.14	.14	.31	.12	.0012
TRANSISTORS											
NPN/PNP (f < 200 MHz)	.00015	.0011	.0017	.0017	.0037	.0030	.0067	.0060	.013	.0056	.000073
Power NPN/PNP (f < 200 MHz)	.0057	.042	.069	.063	.15	.12	.26	.23	.50	.22	.0029
Si FET (f ≤ 400 MHz)	.014	.099	.16	.15	.34	.28	.62	.53	1.1	.51	.0069
Si FET (f > 400 MHz)	.099	.24	.64	.47	1.4	.61	.76	1.3	2.3	2.4	.049
GaAs FET (P < 100 mW)	.17	.51	1.5	1.0	3.4	1.8	2.3	5.4	9.2	7.2	.083

Part Type	G_B	G_F	G_M	N_S	N_U	A_{IC}	A_{IF}	A_{UC}	A_{UF}	A_{RW}	S_F
TRANSISTORS (cont'd)											
GaAs FET (P ≥ 100 mW)	.42	1.3	3.9	2.5	8.5	4.5	5.6	13	23	18	.21
Unijunction	.016	.12	.20	.18	.42	.36	.80	.74	1.6	.66	.0079
RF, Low Noise (f > 200 MHz, P < 1W)	.094	.23	.63	.46	1.4	.60	.75	1.3	2.3	2.4	.047
RF, Power (P ≥ 1W)	.045	.091	.23	.18	.50	.18	.23	.32	.55	.73	.023
OPTO-ELECTRONICS											
Photodetector	.011	.029	.13	.074	.20	.084	.13	.17	.23	.36	.0057
Opto-Isolator	.027	.070	.31	.17	.47	.20	.30	.42	.56	.85	.013
Emitter	.00047	.0012	.0056	.0031	.0084	.0035	.0053	.0074	.0098	.015	.00024
Alphanumeric Display	.0062	.016	.073	.040	.11	.046	.069	.096	.13	.20	.0031
Laser Diode, GaAs/Al GaAs	5.1	16	78	39	120	58	86	86	110	240	2.6
Laser Diode, In GaAs/In GaAsP	9.0	28	135	69	200	100	150	150	200	400	4.5

Discrete Semiconductor Quality Factors - π_Q

Part Types	JANTXV	JANTX	JAN	Lower	Plastic
Non-RF Devices/ Opto-Electronics*	.70	1.0	2.4	5.5	8.0
High Freq Diodes	.50	1.0	5.0	25	50
Schottky Diodes	.50	1.0	1.8	2.5	- - - -
RF Transistors	.50	1.0	2.0	5.0	- - - -

*Laser Diodes:
π_Q = 1.0 Hermetic Package
= 1.0 Nonhermetic with Facet Coating
= 3.3 Nonhermetic without Facet Coating

* not normally used in this environment

Table A10-3: Generic Failure Rate - λ_g (Failures/10^6 Hours) for Resistors

Part Type/Style	G_B	G_F	G_M	N_S	N_U	A_{IC}	A_{IF}	A_{UC}	A_{UF}	A_{RW}	S_F
RESISTORS											
Composition, RC	.00050	.0022	.0071	.0037	.012	.0052	.0065	.016	.025	.025	.00025
Film, Insulated, RL	.0012	.0027	.011	.0054	.020	.0063	.013	.018	.033	.030	.00025
Film, RN	.0014	.0031	.013	.0061	.023	.0072	.014	.021	.038	.034	.00028
Film, Power, RD	.012	.025	.13	.062	.21	.078	.10	.19	.24	.32	.0060
Film, Network, RZ	.0023	.0066	.031	.013	.055	.022	.043	.077	.15	.10	.0011
Wirewound, Accurate, RB	.0085	.018	.10	.045	.16	.15	.17	.30	.38	.26	.0068
Wirewound, Power, RW	.014	.031	.16	.077	.26	.073	.15	.19	.39	.42	.0042
Wirewound, Power, Chassis, Mounted, RE	.0080	.018	.096	.045	.15	.044	.088	.12	.24	.25	.0040
Thermistor, RTH	.065	.32	1.4	.71	1.6	.71	1.9	1.0	2.7	2.4	.032
Wirewound, Variable, RT	.026	.056	.36	.17	.59	.17	.27	.36	.60	1.1	.013
Wirewound, Variable, Precision, RR	.36	.80	7.7	3.2	13	3.9	5.8	7.8	11	26	.18
Wirewound, Variable, Semiprec., RA, RK, RP	.15	.35	3.1	1.2	5.4	1.9	2.8	*	*	9.0	.075
Nonwirewound, Variable, RJ	.033	.10	.50	.21	.87	.19	.27	.52	.79	1.5	.017
Composition, Variable, RV	.050	.11	1.1	.45	1.7	2.8	4.6	4.6	7.5	3.3	.025
Nonwirewound, Variable Precision, RQ	.043	.15	.75	.35	1.3	.39	.78	1.8	2.8	2.5	.021
Film, Variable, RVC	.048	.16	.76	.36	1.3	.36	.72	1.4	2.2	2.3	.024

* Not normally used in this environment

Resistor Quality Factors - π_Q

Quality	Established Reliability Styles				MIL-SPEC	Lower
	S	R	P	M		
π_Q	.030	.10	.30	1.0	3.0	10

Table A10-4: Generic Failure Rate - λ_g (Failures/10^6 Hours) for Capacitors

Part Type/Style	G_B	G_F	G_M	N_S	N_U	A_{IC}	A_{IF}	A_{UC}	A_{UF}	A_{RW}	S_F
CAPACITORS											
Paper, By-Pass, CP	.0036	.0072	.033	.018	.055	.023	.03	.070	.13	.083	.0018
Paper, By-Pass, CA	.0039	.0087	.042	.022	.070	.035	.047	.19	.35	.13	.002
Paper/Plastic, Feed-through, CZR	.0047	.0096	.044	.034	.073	.030	.040	.094	.15	.11	.0024
Paper/Plastic Film, CPV, CQR	.0021	.0042	.017	.010	.030	.0088	.013	.026	.048	.044	.0010
Metallized Paper/Plastic, CH	.0029	.0058	.023	.014	.041	.012	.018	.037	.066	.060	.0014
Metallized Paper/Plastic, CFR	.0041	.0083	.042	.021	.067	.026	.048	.086	.14	.10	.0020
Metallized Plastic, CRH	.0023	.0092	.019	.012	.033	.0096	.014	.034	.053	.048	.0011
MICA (Dipped or Molded), CM	.0005	.0015	.0091	.0044	.014	.0068	.0095	.054	.069	.031	.00025
MICA (Button), CB	.018	.037	.19	.094	.31	.10	.14	.47	.60	.46	.0091
Glass, CY	.00032	.00096	.0059	.0029	.0094	.0044	.0062	.035	.045	.020	.00016
Ceramic (Gen. Purpose), CK	.0036	.0074	.034	.019	.056	.015	.015	.032	.048	.077	.0014
Ceramic (Temp. Comp.), CC, CD	.00078	.0022	.013	.0056	.023	.0077	.015	.053	.12	.046	.00039
Tantalum, Solid, CSR	.0018	.0039	.016	.0097	.028	.0091	.011	.034	.057	.055	.00072
Tantalum, Non-Solid, CLR	.0061	.013	.069	.039	.11	.031	.061	.13	.29	.18	.0030
Aluminum Oxide, CUR	.024	.061	.42	.18	.59	.46	.55	2.1	2.6	1.2	.012
Aluminum Dry, CE	.029	.081	.58	.24	.83	.73	.88	4.3	5.4	2.0	.015
Variable, Ceramic, CV	.08	.27	1.2	.71	2.3	.69	1.1	6.2	12	4.1	.032
Variable, Piston, PC	.033	.13	.62	.31	.93	.21	.28	2.2	3.3	2.2	.016
Variable, Air Trimmer, CT	.080	.33	1.6	.87	3.0	1.0	1.7	9.9	19	6.1	.040
Variable, Vacuum, CG	0.4	1.3	6.7	3.6	13	5.7	10	58	90	23	.20

Capacitor Quality Factors - π_Q

Quality	S	Established Reliability Styles				MIL-SPEC	Lower
		R	P	M	L		
π_Q	.030	.10	.30	1.0	3.0	3.0	10

Table A10-5: Generic Failure Rate - λ_g (Failures/10⁶ Hours) for Inductive and Electromechanical Parts

Part Type	G_B	G_F	G_M	N_S	N_U	A_{IC}	A_{IF}	A_{UC}	A_{UF}	A_{RW}	S_F
INDUCTIVE DEVICES											
Low Power Pulse XFMR	.0035	.023	.049	.019	.065	.027	.037	.041	.052	.11	.0018
Audio XFMR	.0071	.046	.097	.038	.13	.055	.073	.081	.10	.22	.0035
High Pwr. Pulse and Pwr. XFMR, Filter	.023	.16	.34	.13	.45	.21	.27	.35	.45	.82	.011
RF XFMR	.028	.18	.39	.15	.52	.22	.29	.33	.42	.88	.014
RF Coils, Fixed or Molded	.0017	.0073	.023	.0091	.031	.011	.015	.016	.022	.052	.00083
RF Coils, Variable	.0033	.015	.046	.018	.061	.022	.03	.033	.044	.10	.0017
ROTATING DEVICES											
Motors	1.6	2.4	3.3	2.4	3.3	7.1	7.1	31	31	7.1	1.6
Synchros	.07	.20	1.5	.70	2.2	.78	1.2	7.9	12	5.1	.035
Resolvers	.11	.30	2.2	1.0	3.3	1.2	1.8	12	18	7.6	.053
ELAPSED TIME METERS											
ETM-AC	10	20	120	70	180	50	80	160	250	260	5.0
ETM-Inverter Driver	15	30	180	105	270	75	120	240	375	390	7.5
ETM-Commutator DC	40	80	480	280	720	200	320	640	1000	1040	20
RELAYS											
General Purpose	.13	.28	2.1	1.1	3.8	1.1	1.4	1.9	2.1	7.0	.066
Contactor, High Current	.43	.89	6.9	3.6	12	3.4	4.4	6.2	6.7	22	.21
Latching	.13	.28	2.1	1.1	3.8	1.1	1.4	1.9	2.1	7.0	.066
Reed	.11	.23	1.8	.92	3.3	.96	1.2	2.1	2.3	6.3	.054
Thermal, Bi-metal	.29	.60	4.6	2.4	8.2	2.3	2.9	4.1	4.5	15	.14
Meter Movement	.88	1.8	14	7.4	26	7.1	9.1	13	14	46	.44
Solid State	.40	1.2	4.8	2.4	6.8	4.8	7.6	8.4	13	9.2	.16
Hybrid and Solid State Time Delay	.50	1.5	6.0	3.0	8.5	6.0	9.5	11	16	12	.20

Part Type	G_B	G_F	G_M	N_S	N_U	A_{IC}	A_{IF}	A_{UC}	A_{UF}	A_{RW}	S_F
SWITCHES											
Toggle or Pushbutton	.0010	.0030	.018	.0080	.029	.010	.018	.013	.022	.046	.0005
Sensitive	.15	.44	2.7	1.2	4.3	1.5	2.7	1.9	3.3	6.8	.074
Rotary Wafer	.33	.99	5.9	2.6	9.5	3.3	5.9	4.3	7.2	15	.16
Thumbwheel	.56	1.7	10	4.5	16	5.6	10	7.3	12	26	.28
Circuit Breaker, Thermal	.11	.23	1.7	.91	3.1	.80	1.0	1.3	1.4	5.2	.057
Circuit Breaker, Magnetic	.060	.12	.90	.48	1.6	.42	.54	.66	.72	2.8	.030
CONNECTORS											
Circular/Rack/Panel	0.011	0.14	.12	.069	.20	.059	.098	.23	.34	.37	.0054
Coaxial	.012	.015	.13	.075	.21	.060	.10	.22	.32	.38	.0061
Printed Circuit Board Connector	.0054	.021	.063	.035	.10	.059	.11	.085	.16	.19	.0027
IC Sockets	.0019	.0058	.027	.012	.035	.015	.023	.021	.025	.048	.00097
INTERCONNECTION ASSEMBLIES											
Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs)	.053	.11	.37	.69	.27	.27	.43	.85	1.5	1.0	.027

Table A10-6: Generic Failure Rate - λ_g (Failures/10^6 Hours) for Miscellaneous Parts

Part Type	G_B	G_F	G_M	N_S	N_U	A_{IC}	A_{IF}	A_{UC}	A_{UF}	A_{RW}	S_F
SINGLE CONNECTIONS											
Hand Solder, w/o Wrapping	.0026	.0052	.018	.010	.029	.010	.016	.016	.021	.042	.0013
Hand Solder, w/Wrapping	.00014	.00028	.00098	.00056	.0015	.00056	.00084	.00084	.0011	.0022	.00007
Crimp	.00026	.00052	.0018	.0010	.0029	.0010	.0016	.0016	.0021	.0042	.00013
Weld	.000050	.000100	.000350	.000200	.000550	.000200	.000300	.000300	.000400	.000800	.000025
Solderless Wrap	.0000035	.0000007	.0000025	.000014	.000039	.000014	.000021	.000021	.000028	.000056	.0000018
Clip Termination	.00012	.00024	.00084	.00048	.0013	.00048	.00072	.00072	.00096	.0019	.00006
Reflow Solder	.000069	.00014	.00048	.00028	.00076	.00028	.00041	.00041	.00055	.0011	.000035
METERS, PANEL											
DC Ammeter or Voltmeter	0.09	0.36	2.3	1.1	3.2	2.5	3.8	5.2	6.6	5.4	0.099
AC Ammeter or Voltmeter	0.15	0.61	3.8	1.8	5.4	4.3	6.4	8.9	11	9.2	0.17
QUARTZ CRYSTALS	.032	.096	.32	.19	.51	.38	.54	.70	.90	.74	.016
LAMPS											
Incandescent, AC	3.9	7.8	12	12	16	16	16	19	23	19	2.7
Incandescent, DC	13	26	38	38	51	51	51	64	77	64	9.0
ELECTRONIC FILTERS											
Ceramic-Ferrite	.022	.044	.13	.088	.20	.15	.20	.24	.29	.24	.018
Discrete LC Comp.	.12	.24	.72	.48	1.1	.84	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.3	.096
Discrete LC & Crystal Comp.	.27	.54	1.6	1.1	2.4	1.9	2.4	3.0	3.5	3.0	.22
FUSES	.010	.020	.080	.050	.11	.090	.12	.15	.18	.16	.009

Table A10-7: π_Q Factor for Use with Inductive, Electromechanical and Miscellaneous Parts

Part Type	Established Reliability	MIL-SPEC	Non-MIL
Inductive Devices	.25	1.0	10
Rotating Devices	N/A	N/A	N/A
Relays, Mechanical	.60	3.0	9.0
Relays, Solid State and Time Delay (Hybrid & Solid State)	N/A	1.0	4
Switches, Toggle, Pushbutton, Sensitive	N/A	1.0	20
Switches, Rotary Wafer	N/A	1.0	50
Switches, Thumbwheel	N/A	1.0	10
Circuit Breakers, Thermal	N/A	1.0	8.4
Connectors	N/A	1.0	2.0
Interconnection Assemblies	N/A	1.0	2.0
Connections	N/A	N/A	N/A
Meters, Panel	N/A	1.0	3.4
Quartz Crystals	N/A	1.0	2.1
Lamps, Incandescent	N/A	N/A	N/A
Electronic Filters	N/A	1.0	2.9
Fuses	N/A	N/A	N/A

Topic A11: Reliability Adjustment Factors

"What if" questions are often asked regarding reliability figures of merit. For a rapid translation, tables for different quality levels, various environments and temperatures are presented to make estimates of the effects of the various changes. The data base for these tables is a grouping of approximately 18000 parts from a number of equipment reliability predictions performed in-house on military contracts. The ratios were developed using this data base and MIL-HDBK-217F algorithms. The relative percentages of the part data base are shown as follows:

Table A11-1: Part Quality Factors (Multiply MTBF by)

		To Quality Class			
		Space	**Full Military**	**Ruggedized**	**Commercial**
	Space	X	0.8	0.5	0.2
From	**Full Military**	1.3	X	0.6	0.2
Quality	**Ruggedized**	2.1	1.6	X	0.4
Class	**Commercial**	5.3	4.1	2.5	X
	IC	Class S	Class B	Class B-1	Class D
	Semiconductor	JANTXV	JANTX	JAN	NONMIL
	Passive Part	ER(S)	ER(R)	ER(M)	NONMIL

CAUTION: Do not apply to Mean-Time-Between-Critical-Failure (MTBCF).

Table A11-2: Environmental Conversion Factors (Multiply MTBF by)

From Environment / **To Environment**

From \ To	GB	GF	GM	NS	NU	AIC	AIF	AUC	AUF	ARW	SF
GB	X	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.2
GF	1.9	X	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.2	2.2
GM	4.6	2.5	X	1.4	0.7	1.4	0.9	0.6	0.3	0.5	5.4
NS	3.3	1.8	0.7	X	0.5	1.0	0.7	0.4	0.2	0.3	3.8
NU	7.2	3.9	1.6	2.2	X	2.2	1.4	0.9	0.5	0.7	8.3
AIC	3.3	1.8	0.7	1.0	0.5	X	0.7	0.4	0.2	0.3	3.9
AIF	5.0	2.7	1.1	1.5	0.7	1.5	X	0.6	0.4	0.5	5.8
AUC	8.2	4.4	1.8	2.5	1.2	2.5	1.6	X	0.6	0.8	9.5
AUF	14.1	7.6	3.1	4.4	2.0	4.2	2.8	1.7	X	1.4	16.4
ARW	10.2	5.5	2.2	3.2	1.4	3.1	2.1	1.3	0.7	X	11.9
SF	0.9	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	X

Environmental Factors as Defined in MIL-HDBK-217

GB - Ground Benign; GF - Ground Fixed; GM - Ground Mobile; NS - Naval Sheltered; NU - Naval Unsheltered; AIC - Airborne Inhabited Cargo; AIF - Airborne Inhabited Fighter; AUC - Airborne Uninhabited Cargo; AUF - Airborne Uninhabited Fighter; ARW - Airborne Rotary Winged; SF - Space Flight

CAUTION: Do not apply to MTBCF.

Table A11-3: Temperature Conversion Factors
(Multiply MTBF by)

From Temperature °C	To Temperature °C									
	10	**20**	**30**	**40**	**50**	**60**	**70**	**80**	**90**	**100**
10	X	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1
20	1.1	X	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.2
30	1.2	1.1	X	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.2
40	1.3	1.2	1.0	X	0.8	0.7	0.6	.04	0.3	0.2
50	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.2	X	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.3	0.2
60	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.2	X	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.3
70	2.4	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.5	1.2	X	0.7	0.5	0.3
80	3.3	3.0	2.7	2.6	2.1	1.7	1.4	X	0.7	0.4
90	4.9	4.5	4.0	3.8	3.2	2.5	2.0	1.5	X	0.6
100	7.7	7.0	6.3	6.0	5.0	4.0	3.2	2.3	1.6	X

CAUTION: Do no apply to MTBCF.

Topic A12: Surface Mount Technology (SMT) Assessment Model

The SMT Model was developed to assess the life integrity of leadless and leaded devices. It provides a relative measure of circuit card wearout due to thermal cycling fatigue failure of the "weakest link" SMT device. An analysis should be performed on all circuit board SMT components. The component with the largest failure rate value (weakest link) is assessed as the overall board failure rate due to SMT. The model assumes the board is completely renewed upon failure of the weakest link and the results do not consider solder or lead manufacturing defects. This model is based on the techniques developed in the Rome Laboratory technical report RL-TR-92-197, "Reliability Assessment of Critical Electronic Components."

λ_{SMT} = Average failure rate over the expected equipment life cycle due to surface mount device wearout. This failure rate contribution to the system is for the Surface Mount Device on each board exhibiting the highest **absolute** value of the strain range:

$$[(\alpha_s \Delta T - \alpha_{CC} (\Delta T + T_{RISE})) \times 10^{-6}]$$

λ_{SMT} = $\dfrac{ECF}{\alpha_{SMT}}$

ECF = Effective cumulative number of failures over the Weibull characteristic life.

Table A12-1: Effective Cumulative Failures - ECF

$\dfrac{LC}{\alpha_{SMT}}$	ECF
0 - .1	.13
.11 - .20	.15
.21 - .30	.23
.31 - .40	.31
.41 - .50	.41
.51 - .60	.51
.61 - .70	.61
.71 - .80	.68
.81 - .90	.76
> .9	1.0

LC = Design life cycle of the equipment in which the circuit board is operating.

α_{SMT} = The Weibull characteristic life. α_{SMT} is a function of device and substrate material, the manufacturing methods, and the application environment used.

$$\alpha_{SMT} = \frac{N_f}{CR}$$

where:

CR = Temperature cycling rate in cycles per calendar hour

N_f = Average number of thermal cycles to failure

$$N_f = 3.5 \left(\frac{d}{.65h} \left| (\alpha_S \Delta T - \alpha_{cc}(\Delta T + T_{RISE})) \right| x10^{-6} \right)^{-2.26} (\pi_{LC})$$

where:

d = Distance from center of device to the furthest solder joint in mils (thousandths of an inch)

h = Solder joint height in mils for leadless devices. Use h = 8 for all leaded configurations.

α_S = Circuit board substrate thermal coefficient of expansion (TCE)

ΔT = Use environment temperature difference

α_{CC} = Package material thermal coefficient of expansion (TCE)

T_{RISE} = Temperature rise due to power dissipation (Pd)
Pd = θ_{JC}P θ_{JC} = Thermal resistance °/Watt
                              P = Watts

π_{LC} = Lead configuration factor

Table A12-2: CR - Cycling Rate Values

Equipment Type	Number of Cycles/Hour
Consumer (television, radio, recorder)	.0042
Computer	.17
Telecommunications	.0042
Commerical Aircraft	.34
Industrial	.021
Military Ground Applications	.03
Military Aircraft	.12

Table A12-3: π_{LC} - Lead Configuration Factor

Lead Configuration	π_{LC}
Leadless	1
J or S Lead	150
Gull Wing	5,000

Table A12-4: α_{CC} - TCE Package Values

Substrate Material	α_{CC} Average Value
Plastic	7
Ceramic	6

Table A12-5: ΔT - Use Environment Temperature Difference

Environment	ΔT
G_B	7
G_F	21
G_M	26
A_{IC}	31
A_{UC}	57
A_{IF}	31
A_{UF}	57
A_{RW}	31
N_U	61
N_S	26

Table A12-6: α_S - TCE Substrate Values

Substrate Material	α_S
FR-4 Laminate	18
FR-4 Multilayer Board	20
FR-4 Multilayer Board w/Copper Clad Invar	11
Ceramic Multilayer Board	7
Copper Clad Invar	5
Copper Clad Molybdenum	5
Carbon-Fiber/Epoxy Composite	1
Kevlar Fiber	3
Quartz Fiber	1
Glass Fiber	5
Epoxy/Glass Laminate	15
Polimide/Glass Laminate	13
Polyimide/Kevlar Laminate	6
Polyimide/Quartz Laminate	8
Epoxy/Kevlar Laminate	7
Aluminum (Ceramic)	7
Epoxy Aramid Fiber	7
Polyimide Aramid Fiber	6
Epoxy-Quartz	9
Fiberglass Teflon Laminates	20
Porcelainized Copper Clad Invar	7
Fiberglass Ceramic Fiber	7

Example: A large plastic encapsulated leadless chip carrier is mounted on a epoxy-glass printed wiring assembly. The design considerations are: a square package is 1480 mils on a side, solder height is 5 mils, power dissipation is .5 watts, thermal resistance is 20°C/watt, the design life is 20 years and environment is military ground application. The failure rate developed is the impact of SMT for a single circuit board and accounts for **all** SMT devices on this board. This failure rate is added to the sum of all of the component failure rates on the circuit board.

$$\lambda_{SMT} \quad = \quad \frac{ECF}{\alpha_{SMT}}$$

$$\alpha_{SMT} = \frac{N_f}{CR}$$

$$N_f = 3.5\left(\frac{d}{(.65)(h)}\left|(\alpha_S\Delta T - a_{CC}(\Delta T + T_{RISE}))\right|x10^{-6}\right)^{-2.26}(\pi_{LC})$$

For d: $d = \frac{1}{2}(1480) = 740$ mils

For h: h = 5 mils

For α_S: α_S = 15 (Table A12-6 - Epoxy Glass)

For Δ_T: Δ_T = 21 (Table A12-5 - G_F)

For α_{CC}: α_{CC} = 7 (Table A12-4 - Plastic)

For T_{RISE}: $T_{RISE} = \theta_{JC}$ P = 20(.5) = 10°C

For π_{LC}: π_{LC} = 1 (Table A12-3 - Leadless)

For CR: CR = .03 cycles/hour (Table A12-2 - Military Ground)

$$N_f = 3.5\left(\frac{740}{(.65)(5)}\left|(15(21) - 7(21+10))\right|x10^{-6}\right)^{-2.26} \quad (1)$$

N_f = 18,893 thermal cycles to failure

$$\alpha_{SMT} = \frac{18,893 \text{ cycles}}{.03 \text{ cyles/hour}} = 629,767 \text{ hours}$$

$$\frac{LC}{\alpha_{SMT}} = \frac{(20 \text{ yrs.})\left(8760\frac{hr}{yr}\right)}{629,767 \text{ hrs.}} = .28$$

ECF = .23 failures (Table A12-1)

$$\lambda_{SMT} = \frac{ECF}{\alpha_{SMT}} = \frac{.23 \text{ failures}}{629,767 \text{ hours}} = .0000004 \text{ failures/hour}$$

$$\boxed{\lambda_{SMT} = .4 \text{ failures}/10^6 \text{ hours}}$$

Topic A13: Finite Element Analysis

Background

Finite Element Analysis (FEA) is a computer simulation technique that can predict the material response or behavior of a modeled device. These analyses can provide material stresses and temperatures throughout modeled devices by simulating thermal or dynamic loading situations. FEA can be used to assess mechanical failure mechanisms such as fatigue, rupture, creep, and buckling.

When to Apply

FEA of electronic devices can be time consuming and analysis candidates must be carefully selected. Selection criteria includes devices, components, or design concepts which: (a) Are unproven and for which little or no prior experience or test information is available; (b) Utilize advanced or unique packaging or design concepts; (c) Will encounter severe environmental loads; (d) Have critical thermal or mechanical performance and behavior constraints.

Typical Application

 A typical finite element reliability analysis of an electronic device would be an assessment of the life (i.e. number of thermal or vibration cycles to failure or hours of operation in a given environment) or perhaps the probability of a fatigue failure after a required time of operation of a critical region or location within the device. Examples are surface mount attachments of a chip carrier to a circuit board, a critical location in a multichip module, or a source via in a transistor microcircuit. First, the entire device (or a symmetrical part of the entire device) is modeled with a coarse mesh of relatively large sized elements such as 3-dimensional brick elements. For example, as shown in Figure A13-1, an entire circuit board is analyzed (Step 1). The loading, material property, heat sink temperature, and structural support data are entered into the data file in the proper format and sequence as required by the FEA solver. Output deflections and material stresses for all node point locations on the model are then acquired. For microelectronic devices, second or third follow-on models of refined regions of interest may be required because of the geometrically small feature sizes involved. The boundary nodes for the follow-on model are given initial temperatures and displacements that were acquired from the circuit board model. The figure shows a refined region containing a single chip carrier and its leads (Step 2). The more refined models provide accurate temperature, deflection, and stress information for reliability analyses. For example, the results of Step 2 could be a maximum stress value in a corner lead of a chip carrier caused by temperature or vibration cycling. A deterministic life analysis is made by locating the stress value on a graph of stress versus cycles to failure for the appropriate material and reading cycles to failures on the abscissa (Step 3). Cycles to failure and time to failure are related by the temperature cycling rate or the natural frequency for thermal or dynamic environments, respectively. A distribution of stress coupled with a distribution of strength (i.e. scatter in fatigue data) will result in a probability distribution function and a cumulative distribution function of time to failure (Step 4).

● **FEM Results**

Step 1

● **Interpretation of Local Displacements/Stresses**

Step 2

Vibration and Thermal Displacements
Component Relative to Board

● **Life Analysis**

Step 3

● **Probabilistic Reliability Analysis**

Step 4

Figure A13-1

Topic A14: Common Thermal Analysis Procedures

The following graphs and associated examples provide a guide for performing basic integrated circuit junction temperature calculations for three of the most common types of cooling designs: impingement, cold wall, and flow through modules. This procedure is intended to provide the Reliability Engineer with a simple means of calculating approximate junction temperatures and for performing a quick check of more detailed thermal analysis calculations.

Card-Mounted, Flow-through Modules

Notes:

1.   Module dissipation uniformly distributed and applied on both sides.

2.   The part junction temperature is obtained as follows:

$$T_J = T_A + \Delta T_{BA} + (\theta_{JC} + \theta_{CB}) Q_P$$

where

T_J is the junction temperature

T_A is the cooling air inlet

ΔT_{BA} is the weighted average heat-exchanger-to-cooling-air inlet temperature difference (See Note 4)

θ_{JC} is the junction-to-case thermal resistance in °C/W

θ_{CB} is the thermal resistance between the case and the heat exchanger in °C/W

Q_P is the part power dissipation in watts

3.   All temperatures are in °C

4.   Weighted average temperature difference is the value at a location two thirds of the distance from the inlet to the outlet, as shown in sketch. Experience has shown that the temperature at this location approximates the average board temperature.

Figure A14-1: Estimated Temperature of Card-mounted Parts Using Forced-air-cooled Flow-through Modules

Card-Mounted, Air-Cooled Coldwalls

Notes:

1. ΔT_{CE} from curve is for L/W = 2; for other L/W ratios, multiply ΔT_{CE} from curve by 0.5 L/W

2. The junction temperature is obtained as follows:

$$T_J = T_A + \frac{0.03\ Q_T}{m_a} + \Delta T_{CE} + Q_T\ (0.0761/W + 0.25) + Q_P\ (\theta_{JC} + \theta_{CB})$$

where
  T_J is the junction temperature
  T_A is the air inlet temperature
  Q_T is the total card power dissipation in watts
  Q_P is the part power dissipation in watts
  m_a is the airflow rate in Kg/Min
  ΔT_{CE} is the temperature difference between center of card and card edge
  W is the card width in meters
  θ_{JC} is the junction-to-case thermal resistance in °C/W
  θ_{CB} is the case-to-mounting surface thermal resistance in °C/W

3. All temperatures are in °C

4. The card edge to card guide interface thermal resistance is 0.0761 °C/W per meter of card width

5. The coldwall convective thermal resistance is 0.25°C/W

Figure A14-2: Estimated Temperature of Card-mounted Parts Using Forced-air Cooled Coldwalls

Air Impingement, Card-Mounted

Notes:

1. The part junction temperature is obtained as follows:

    $$T_J = T_A + \Delta T_{BA} + (\theta_{JC} + \theta_{CB}) Q_P$$

    where

    T_J is the junction temperature

    T_A is the local cooling air temperature

    ΔT_{BA} is the local card-to-air temperature difference

    θ_{JC} is the junction-to-case thermal resistance in °C/W

    θ_{CB} is the case-to-mounting-surface thermal resistance in °C/W

    Q_P is the part power dissipation in watts

2. All temperatures are in °C

3. Assumes all the heat is uniformly distributed over both sides of the board

4. Assumes no air temperature rise (add any rise in air temperature to the result)

Figure A14-3: Estimated Temperature of Card-mounted Parts Using Forced-air Impingement Cooling at Sea Level

Example 1: Card Mounted, Air Cooled Coldwalls

Estimate the junction temperature of a 0.25-W microcircuit mounted at the center of a coldwall-cooled circuit board, 0.152 X 0.102 m, with a total power dissipation of 20 W. The part, which has a mounting base of 0.00635 X 0.00953 m, is attached to the board with a 7.6 X 10^{-5} m (3 mils) thick bonding compound whose thermal conductivity (k) is 0.25 W/m-$^{\circ}$C. The forced airflow rate is 1.8 kg/min with an inlet temperature of 45°C. The board contains a 5.08 X 10^{-4} (0.020 inch) thick copper thermal plane. The θ_{JC} of the part is 50°C/W.

1. From Figure A14-2, ΔT_{CE} = 57°C for L/W = 2

   Actual L/W = $\frac{0.152 \text{ m}}{0.102 \text{ m}}$ = 1.49, so

   Corrected ΔT_{CE} = (0.5) (1.49) (57°C) = 42.5°C

2. $\theta_{CB} = \dfrac{7.6 \text{ X } 10^{-5}\text{m}}{(0.25 \text{ W/m}^{\circ}\text{C}) (0.00635\text{m}) (0.00953 \text{ m})}$ = 5.03°C/W

3. From Note 2 in Figure A14-2

   $T_J = T_A + \dfrac{0.03 Q_T}{m_a} + \Delta T_{CE} + Q_T (0.0761 \text{ W} + 0.25) + Q_P (\theta_{JC} + \theta_{CB})$

   $= 45 + \dfrac{0.03 \ (20)}{1.8} \ 42.5 + 20 \left(\dfrac{0.0761}{0.102} + 0.25 \right) + 0.25 \ (50 + 5.03)$

   T_J = 122°C

Example 2: Air Impingement, Card Mounted Cooling

Estimate the junction temperature of a part dissipating 0.25 W and mounted on a circuit board cooled by impingement with ambient air at 40°C and a velocity of 15 m/s. The circuit board, whose dimensions are 0.102 X 0.152 m, has a total power dissipation of 20 W. The part, whose mounting base is 0.00635 X 0.00953 m, is attached to the board with a 7.61 X 10^{-5} m (3 mils) thick bonding compound whose thermal conductivity (k) is 0.25 W/m-$^{\circ}$C. The junction-to-case thermal resistance (θ_{JC}) of the part is 50°C/W.

1. Compute the card heat flux density (see Note 3 in Figure A14-3):

   $\dfrac{20 \text{ W}}{2 \ (0.102 \text{ m}) \ (0.152 \text{ m})}$ = 645 W/m^2

2. From Figure A14-3: ΔT_{BA} = 17°C

3. $\theta_{CB} = \dfrac{7.61 \text{ X } 10^{-5} \text{ m}}{(0.25\text{W/m}^{\circ}\text{C}) \ (0.00635 \text{ m}) \ (0.00953 \text{ m})}$ = 5.03°C/W

4. From Note 1 in Figure A14-3
   $T_J = T_A + \Delta T_{BA} + (\theta_{JC} + \theta_{CB}) Q_P = 40 + 17 + (50 + 5.03) \ 0.25$
   T_J = 71°C

Topic A15: Sneak Circuit Analysis

Electronics that operate within their specifications are still vulnerable to critical failures. Hidden within the complexity of electronic designs are conditions that slip past standard stress tests. These conditions are known as sneak circuits.

Definitions

- **Sneak Circuit:** A condition which causes the occurrence of an unwanted function or inhibits a desired function even though all components function properly.

- **Sneak Paths:** Unintended electrical paths within a circuit and its external interfaces.

- **Sneak Timing:** Unexpected interruption or enabling of a signal due to switch circuit timing problems.

- **Sneak Indications:** Undesired activation or de-activation of an indicator.

- **Sneak Labels:** Incorrect or ambiguous labeling of a switch.

- **Sneak Clue:** Design rule applied to a circuit pattern to identify design inconsistencies.

Cause of Sneaks

- Complex designs with many interfaces
- Flaws unknowingly designed into equipment
- Switching and timing requirements
- Incomplete analyses and test

Why Do Sneak Analysis?

- Method for detecting hidden failures
- Verification of interface switching and timing requirements
- Improves system/unit reliability

Where are Sneak Circuits?

- Electrical power systems
- Switching circuits
- Distribution and control systems
- Software control functions
- Interface configurations

Table A15-1: Typical Clue Statements

Clue	Sneak	Impact
Fanout Exceeded	Design Concern	Unpredictable Outputs
Unterminated CMOS Input	Design Concern	Device Damage
Large Time Constant	Sneak Timing	Unpredictable Switching Times
Uncommitted Open Collector Output	Design Concern	False Unstable Logic

Performing Sneak Analysis

- **Time to complete analysis:** An average Sneak Circuit Analysis (SCA) is a lengthy process that requires several months to complete. Redrawing the electronics of a system into hundreds of topographical patterns and checking each one against a multitude of sneak clues is a time consuming task.

- **Cost of analysis:** SCA specialists will be required due to the need for proprietary sneak clues. Their cost of analysis is based on part count and design complexity. Outside specialists, not familiar with the design, will require extra time and money to complete a detailed analysis of the functions and operation of a design. This learning curve cost is in addition to the cost of analysis.

- **Availability of results:** A manual SCA requires preproduction level drawings to prevent late design changes from inserting new sneaks into the system after performing the analysis. Extra time must be available to review the results or taking the necessary corrective action will require hardware rework, recall, or redesign rather than drawing changes.

For More Information

To perform a manual analysis, many independent contractors are available for contracts. If in-house work is contemplated, RADC-TR-89-223, "Sneak Circuit Analysis for the Common Man," is recommended as a guide. Automated tools are available including the Rome Laboratory prototype called SCAT (Sneak Circuit Analysis Tool). A new Rome Laboratory tool, Sneak Circuit Analysis Rome Laboratory Engineering Tool (SCARLET), is in development for future use.

Example: Subsystem Sneak Circuit Reverse Current Operation

Figure A15-1a shows the original circuit which was designed to prevent routine opening of the cargo door unless the aircraft was on the ground with the gear down and locked. The secondary switch permits emergency operation of the door when the gear is not down. Figure A15-1b shows the network tree diagram which indicates the existence of a sneak path. If the emergency and normal door open switches are both closed, the gear will be inadvertently lowered. The solution to the problem is the addition of a diode to prevent reverse current flow as shown in Figure A15-1c.

(a) ORIGINAL CIRCUIT

(b) NETWORK TREE

(c) REVISED CIRCUIT

Figure A15-1: Sneak Circuit Example

Topic A16: Dormant Analysis

In the past, analysis techniques for determining reliability estimates for dormant or storage conditions relied on rules of thumb such as "the failure rate will be reduced by a ten to one factor" or "the failure rate expected is zero." A more realistic estimate, based on part count failure results, can be calculated by applying the conversion factors shown in Table A16-1. The factors convert active failure rates by part type to passive or dormant conditions for seven scenarios. For example, to convert the reliability of an active airborne receiver to a captive carry dormant condition, determine the number of components by type, then multiply each by the respective active failure rate obtained from handbook data, field data, or vendor estimates.   The total active failure rate for each type is converted using the conversion factors of Table A16-1. The dormant estimate of reliability for the receiver is determined by summing the part results.

Example: Aircraft Receiver Airborne Active Failure Rate to Captive Carry Passive Failure Rate

Device	Qty.	λ_A	λ_T	Conversion Factor	λ_P
IC	25	0.06	1.50	.06	.090
Diode	50	0.001	0.05	.05	.003
Transistor	25	0.002	0.05	.06	.003
Resistor	100	0.002	0.20	.06	.012
Capacitor	100	0.008	0.80	.10	.080
Switch	25	0.02	0.50	.20	.100
Relay	10	0.40	4.00	.20	.800
Transformer	2	0.05	0.10	.20	.020
Connector	3	1.00	3.00	.005	.015
PCB	1	0.70	0.70	.02	.014
TOTALS	---	---	10.9	---	1.137

λ_A = Part (Active) Failure Rate (Failures per Million Hours)
λ_T = Total Part (Active) Failure Rate (Failures per Million Hours)
λ_P = Part (Passive) (Dormant) Failure Rate (Failures per Million Hours)

Mean-Time-Between-Failure (Active) = 92,000 hours

Mean-Time-Between-Failure (Passive) = 880,000 hours

Table A16-1: Dormant Conversion Factors
(Multiply Active Failure Rate by)

Part Types	Ground Active To Ground Passive	Airborne Active To Airborne Passive	Airborne Active To Ground Passive	Naval Active To Naval Passive	Naval Active To Ground Passive	Space Active To Space Passive	Space Active To Ground Passive
Integrated Circuits	.08	.06	.04	.06	.05	.10	.30
Diodes	.04	.05	.01	.04	.03	.20	.80
Transistors	.05	.06	.02	.05	.03	.20	1.00
Capacitors	.10	.10	.03	.10	.04	.20	.40
Resistors	.20	.06	.03	.10	.06	.50	1.00
Switches	.40	.20	.10	.40	.20	.80	1.00
Relays	.20	.20	.04	.30	.08	.40	.90
Connectors	.005	.005	.003	.008	.003	.02	.03
Circuit Boards	.04	.02	.01	.03	.01	.08	.20
Transformers	.20	.20	.20	.30	.30	.50	1.00

Topic A17: Software Reliability Prediction and Growth

Software failures arise from a population of software faults. A software fault (often called a "bug") is a missing, extra, or defective code that has caused or can potentially cause a failure. Every time a fault is traversed during execution, a failure does not necessarily ensue; it depends on the machine state (values of intermediate variables). The failure rate of a piece of software is a function of the number and location of faults in the code, how fast the program is being executed, and the operational profile. While most repair activity is imperfect, the hoped-for and generally observed result is that the times between failures tend to grow longer and longer as the process of testing and fault correction goes on. A software reliability growth model mathematically summarizes a set of assumptions about the phenomenon of software failure. The model provides a general form for the failure rate as a function of time and contains parameters that are determined either by prediction or estimation.

The following software reliability prediction and growth models are extracted from Rome Laboratory Technical Report RL-TR-92-15, "Reliability Techniques For Combined Hardware and Software Systems." These models can be used to estimate the reliability of initially released software along with the reliability improvement which can be expected during debugging.

Initial Software Failure Rate

$$\lambda_O = \frac{r_i\, K\, W_O}{I} \text{ failures per CPU second}$$

where

r_i = host processor speed (instructions/sec)

K = fault exposure ratio which is a function of program data dependency and structure (default = 4.2×10^{-7})

W_O = estimate of the total number of faults in the initial program (default = 6 faults/1000 lines of code)

I = number of object instructions which is determined by number of source lines of code times the expansion ratio

Programming Language	Expansion Ratio
Assembler	1
Macro Assembler	1.5
C	2.5
COBOL	3
FORTRAN	3
JOVIAL	3
Ada	4.5

Software Reliability Growth

$$\lambda(t) = \lambda_O e^{-[\beta t]}$$

where

$\lambda(t)$ = software failure rate at time t (in CPU time)
λ_O = initial software failure rate
t = CPU execution time (seconds)

β = decrease in failure rate per failure occurrence

$$\beta = B \frac{\lambda_O}{W_O}$$

B = fault reduction factor (default = .955)
W_O = initial number of faults in the software program per 1,000 lines of code

Example 1: Estimate the initial software failure rate and the failure rate after 40,000 seconds of CPU execution time for a 20,000 line Ada program:

r_i = 2 MIPS = 2,000,000 instructions/sec

K = 4.2×10^{-7}

W_O = (6 faults/1000 lines of code) (20,000 lines of code) = 120 Faults

I = (20,000 source lines of code) (4.5) = 90,000 instructions

$$\lambda_O = \frac{(2,000,000 \text{ inst./sec}) (4.2 \times 10^{-7}) (120 \text{ faults})}{90,000 \text{ inst.}}$$

λ_O = .00112 failures/CPU second

$$\beta = B \frac{\lambda_O}{W_O} = (.955) (\frac{.00112 \text{ failures/sec}}{120 \text{ faults}})$$

β = 8.91×10^{-6} failures/sec

$\lambda(40,000)$ = $.00112 e^{-[(8.91 \times 10^{-6} \text{ failures/sec}) (40,000 \text{ sec})]}$

$\lambda(40,000)$ = .000784 failures/CPU second

Section T

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Testing

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Contents

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Insight

A well tailored reliability and maintainability program contains several forms of testing. Depending on the program constraints, a program should be invoked to mature the designed in reliability as well as to determine whether the contract quantitative reliability and maintainability requirements have been achieved prior to a commitment to production. All forms of testing (Environmental Stress Screening (ESS), Reliability Growth, Reliability Demonstration) must be tailored to fit specific program constraints. Test plans and procedures must be evaluated to ensure proper test implementation. Test participation depends on the program situation but test reports must be carefully evaluated by the government.

For More Information

MIL-STD-471	"Maintainability Verification/Demonstration /Evaluation"
MIL-STD-781	"Reliability Testing for Engineering Development, Qualification and Production"
MIL-HDBK-781	"Reliability Test Methods, Plans, and Environments for Engineering Development, Qualification, and Production"
DoD-HDBK-344	"Environmental Stress Screening of Electronic Equipment"
MIL-HDBK-189	"Reliability Growth Management"
RADC-TR-86-241	"Built-In-Test Verification Techniques"
RADC-TR-89-160	"Environmental Extreme Recorder
RADC-TR-89-299	"Reliability & Maintainability Operational Parameter Translation II
RADC-TR-90-269	"Quantitative Reliability Growth Factors for ESS"
RL-TR-91-300	"Evaluation of Quantitative Environmental Stress Screening (ESS) Methods"

Topic T1: ESS Process

Environmental Stress Screening (ESS) has been the subject of many recent studies. Determination of the optimum screens for a particular product, built by a particular manufacturer, at a given time is an iterative process. Procedures for planning for and controlling the screening process are contained in DOD-HDBK-344 (USAF), "Environmental Stress Screening of Electronic Equipment." The process can be depicted as shown below:

Figure T1-1: ESS Process

Topic T2: ESS Placement

Level of Assembly	Advantages	Disadvantages
Assembly	● Cost per flaw precipitated is lowest (unpowered screens) ● Small size permits batch screening ● Low thermal mass allows high rates of temperature change ● Temperature range greater than operating range allowable	● Test detection efficiency is relatively low ● Test equipment cost for powered screens is high
Unit	● Relatively easy to power and monitor performance during screen ● Higher test detection efficiency than assembly level ● Assembly interconnections (e.g., wiring backplane) are screened	● Thermal mass precludes high rates of change or requires costly facilities ● Cost per flaw significantly higher than assembly level ● Temperature range reduced from assembly level
System	● All potential sources of flaws are screened ● Unit interoperability flaws detected ● High test detection efficiency	● Difficult and costly to test at temperature extremes ● Mass precludes use of effective vibration screens or makes use costly ● Cost per flaw is highest

Topic T3: Typical ESS Profile

Screen Type, Parameter and Conditions	Assemblies (Printed Wiring Assemblies) (SRU)*	Equipment or Unit (LRU/LRM)*
Thermal Cycling Screen		
Temperature Range (Minimum) (See Note 1)	From - 50°C to + 75°C	From -40°C to +71°C
Temperature Rate of Change (Minimum) (See Notes 1 & 2)	20°C/Minute	15°C/Minute
Temperature Dwell Duration (See Note 3)	Until Stabilization	Until Stabilization
Temperature Cycles	20 to 40	12 to 20
Power On/Equipment Operating	No	(See Note 5)
Equipment Monitoring	No	(See Note 6)
Electrical Testing After Screen	Yes (At Ambient Temperature)	Yes (At Ambient Temperature)
Random Vibration (See Notes 7 and 8)		
Acceleration Level	6 Grms	6 G rms
Frequency Limits	20 - 2000 Hz	20 - 2000 Hz
Axes Stimulated Serially or Concurrently	3	3 (See Note 9)
Duration of Vibration (Minimum) o Axes stimulated serially o Axes stimulated concurrently	10 Minutes/Axis 10 Minutes	10 Minutes/Axis 10 Minutes
Power On/Off	Off	On (See Note 5)
Equipment Monitoring	No	Yes (See Note 6)

Piece Parts: Begin the manufacturing and repair process with 100 defects per million or less (See Note 10).

*SRU - Shop Replaceable Unit   *LRM - Line Replaceable Module
*LRU - Line Replaceable Unit

Notes:

1. All temperature parameters pertain to agreed upon selected sample points inside the unit being screened, not chamber air temperature.

2. Rapid transfers of the equipment between one chamber at maximum temperature and another chamber at minimum temperature are acceptable. SRU temperature rates of change may be reduced if equipment damage will occur at 20°C/minute.

3. The temperature has stabilized when the temperature of the part of the test item considered to have the longest thermal lag is changing no more than 2°C per hour.

4. A minimum of 5 thermal cycles must be completed after the random vibration screen. Random vibration frequently induces incipient failures.

5. Shall occur during the low to high temperature excursion of the chamber and during vibration. When operating, equipment shall be at maximum power loading. Power will be OFF on the high to low temperature excursion until stabilized at the low temperature. Power will be turned ON and OFF a minimum of three times at temperature extremes on each cycle.

6. Instantaneous go/no-go performance monitoring during the stress screen is essential to identify intermittent failures when power is on.

7. Specific level may be tailored to individual hardware specimen based on vibration response survey and operational requirements.

8. When random vibration is applied at the equipment level, random vibration is not required at the subassembly level. However, subassemblies purchased as spares are required to undergo the same random vibration required for the equipment level. An "LRU mock-up" or equivalent approach is acceptable.

9. One axis will be perpendicular to plane of the circuit board(s)/LRM(s).

10. The Air Force or its designated contractor may audit part defective rates at its discretion. The test procedure will include thermal cycling as outlined below. Sample sizes and test requirements are included in the "Stress Screening Military Handbook," DOD-HDBK-344.

Minimum Temperature Range	From - 54°C to + 100°C
Minimum Temperature Rate of Change	The total transfer time from hot-to-cold or cold-to-hot shall not exceed one minute. The working zone recovery time shall be five minutes maximum after introduction of the load from either extreme in accordance with MIL-STD-883D.
Temperature Dwell	Until Stabilization (See Note 3)
Minimum Temperature Cycles	25
Power On/Equipment Monitoring	No
Electrical Testing After Screen	Yes (At high and low temperatures)

Topic T4: RGT and RQT Application

The Reliability Qualification Test (RQT) is an "accounting task" used to measure the reliability of a fixed design configuration. It has the benefit of holding the contractor accountable some day down the road from his initial design process. As such, he is encouraged to seriously carry out the other design related reliability tasks. The Reliability Growth Test (RGT) is an "engineering task" designed to improve the design reliability. It recognizes that the drawing board design of a complex system cannot be perfect from a reliability point of view and allocates the necessary time to fine tune the design by finding problems and designing them out. Monitoring, tracking and assessing the resulting data gives insight into the efficiency of the process and provides nonreliability persons with a tool for evaluating the development's reliability status and for reallocating resources when necessary. The forms of testing serve very different purposes and complement each other in development of systems and equipments. An RGT is not a substitute for an RQT, or other reliability design tasks.

Table T4-1: RGT and RQT Applicability as a Function of System/Program Constraints

System/Program Parameter	Reliability Growth Test			Reliability Qualification Test		
	Apply	Consider	Don't Apply	Apply	Consider	Don't Apply
Challenge to state-of-the-art	X			X		
Severe use environment	X			X		
One-of-a-kind system		X			X	
High quantities to be produced	X			X		
Benign use environment		X			X	
Critical mission	X			X		
Design flexibility exists	X			X		
No design flexibility			X		X	
Time limitations			X		X	
Funding limitations			X		X	
Very high MTBF system			X			X

Topic T5: Reliability Demonstration Plan Selection

Test Characteristics	Program Constraints						Notes
	Previous Testing Performed	Calendar Time Required	Number of Equipments Available	Test Facility Limitations	Level of Required MTBF	Desired Confidence In Results	
Test Type (Fixed or sequential)		Time is known with fixed. Time is unknown with sequential.				Fixed gives demonstrated MTBF to desired confidence. Sequential is test of hypothesis.	• Sequential will accept/reject very high MTBFs and very low MTBFs more quickly. • Fixed are better for estimates of true MTBF. • Sequential tests have undetermined test lengths (maximum length must be planned for).
Test Plan Risks (Consumer & Producer) (1 - Consumer risk = confidence)	Lower confidence test acceptable	High confidence makes test longer	Multiple equipment requires less calendar time (Allows higher confidence test).	Can limit confidence by limiting number of equipments on test.	High MTBFs force higher risk tests. Some high MTBFs are impractical to demonstrate	High confidence requires longer test time which can be limited by calendar time, number of equipments & facilities	• The higher the desired confidence (lower risk) the longer the test. Usual range: 30% = high risk 10% = low risk • Consumer's risk = probability of accepting equipment with true MTBF = θ_1 (unacceptable). • Producer's risk = probability of rejecting equipment with true MTBF = θ_0 (acceptable)

Test Characteristics	Program Constraints						
	Previous Testing Performed	Calendar Time Required	Number of Equipments Available	Test Facility Limitations	Level of Required MTBF	Desired Confidence In Results	Notes
Discrimination Ratio (D.R.) (θ_0/θ_1)	May justify using higher D.R.	Lower D.R. requires more test time	More equipments will allow lower D.R.	Facilities may limit test to high D.R.	High MTBFs may force high D.R.		• The larger the θ_0/θ_1 ratio the shorter the test. • θ_0 (upper test MTBF) - MTBFs approaching θ_0 will be accepted with high probability. • θ_1 (lower test MTBF) - MTBFs approaching θ_1 will be rejected with high probability.
Notes	• Significant previous testing may allow lower confidence test to be chosen	• Can be compensated for by more equipments (if facilities available)	• Limitations will require more calendar time	• Real constraint if environment severe. • Can limit number of test articles (increase calendar time)	• Some high MTBFs are impractical to demonstrate unless multiple equipments can be tested	• Mission criticality is the driver • Previous testing such as RGT may lower the confidence required by RQT	

Note: See Appendix 5 for Summary of MIL-HDBK-781 Test Plans.

Topic T6: Maintainability Demonstration Plan Selection

Test Characteristic	Program Constraints				
	Calendar Time Required	Number of Equipments Available	Test Facility Limitations	Level of Maintainability Required	Desired Confidence in Results
Fixed sample size or sequential type tests	Much less than that required for reliability demo. Time required is proportional to sample size number. Sample size may vary depending on program.	No effect on sample size number.		No effect on sample size number.	Fixed sample size test gives demonstrated maintainability to desired confidence. Sequential is test of hypothesis.
Test plan risks (consumer and producer) (1 - consumer risk = confidence) Risks can be tailored to program	Lower producer and consumer risks require larger sample sizes than higher risks.		Must have ability to simulate operational maintenance environment, scenario, skills, levels available.	No effect on sample size number.	Higher confidence levels require more samples than lower confidence levels.

Note: Demonstration facility must have capacity for insertion of simulated faults.

Topic T7: Testability Demonstration Plan Selection

| | Program Constraints | | | |
Test Characteristic	Calendar Time Required	Number of Equipments Available	Test Facility Limitations	Desired Confidence in Results
Fixed sample size type tests	Calendar time much less than that required for reliability demonstration. Time required is proportional to sample size. May vary depending on program.	No effect on sample size number.	Same as that required for maintainability demonstration.	Provides for producer's risks of 10%. Provides consumer assurance that designs with significant deviations from specified values will be rejected.
Preset Risks (consumer and producer) (1 - consumer risk = confidence)	Risks inversely proportional to sample size used.			

Notes:

1. Sample size dependent on total number of sample maintenance tasks selected as per paragraph A.10.4 of MIL-STD-471A.

2. Demonstration facility must have capability for insertion of simulated faults.

Topic T8: FRACAS (Failure Reporting and Corrective Action System)

Early elimination of failure trends is a major contributor to reliability growth and attaining the needed operational reliability. To be effective, a closed loop coordinated process must be implemented by the system/equipment contractor. A description of the major events and the participant's actions is shown below.

Event	Functions	Actions
Failure or Malfunction	Operators:	● Identify a problem, call for maintenance, annotate the incident.
	Maintenance:	● Corrects the problem, logs the failure.
	Quality:	● Inspects the correction.
Failure Report	Maintenance:	● Generates the failure report with supporting data (time, place, equipment, item, etc.)
	Quality:	● Insures completeness and assigns a travel tag for the failed item for audit control.
Data Logged	R&M:	● Log all the failure reports, validate the failures and forms, classify the failures (inherent, induced, false alarm).
Failure Review	R&M:	● Determine failure trends (i.e., several failures of the same or similar part).
	Design:	● Review operating procedures for error.
Failure Analysis	R&M:	● Decide which parts will be destructively analyzed.
	Physics of Failure:	● Perform failure analysis to determine the cause of failure (i.e., part or external).
Failure Correction	Quality:	● Inspect incoming test data for the part.
	Design:	● Redesign hardware, if necessary.
	Vendor:	● New part or new test procedure.
Post Data Review	Quality:	● Evaluate incoming test procedures, inspect redesigned hardware.
	R&M:	● Close the loop by collecting and evaluating post test data for reoccurrence of the failure.

Figure T8-1: Failure Reporting System Flow Diagram

Table T8-1: FRACAS Evaluation Checklist

Topic	Items to Be Addressed
General	• Closed loop (i.e., reported, analyzed, corrected and verified)
	• Responsibility assigned for each step
	• Overall control by one group or function
	• Audit trail capability
	• Travel tags for all failed items
	• Fast turn-around for analysis
Failure Report	• Clear description of each event
	• Surrounding conditions noted
	• Operating time indicated
	• Maintenance repair times calculated
	• Built-in-test indications stated
Failure Analysis	• Perform if three or more identical or similar parts fail
	• Perform if unit reliability is less than half of predicted
	• Results should indicate: overstress condition, manufacturing defect, adverse environmental condition, maintenance induced or wearout failure mode
Failure Data	• Collated by week and month by unit
	• Compared to allocated values
	• Reliability growth tracked
	• Problems indicated and tracked
	• Correction data collected for verification

Topic T9: Reliability Demonstration Test Plan Checklist*

Topic	Items to Be Addressed
Purpose and Scope	● Statement of overall test objectives
	● General description of all tests to be performed
Reference Documents	● List all applicable reference documents
Test Facilities	● Description of test item configuration
	● Sketches of system layout during testing
	● Serial numbers of units to be tested
	● General description of test facility
	● Identification of test location
	● General description of failure analysis facility
	● Security of test area
	● Security of test equipment and records
	● Test safety provisions
Test Requirements	● Pre-reliability environmental stress screening (ESS)
	● Test length
	● Number of units to be tested
	● Number of allowable failures
	● Description of MIL-HDBK-781 test plan showing accept, reject and continue test requirements
	● List of government furnished equipment
	● List and schedule of test reports to be issued
Test Schedule	● Start date (approximate)
	● Finish date (approximate)
	● Test program review schedule
	● Number of test hours per day
	● Number of test days per week
Test Conditions	● Description of thermal cycle
	● Description of thermal survey
	● Description of vibration survey
	● Description of unit under test mounting method
	● Description of test chamber capabilities
	● List of all limited life items and their expected life

Topic	Items to Be Addressed
Test Conditions (cont'd)	• Description of all preventive maintenance tasks and their frequency
	• Description of unit under test calibration requirements
	• Description of unit under test duty cycle
	• General description of unit under test operating modes and exercising method
Test Monitoring	• Description of test software and software verification method
	• List of all units under test functions to be monitored and monitoring method
	• List of all test equipment parameters to be monitored and monitoring method
	• Method and frequency of recording all monitored parameters
Test Participation	• Description of all contractor functions
	• Description of all contractor responsibilities
	• Description of all government responsibilities
	• Description of test management structure
Failure Definitions	The following types of failures should be defined as *relevant* in the test plan:
	• Design defects
	• Manufacturing defects
	• Physical or functional degradation below specification limits
	• Intermittent or transient failures
	• Failures of limited life parts which occur before the specified life of the part
	• Failures which cannot be attributed to a specific cause
	• Failure of built-in-test (BIT)
	The following types of failures should be defined as *nonrelevant* in the test plan:
	• Failures resulting from improper installation or handling
	• Failure of instrumentation or monitoring equipment which is external to equipment under test
	• Failures resulting from overstress beyond specification limits due to a test facility fault
	• Failures resulting from procedural error by technicians
	• Failures induced by repair actions
	• A secondary failure which is the direct result of a failure of another part within the system.

Topic	Items to Be Addressed
Test Ground Rules	The following test ground rules should be stated in the test plan:

- *Transient Failures* - Each transient or intermittent failure is to be counted as relevant. If several intermittent or transient failures can be directly attributed to a single hardware or software malfunction which is corrected and verified during the test, then only a single failure will be counted as relevant.

- *Classification of Failures* - All failures occurring during reliability testing, after contractor failure analysis, shall be classified as either relevant or nonrelevant. Based on the failure analysis, the contractor shall justify the failure as relevant or nonrelevant to the satisfaction of the procuring activity.

- *Pattern Failure* - A pattern failure is defined as three or more relevant failures of the same part in identical or equivalent applications whose 95th percentile lower confidence limit failure rate exceeds that predicted.

- *Malfunctions Observed During Test Set Up, Troubleshooting or Repair Verification* - Malfunctions occurring during test set up, troubleshooting or repair verification tests shall not be considered as reliability test failures; however, such malfunctions shall be recorded and analyzed by the contractor to determine the cause of malfunctions and to identify possible design or part deficiencies.

- *Test Time Accumulation* - Only the time accumulated during the equipment power "on" portion of the test cycle shall be considered as test time, provided that all functions are operating as required. Operating time accumulated outside the operational cycles such as during tests performed to check out the setup or to verify repairs shall not be counted. Also, time accumulated during degraded modes of operation shall not be counted.

- *Design Changes to the Equipment:*
  - After test reject decision—With procuring activity approval, the equipment may be redesigned and retested from time zero.

  - Major design change prior to test reject—The contractor may stop the test for purposes of correcting a major problem. The test will restart from time zero after the design change has been made.

  - Minor design change prior to test reject—With procuring activity approval, the test may be halted for the purpose of making a minor design change. Test time will resume from the point at which it was stopped and the design change shall have no effect on the classification of previous failures. Minor changes made as a result of other testing may be incorporated, with procuring activity approval, without declaring a failure of the equipment under test.

Topic	Items to Be Addressed
Test Ground Rules (cont'd)	● *Failure Categorization* - In order to clearly evaluate test results and identify problem areas, failure causes will be categorized as: (1) deficient system design, (2) deficient system quality control, and (3) deficient part design or quality.
Test Logs	The following types of test logs should be described in the test plan:
	● *Equipment Data Sheets* - used to record the exact values of all parameters measured during functional testing of the equipment.
	● *Test Log* - a comprehensive narrative record of the required test events. All names and serial numbers of the equipments to be tested shall be listed before start of the test. An entry shall be made in the test log each time a check is made on the equipment under test, including data, time, elapsed time, and result (e.g., pass/malfunction indication/failure or etc.). An entry shall be made in the log whenever a check is made of the test facilities or equipments (such as accelerometers, thermocouples, input power, self-test, etc.). In the event of a failure or malfunction indication, all pertinent data, such as test conditions, facility conditions, test parameters and failure indicators, will be recorded. The actions taken to isolate and correct the failure shall also be recorded. Whenever engineering changes, or equipment changes are implemented, an entry shall be made in the log.
	● *Failure Summary Record* - the failure summary record must chronologically list all failures that occur during the test. This record must contain all the information needed to reach an accept or reject decision for the test. Each failure must be described and all failure analysis data must be provided.
	● *Failure Report* - for each failure that occurs, a failure report must be initiated. The report should contain the unit that failed, serial number, time, data, symptoms of failure and part or parts that failed .

*Most of these contents also apply to reliability growth testing.

Topic T10: Reliability Test Procedure Checklist

Topic	Items to Be Addressed
Equipment Operation	A general description of the equipment under test and its operation must be provided.
On/Off Cycle	Specific on/off times for each subsystem must be described.
Operation Modes	Specific times of operation for each system/subsystem mode must be described.
Exercising Methods	Methods of exercising all system/subsystem operation modes must be described. (Note: The system should be exercised continuously, not just power on).
Performance Verification Procedure	*Step by step* test procedures must be provided which fully describe how and when each performance parameter will be measured. Acceptable and unacceptable limits of each measured parameter should also be specified. All failure and out-of-tolerance indicators must be described and their location defined. Programmable alarm thresholds must be specified.
Failure Event Procedure	Step by step procedures must describe specific actions to be taken in the event of a trouble indication.
Adjustments and Preventive Maintenance	*Step by step* procedures must be provided which fully describe how and when all adjustments and preventive maintenance actions will be performed.

Topic T11: Maintainability Demonstration Plan and Procedure Checklist

Topic	Items to Be Addressed
Purpose and Scope	• Statement of general test objectives • General description of test to be performed
Reference Documents	• List of all applicable reference documents
Test Facilities	• Description of test item configuration • Sketches of system layout during testing • Serial numbers of units to be tested • General description of site and test facility • Description of all software and test equipment
Test Requirements	• Description of MIL-STD-471 test plan requirements • Method of generating candidate fault list • Method of selecting and injecting faults from candidate list • List of government furnished equipment • List and schedule of test reports to be issued • Levels of maintenance to be demonstrated • Spares and other support material requirements
Test Schedule	• Start and finish dates (approximate) • Test program review schedule
Test Conditions	• Description of environmental conditions under which test will be performed • Modes of equipment operation during testing
Test Monitoring	• Method of monitoring and recording test results
Test Participation	• Test team members and assignments • Test decision making authority
Test Ground Rules with Respect to	• Instrumentation failures • Maintenance due to secondary failures • Technical manual usage and adequacy • Maintenance inspection, time limits and skill level
Testability Demonstration	• Repair levels for which requirements will be demonstrated • Built-in-test requirements to be demonstrated • External tester requirements to be demonstrated • Evaluation method for making pass/fail decision • Performance of FMEA prior to test start • Method of selecting and simulating candidate faults • Acceptable levels of ambiguity at each repair level

Topic T12: Reliability and Maintainability Test Participation Criteria

Degree of Participation Depends On:

- Availability of program resources to support on-site personnel

- How important R&M are to program success

- Availability and capability of other government on-site personnel

Test Preliminaries

- All test plans and procedures must be approved

- Agreements must be made among government personnel with respect to covering the test and incident reporting procedures

- Units under test and test equipment including serial numbers should be documented

- Working fire alarms, heat sensors and overvoltage alarms should be used

- Trial survey runs should be made per the approved test plan

Test Conduct

- Approved test plans and procedures must be available and strictly adhered to

- Equipment must not be tampered with

- Test logs must be accurately and comprehensively maintained

- Appropriate government personnel must be kept informed

- Only authorized personnel should be allowed in area (a list should be posted)

- Test logs, data sheets, and failure reports should be readily available for government review

- Units under test should be sealed to prevent tampering or unauthorized repair

- A schedule of inspections and visits should be maintained

- No repairs or replacements should be made without a government witness

- Government representatives must take part in failure review process

- Failed items should have "travel tags" on them

- Technical orders should be used for repair if available

Topic T13: Reliability and Maintainability Demonstration Reports Checklist

- **Identification and description of equipment/system tested**

- **Demonstration objectives and requirements**
  - Test Plans, Risks and Times
  - Test Deviations and Risk Assessment
  - Test Conditions
  - Test Facilities

- **Data Analysis Techniques**
  - Statistical Equations
  - Accept/Reject Criteria

- **Test Results (Summarized)**

Reliability
- Test Hours
- Number of Failures/Incidents
- Classification of Failures
- Data Analysis Calculations
- Application of Accept/Reject Criteria
- Failure Trends/Design and Process Deficiencies
- Status of Problem Corrections

Maintainability
- Maintenance Tasks Planned and Selected
- Task Selection Method
- Personnel Qualifications Performing Tasks
- Documentation Used During Maintenance
- Measured Repair Times
- Data Analysis Calculations
- Application of Accept/Reject Criteria
- Discussion of Deficiencies Identified

Testability
- Summary data for each item involved in testability demonstration including original plans, summarized results and any corrective action taken.

- Recommended action to be taken to remedy testability deficiencies or improve the level of testability achievable through prime equipment engineering changes, ATE improvements and/or test program set improvements.

- **Data**
  - Test Logs and Failure Reports
  - Failure Analysis Results

Topic T14: Design of Experiments

Design of Experiments is a very efficient, statistically based method of systematically studying the effects of experimental factors on response variables of interest. The efficiency is achieved through greatly reduced test time because the effects of varying multiple input factors at once can be systematically studied. The technique can be applied to a wide variety of product design, process design, and test and evaluation situations. Many books have been written on various experimental design strategies which cannot possibly be addressed in these few pages. It is the intent of this section only to give the reader a brief introduction to Design of Experiments by providing a single numerical example of what is called a fractional factorial design. Some other competing design strategies, each with their own strengths or weaknesses, include Full Factorial, Plackett-Burman, Box-Burman, and Taguchi.

Improved levels of reliability can be achieved through the use of Design of Experiments. Design of Experiments allows the experimenter to examine and quantify the main effects and interactions of factors acting on reliability. Once identified, the main factors affecting reliability (some of which may be uncontrollable, such as weather) can be dealt with systematically and scientifically. Their adverse effects on the system design can be minimized, thereby meeting performance specifications while remaining insensitive to uncontrollable factors. The following example illustrates the general procedure and usefulness of Design of Experiments. The example is broken down into a series of steps which illustrate the general procedure of designing experiments.

Example: Fractional Factorial Design

An integrated circuit manufacturer desired to maximize the bond strength of a die mounted on an insulated substrate since it was determined that bonding strength problems were resulting in many field failures. A designed experiment was conducted to maximize bonding strength.

Step 1 - Determine Factors: It isn't always obvious which factors are important. A good way to select factors is through organized "brainstorming". Ishikawa charts (see Introduction) are helpful in organizing cause and effect related data. For our example, a brainstorming session was conducted and four factors were identified as affecting bonding strength: (1) epoxy type, (2) substrate material, (3) bake time, and (4) substrate thickness.

Step 2 - Select Test Settings: Often, as with this example, high and low settings are selected. This is referred to as a two-level experiment. (Design of Experiments techniques are often used for more than two-level experiments.) The four factors and their associated high and low settings for the example are shown in Table T14-1. The selection of high and low settings is arbitrary (e.g. Au Eutectic could be "+" and Silver could be "-").

Table T14-1: Factors and Settings

Factor	Levels	
	Low (-)	High (+)
A. Epoxy Type	Au Eutectic	Silver
B. Substrate Material	Alumina	Beryllium Oxide
C. Bake Time (at 90°C)	90 Min	120 Min
D. Substrate Thickness	.025 in	.05 in

Step 3 - Set Up An Appropriate Design Matrix: For our example, to investigate all possible combinations of four factors at two levels (high and low) each would require 16 (i.e., 2^4) experimental runs. This type of experiment is referred to as a full factorial. The integrated circuit manufacturer decided to use a one half replicate fractional factorial with eight runs. This decision was made in order to conserve time and resources. The resulting design matrix is shown in Table T14-2. The Table T14-2 "+, -" matrix pattern is developed utilizing a commonly known Design of Experiments method called Yates algorithm. The test runs are randomized to minimize the possibility of outside effects contaminating the data. For example, if the tests were conducted over several days in a room where the temperature changed slightly, randomizing the various test trials would tend to minimize the effects of room temperature on the experimental results. The matrix is orthogonal which means that it has the correct balancing properties necessary for each factor's effect to be studied statistically independent from the rest. Procedures for setting up orthogonal matrices can be found in any of the references cited.

Step 4 - Run The Tests: The tests are run randomly at each setting shown in the rows of the array. The trial run order is determined by a random number table or any other type of random number generator. Resultant bonding strengths from testing are shown in Table T14-2 .

Table T14-2: Orthogonal Design Matrix With Test Results

Treatment Combination	Random Trial Run Order	A	B	C	D	Bonding Strength (psi) y
1	6	-	-	-	-	73
2	5	-	-	+	+	88
3	3	-	+	-	+	81
4	8	-	+	+	-	77
5	4	+	-	-	+	83
6	2	+	-	+	-	81
7	7	+	+	-	-	74
8	1	+	+	+	+	90

$$\text{Mean } \overline{y} = \frac{y_i}{8} = \frac{647}{8} = 80.875$$

Step 5 - Analyze The Results: This step involves performing statistical analysis to determine which factors and/or interactions have a significant effect on the response variable of interest. As was done in Table T14-3, interactions and aliasing (aliasing is defined as two or more effects that have the same numerical value) patterns must be identified. The impact on the response variable caused by "A or BCD" cannot be differentiated between factor A or the interaction of BCD. This is the penalty which is paid for not performing a full factorial experiment (i.e., checking every possible combination). The determination of aliasing patterns are unique to each experiment and are described in many Design of Experiments textbooks. The assumption is usually made that 3-way interactions such as BCD are negligible. An Analysis of Variance is then performed as shown in Table T14-4 to determine which factors have a significant effect on bonding strength. The steps involved in performing an Analysis of Variance for this example are:

5A. Calculate Sum of Squares: From Table T14-3 the Sum-of-Squares for a two level, single replicate experiment is computed for all factors and interactions as illustrated below for the A factor (Epoxy Type).

$$\text{Sum of Sq. (Factor A)} = \frac{\text{\# of treatment combinations}}{4} (\text{Avg}(+)\text{-Avg}(-))^2$$

$$\text{Sum of Sq. (Factor A)} = \frac{8}{4} (2.25)^2 = 10.125$$

5B. Calculate Error: The Sum of Squares for the error in this case is set equal to the sum of the Sum of Squares values for the three two-way interactions (i.e., AB or CD, AC or BD, BC or AD). This is known as pooling the error. This error is calculated as follows: Error = 1.125 + 1.125 + .125 = 2.375.

5C. Determine Degrees of Freedom. Degrees of Freedom is the number of levels of each factor minus one. Degrees of Freedom (df) is always 1 for factors and interactions for a two level experiment as shown in this simplified example. Degrees of Freedom for the error (df_{err}) in this case is equal to 3 since there are 3 interaction Degrees of Freedom. df_F denotes degrees of freedom for a factor.

5D. Calculate Mean Square. Mean Square equals the sum of squares divided by the associated degrees of freedom. Mean Square for a two level, single replicate experiment is always equal to the sum of squares for all factors. Mean Square for the error in this case is equal to the Sum of Squares error term divided by 3 (3 is the df of the error).

5E. Perform F Ratio Test for Significance. To determine the F ratio the mean square of the factor is divided by the mean square error (.792) from Table T14-4. F (α, df_F, df_{err}) represents the critical value of the statistical F-distribution and is found in look-up tables in most any statistics book. Alpha (α) represents the level at which you are willing to risk in concluding that a significant effect is not present when in actuality it is. If the F ratio is greater than the looked up value of F (α, df_F, df_{err}) then the factor

does have a significant effect on the response variable. (F (.1,1,3) = 5.54 in this case).

As a word of caution, the above formulations are not intended for use in a cookbook fashion. Proper methods for computing Sum of Squares, Mean Square, Degrees of Freedom, etc. depend on the experiment type being run and can be found in appropriate Design of Experiments reference books.

Table T14-3: Interactions, Aliasing Patterns and Average "+" and "-" Values

Treatment Combination	A or BCD	B or ACD	AB or CD	C or ABD	AC or BD	BC or AD	D or ABC	Bonding Strength* y
1	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	73
2	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	88
3	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	81
4	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	77
5	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	83
6	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	81
7	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	74
8	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	90
Avg (+)	82	80.5	81.25	84	81.25	80.75	85.5	
Avg (-)	79.75	81.25	80.5	77.75	80.5	81	76.25	
Δ = Avg(+) - Avg (-)	2.25	-.75	.75	6.25	.75	-25	9.25	

*The mean bonding strength calculated from this column is 80.875.

Table T14-4: Results of Analysis of Variance

Source	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Square	F ratio*	Significant Effect
Epoxy Type (A)	10.125	1	10.125	12.789	Yes
Substrate Material (B)	1.125	1	1.125	1.421	No
Bake Time (C)	78.125	1	78.125	98.684	Yes
Substrate Thickness (D)	171.125	1	171.125	216.158	Yes
A x B or C x D	1.125	1	--	--	--
A x C or B x D	1.125	1	--	--	--
B x C or A x D	0.125	1	--	--	--
Error	2.375	3	.792	--	

*Example Calculation: F = Mean Square/Error = 10.125/.792 = 12.789

Step 6 - Calculate Optimum Settings: From the Analysis of Variance, the factors A, C, and D were found to be significant at the 10% level. In order to maximize the response, i.e. bonding strength, we can determine optimum settings by inspecting the following prediction equation:

$$y = \text{(mean bonding strength)} + 2.25A + 6.25C + 9.25D$$

Since A, C, and D are the only significant terms they are then the only ones found in the prediction equation. Since A, C, and D all have positive coefficients they must be set at high to maximize bonding strength. Factor B, substrate material, which was found to be nonsignificant should be chosen based on its cost since it does not affect bonding strength. A cost analysis should always be accomplished to assure that all decisions resulting from designed experiments are cost-effective.

Step 7 - Do Confirmation Run Test: Since there may be important factors not considered or nonlinear effects, the optimum settings must be verified by test. If they check out, the job is done. If not, some new tests must be planned.

Design of Experiments References:

Barker, T. B., "Quality By Experimental Design," Marcel Dekker Inc., 1985.

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Taguchi, G., "Introduction to Quality Engineering," American Supplier Institute, Inc, Dearborn MI, 1986

Topic T15: Accelerated Life Testing

Accelerated life testing employs a variety of high stress test methods that shorten the life of a product or quicken the degradation of the product's performance. The goal of such testing is to efficiently obtain performance data that, when properly analyzed, yields reasonable estimates of the product's life or performance under normal conditions.

Why Use It?

- Considerable savings of time and money

- Quantify the relationship between stress and performance

- Identify design and manufacturing deficiencies

Why Not?

- Difficulty in translating the stress data to normal use levels

- High stress testing may damage systems

- Precipitated failures may not represent use level failures

Test Methods

Most accelerated test methods involving electronics are limited to temperature or voltage. However, other methods have included: acceleration, shock, humidity, fungus, corrosion, and vibration.

Graphical Analysis

The advantages are:

- Requires no statistics

- Easily translates the high stress data to normal levels

- Very convincing and easy to interpret

- Provides visual estimates over any range of stress

- Verifies stress/performance relations

The disadvantages are:

- Does not provide objectiveness

- Has statistical uncertainty

- Relies on an assumed relationship which may not fit the data

Test Design

All test conditions should be limited to three elevated stress levels (considering budget, schedule, and chamber capabilities) with the following conditions:

- Test stress should exceed maximum **operating** limits

- Test stress should not exceed maximum **design** limits

- Stress levels only for normal use failure modes

Test Units

The units shall be allocated to the particular stress levels so that most of the units are at the lower stress levels and fewer units at the higher. If 20 test units are available, a reasonable allocation would be 9 units at the lowest level and 7 and 4 at the higher levels. This allocation scheme is employed so that the majority of the test data is collected nearest to the operating levels of stress. Three units should be considered a minimum for the higher levels of stress; if fewer than 10 units are available for test, design for only two levels.

Data Analysis: Probability Plot

The operational performance (time before failure in most cases) of nearly all electronic and electromechanical systems can be described by either the Lognormal or Weibull probability density functions (pdf). The pdf describes how the percentage of failures is distributed as a function of operating time. The probability plot of test data is generated as follows:

- Rank the failure times from first to last for each level of test stress (nonfailed units close out the list).

- For each failure time, rank i, calculate its plotting position as:

$$P = 100 \left(\frac{i - .5}{n} \right)$$

    Where n is the total number of units on test at that level.

- Plot P versus the failure time for each failure at each stress level on appropriately scaled graph paper (either Logarithmic or Weibull).

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● Visually plot lines through each set (level of stress) of points. The lines should plot parallel, weighting the tendency of the set with the most data heaviest. If the lines do not plot reasonably parallel, investigate failure modes.

Data Analysis: Relationship Plot

The relationship plot is constructed on an axis that describes unit performance as a function of stress. Two of the most commonly assumed relations are the Inverse Power and the Arrhenius Relationship. The relationship plot is done as follows:

● On a scaled graph, plot the 50% points determined from the probability plot for each test stress.

● Through these 50% points, plot a single line, projecting beyond the upper and lower points.

● From this plot locate the intersection of the plotted line and the normal stress value. This point, read from the time axis, represents the time at which 50% of the units will fail while operating under normal conditions.

● Plot the time determined in step three on the probability plot. Draw a line through this point parallel to those previously drawn. This resulting line represents the distribution of failures as they occur at normal levels of stress.

Example: Probability and Relationship Plots

Consider an electronic device life test that demonstrates an Arrhenius performance/stress relationship that fails lognormally at any given level of stress. Engineers wish to determine the unit's reliability (MTBF) at 90°C (maximum operating temperature). There are 20 units available for test.

After reviewing the design and considering the potential failure modes, the engineers concluded that the units could survive at temperatures in excess of 230°C without damage. The engineers did, however, estimate that non-regular failure modes will be precipitated above this temperature, therefore, 230°C was established as the maximum test level with 150°C and 180°C as interim stress levels. The test units were allocated to three test levels and run for 1000 hours. The resulting failure times are shown in Table T15-1.

Table T15-1: Test Results

9 Units @ 150°C			7 Units @ 180°C			4 Units @ 230°C		
Time to Failure (Hrs.)	Rank	P	Time to Failure (Hrs.)	Rank	P	Time to Failure (Hrs.)	Rank	P
567	1	5.5	417	1	7.1	230	1	12.5
688	2	16.6	498	2	21.4	290	2	37.5
750	3	27.7	568	3	35.7	350	3	62.5
840	4	38.8	620	4	50.0	410	4	87.5
910	5	50.0	700	5	64.3			
999	6	61.1	770	6	78.6			
---	7	---	863	7	92.9			
---	8	---						
*---	9	---						

* Unit still operating at 1000 hours

The probability and relationship plots are shown in Figures T15-1 & T15-2. From Figure T15-2 it is estimated that 50% of the units will fail by 3500 hours while operating at 90°C. Further, from Figure T15-1, it can be estimated that at 90°C, 10% of the units will fail by 2200 hours and 10% will remain (90% failed) at 5000 hours.

This type of testing is not limited to device or component levels of assembly. Circuit card and box level assemblies can be tested in a similar manner. Generally, for more complex test units, the probability plot will be developed on Weibull paper, while the relationship plot will likely require a trial and error development utilizing several inverse power plots to find an adequate fit.

Figure T15-1: Lognormal Plot

Figure T15-2: Arrhenius Plot

Topic T16: Time Stress Measurement

Environmental factors, such as temperature, humidity, vibration, shock, power quality, and corrosion impact the useful lifetime of electronic equipment. Knowing the environmental conditions under which the equipment is operated provides insight into equipment failure mechanisms. The capability to measure environmental parameters will help reduce and control the incidence of Retest OK (RTOK) and Cannot Duplicate (CND) maintenance events which account for 35% to 65% of the indicated faults in Air Force avionics systems. Many of these RTOK and CND events are environmentally related and a record of the environmental conditions at the time of occurrence should greatly aid in the resolution of these events.

Active Time Stress Measurement Devices (TSMD)

- **Module TSMD:** The module developed by the Rome Laboratory is physically 6" x 4" x 1.25" and measures and records temperature, vibration, humidity, shock, corrosion and power transients. This module operates independently of the host equipment and records and stores data for later retrieval.

- **Micro TSMD:** The micro version of the TSMD is a small hybrid circuit that is suitable for mounting on a circuit card in a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). All the parameters measured by the module TSMD are recorded in the micro version.

- **Fault Logging TSMD:** A new advanced device has been developed that is suitable for circuit board mounting and includes environmental parameters being measured prior to, during, and after a Built-In-Test (BIT) detected fault or event. The environment data will be used to correlate faults with environmental conditions such as temperature, vibration, shock, cooling air supply pressure, and power supply condition to better determine what impact environment has on system failure.

- **Quick Reliability Assessment Tool (QRAT):** The objective of the effort is to build a stand-alone, compact, portable, easily attachable system for quick reaction measurement and recording of environmental stresses. The parameters it measures include voltage, temperature, vibration and shock. The system which includes a debrief laptop computer, an electronics module with internal sensors, a battery pack, remote sensors, various attachment plates, and will fit in a ruggedized suitcase. The electronics module is be 3" x 2" x 0.5" and contains the sensors, digital signal processor, and 512K bytes of EEPROM for storage of data. Three axis continuous vibration data will be recorded and stored in a power spectral density format. The user could choose to use either the sensors internal to the electronics module or the remote sensors. The debrief computer is used to tailor the electronics module to the specific needs of the user and to graphically display the collected data. Some potential uses for the collected data are: identification of environmental design envelopes, determination of loads and boundary

conditions for input into simulation techniques, and characterization of failures in specific systems.

Passive Environmental Recorders

● **High and Low Temperature Strip Recorders:** Strip recorders offer a sequence of chemical mixtures deposited as small spots on a paper. Each spot changes color at a predetermined temperature showing that a given value has been exceeded.

● **Temperature Markers:** Markers are available to measure temperature extremes. The marking material either melts or changes color at predetermined temperatures.

● **Humidity Strip Recorders:** Using crystals that dissolve at different humidity levels, a strip recorder is available that indicates if a humidity level has been surpassed.

● **Shock Indicators:** Single value indicators that tell when an impact acceleration exceeds the set point along a single axis.

Application, Active Devices

● Avionic Environmental Stress Recording

● Transportation Stress Recording

● Flight Development Testing

● Warranty Verification

● Aircraft: A-10, A-7, B-1, and EF-111

For More Information:

For more information on the active TSMD devices under development at Rome Laboratory, write:

Rome Laboratory/ERS
Attn: TSMD
525 Brooks Rd.
Griffiss AFB, NY 13441-4505

Appendix 1
Operational Parameter Translation

Because field operation introduces factors which are uncontrollable by contractors (e.g. maintenance policy), "contract" reliability is not the same as "operational" reliability. For that reason, it is often necessary to convert, or translate, from "contract" to "operational" terms and vice versa. This appendix is based on RADC-TR-89-299 (Vol I & II), "Reliability and Maintainability Operational Parameter Translation II" which developed models for the two most common environments, ground and airborne. The translation models are summarized in Table 1-1.

Definitions

- Mean-Time-Between-Failure-Field (MTBF$_F$) includes inherent maintenance events which are caused by design or manufacturing defects.

$$\text{MTBF}_F = \frac{\text{Total Operating Hours or Flight Hours}}{\text{Inherent Maintenance Events}}$$

- Mean-Time-Between-Maintenance-Field (MTBM$_F$) consists of inherent, induced and no defect found maintenance actions.

$$\text{MTBM}_F = \frac{\text{Total Operating Hours or Flight Hours}}{\text{Total Maintenance Events}}$$

- Mean-Time-Between Removals-Field (MTBR$_F$) includes all removals of the equipment from the system.

$$\text{MTBR}_F = \frac{\text{Total Operating Hours or Flight Hours}}{\text{Total Equipment Removals}}$$

- θ_P = is the predicted MTBF (i.e. MIL-HDBK-217).
- θ_D = is the demonstrated MTBF (i.e. MIL-HDBK-781).
- R_F = is the equipment type or application constant.
- C = is the power on-off cycles per mission.
- D = is the mission duration.

Equipment Operating Hour to Flight Hour Conversion

For Airborne Categories - MTBF$_F$ represents the Mean-Time-Between-Failure in Equipment Operating Hours. To obtain MTBF$_F$ in terms of flight hours (for both fighter and transport models), divide   MTBF$_F$ by 1.2 for all categories except counter measures. Divide by .8 for counter measure equipment.

Example

Estimate the MTBM of a fighter radar given a mission length of 1.5 hours, two radar shutdowns per mission and a predicted radar MTBF of 420 hours. Using Model 1B in Table 1-1,

$$\text{MTBM}_F = \theta_P{}^{.64} \ R_F \ (\tfrac{C}{D})^{-.57} = (420 \ \text{hr.})^{.64} \ 1.7 \ (\ \frac{2 \ \text{cyc.}}{1.5 \ \text{hr.}}\ )^{-.57}$$

MTBM_F = 69 equipment operating hours between maintenance.

Since this is below the dependent variable lower bound of (.24)(420) = 101 hours, the calculated MTBM_F is correct. Since this equipment is often turned on for pre and post flight checkout, the number of flight hours between maintenance is somewhat less than the actual equipment operating hours. The number of flight hours between maintenance is approximately 69/1.2 = 58 hours.

Table 1-1: Reliability Translation Models

R_F Selection

1. Airborne Fighter Models	Communication	Navigation	Computer	Counter Measure	Radar	All Other	Dependent Var. Lower Bound (% of Ind. Var.)*
1A. $MTBF_F = \theta_P^{.64} R_F \left(\frac{C}{D}\right)^{-.46}$	2.1	6.5	5.9	4.7	3.6	4.3	48
1B. $MTBM_F = \theta_P^{.64} R_F \left(\frac{C}{D}\right)^{-.57}$	1.1	2.7	1.9	2.8	1.7	2.0	24
1C. $MTBR_F = \theta_P^{.62} R_F \left(\frac{C}{D}\right)^{-.77}$	1.8	4.4	3.0	5.9	2.5	3.2	34
1D. $MTBF_F = \theta_D^{.76} R_F \left(\frac{C}{D}\right)^{-.34}$	2.1	5.0	5.3	3.7	5.1	2.2	79
1E. $MTBM_F = \theta_D^{.75} R_F \left(\frac{C}{D}\right)^{-.44}$	1.4	2.2	1.8	2.4	2.8	.90	36
1F. $MTBR_F = \theta_D^{.77} R_F \left(\frac{C}{D}\right)^{-.65}$	1.6	4.0	2.2	3.4	3.0	.83	49

2. Airborne Transport Models	R_F, Uninhabited Equipment	R_F, Inhabited Equipment	Dependent Var. Lower Bound (% of Ind. Var.)*
2A. $MTBF_F = \theta_P^{.73} R_F \left(\frac{C}{D}\right)^{-.46}$	2.7	2.5	50
2B. $MTBM_F = \theta_P^{.69} R_F \left(\frac{C}{D}\right)^{-.57}$	1.6	1.4	26
2C. $MTBR_F = \theta_P^{.66} R_F \left(\frac{C}{D}\right)^{-.77}$	2.1	2.3	35
2D. $MTBF_F = \theta_D^{1.0} R_F \left(\frac{C}{D}\right)^{-.34}$	.58	.39	91
2E. $MTBM_F = \theta_D^{1.1} R_F \left(\frac{C}{D}\right)^{-.44}$	.13	.09	44
2F. $MTBR_F = \theta_D^{.88} R_F \left(\frac{C}{D}\right)^{-.65}$	.78	.60	72

3. Ground System Models	R_F, Fixed Equipment	R_F, Mobile Equipment	Dependent Var. Lower Bound (% of Ind. Var.)*
3A. $MTBF_F = \theta_P^{.60} R_F$	27	4.8	90
3B. $MTBM_F = \theta_P^{.67} R_F$	11	1.8	49
3C. $MTBR_F = \theta_P^{.50} R_F$	91	18	80

*The field numeric (i.e., $MTBF_F$, $MTBM_F$ or $MTBR_F$) is always taken to be the greater of (1) the calculated value from Column 1 or, (2) the percentage shown of the independent variable (i.e., θ_P or θ_D).

Example R&M Requirement Paragraphs

Example Reliability Requirements for the System Specification

R.1 Reliability Requirements

Guidance: *The use of the latest versions and notices of all military specifications, standards and handbooks should be specified. See Toolkit Section R, "Requirements" for task tailoring guidance. When specifying an MTBF, it should be the "upper test MTBF (θ_0)" as defined in MIL-STD-781. When specifying MTBCF, the maintenance concept needs to be clearly defined for purposes of calculating reliability of redundant configurations with periodic maintenance. If immediate maintenance will be performed upon failure of a redundant element then specifying the system MTTR is sufficient. If maintenance is deferred when a redundant element fails, then the length of this deferral period should be specified.*

R.1.1   Mission Reliability: The *(system name)* shall achieve a mean-time-between-critical-failure (MTBCF) of _____ hours under the worst case environmental conditions specified herein. MTBCF is defined as the total uptime divided by the number of critical failures that degrade full mission capability (FMC). FMC is that level of performance which allows the system to perform its primary mission without degradation below minimum levels stated herein. For purposes of analyzing redundant configurations, calculation of MTBCF shall reflect the expected field maintenance concept.

R.1.2 Basic Reliability: The *(system name)* shall achieve a series configuration mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) of _____ hours under the worst case environmental conditions specified herein.   The series configuration MTBF is defined as the total system uptime divided by the total number of part failures.

R.1.3   Reliability Configuration: The reliability requirements apply for the delivered configuration of the system. Should differences exist between this configuration and a potential production configuration, all analyses shall address the reliability effects of the differences.

Guidance: *If equipment or system performance criteria are not stated elsewhere in the statement of work or specification, the following paragraph must be included.*

R.1.4 Reliability Performance Criteria: The minimum performance criteria that shall be met for full mission capability of the *(system name)* system is defined as (specify full mission capability).

R.1.5 Reliability Design Requirements: Design criteria and guidelines shall be developed by the contractor for use by system designers as a means of achieving the required levels of reliability.

Guidance: *For more critical applications, Level II or I, derating should be specified. See Topic D1 for derating level determination. Baseline thermal requirements such as ambient and extreme temperatures, pressure extremes, mission profile and*

duration, temperature/pressure rates of change and maximum allowable temperature rise should be specified.

R.1.5.1 Thermal Management and Derating: Thermal management (design, analysis and verification) shall be performed by the contractor such that the reliability quantitative requirements are assured. RADC-TR-82-172, "RADC Thermal Guide for Reliability Engineers," shall be used as a guide. Derating criteria shall be established for each design such that all parts used in the system are derated to achieve reliability requirements. As a minimum, Level 3 of AFSC Pamphlet 800-27 "Part Derating Guidelines" shall be used for this design.

Guidance: If the system is for airborne use, MIL-STD-5400 must be referenced in place of MIL-E-4158 (ground equipment).

R.1.5.2 Parts Selection: All parts employed in the manufacture of the system shall be selected from the government generated and maintained Program Parts Selection List (PPSL), Electrical/Electronic Parts and the PPSL for Mechanical Parts. Parts not covered by the above referenced PPSLs shall be selected in accordance with MIL-E-4158 and MIL-STD-454 and require approval by the procuring activity.

   a. **Microcircuits.** Military standard microcircuits must be selected in accordance with Requirement 64 of MIL-STD-454. All non-JAN devices shall be tested in accordance with the Class B screening requirements of MIL-STD-883, Method 5004 and 5008, as applicable. All device types shall be tested to the quality conformance requirements of MIL-STD-883, Method 5005 and 5008 Class B.

   b. **Semiconductors.** Military standard semiconductors must be selected in accordance with Requirement 30 of MIL-STD-454. All non-JANTX devices shall be screened in accordance with Table ll of MIL-S-19500. All device types shall be tested to the Group A, Table lll and Group B, Table IV quality conformance requirements of MIL-S-19500, as a minimum. The following device restrictions apply:

   (1) Only solid glass metallurgically bonded axial lead diodes and rectifiers shall be used.

   (2) TO-5 packages shall be limited to the solid metal header type.

   (3) All semiconductor device junctions must be protected and no organic or desiccant materials shall be included in the package.

   (4) Devices using aluminum wire shall not use thermocompression wedge bonding.

   (5) Aluminum TO-3 packages shall not be used.

   (6) Germanium devices shall not be used.

c. **Electrostatic Sensitive Parts.** Certain types of integrated circuits are susceptible to electrostatic discharge damage. Appropriate discharge procedures are necessary when handling, storing or testing these parts and design selections of desired devices should include a consideration of the effectiveness of the input or other protective elements included in the device design.

R.1.6 Reliability Test and Evaluation: The quantitative reliability levels required by paragraph (R.1) shall be verified by the following:

R.1.6.1 The final approved reliability analyses for the various configurations and worst case environments shall demonstrate compliance with the quantitative requirements cited in paragraph (R.1).

R.1.6.2 The contractor shall demonstrate that the reliability (mission and/or basic) requirements have been achieved by conducting a controlled reliability test in accordance with MIL-HDBK-781 Test Plan (specify MIL-HDBK-781 Test Plan). (See Topic T5 and Appendix 5 for Plan Selection). The lower test (MTBCF and/or MTBF) to be demonstrated shall be _____ hours tested in a _____ environment. Relevant failures are defined as any malfunction which causes loss or degradation below the performance level specified for the (equipment/system) and can be attributed to design defect, manufacturing defect, workmanship defect, adjustment, deterioration or unknown causes. Nonrelevant failures are failures caused by installation damage, external test equipment failures, mishandling, procedural errors, dependent failures and external prime power failures.

Guidance: A growth test may apply if the next phase is production. If one is required, it's appropriate to require a higher risk (e.g., 30 percent) demonstration test. See RADC-TR-84-20 "Reliability Growth Testing Effectiveness," Topic T4 and Appendix 6 for further guidance.

R.1.6.3 The contractor shall conduct a controlled fixed length dedicated reliability growth test of _____ hours using MIL-HDBK-189 as a guide. The test shall be at the same environmental conditions as the RQT. Although there is no pass/fail criteria, the contractor shall track the reliability growth process to ensure improvement is taking place by effective implementation of corrective action.

Guidance: See Electronic Systems Center Report TR-85-148, "Derated Application of Parts for ESC Systems Development" (Attachment 2) for a recommended derating verification procedure.

R.1.6.4 The contractor shall verify the thermal and electrical stresses on _____ percent (3 to 5 percent sample is typical) of the semiconductor and microcircuit parts by measurement while the equipment is operated at the worst case environment, duty cycle and load. The results of the measurements shall be compared to the derating requirements and the verification shall be considered successful if measured values are less than specified derated levels.

Example Reliability Requirements for the Statement of Work

R.2 Reliability Program Tasks

R.2.1 Reliability Program: The contractor shall conduct a reliability program in accordance with MIL-STD-785 including the following tasks as a minimum to assure reliability consistent with state-of-the-art.

R.2.2 Subcontractor Control: The contractor shall establish management procedures and design controls including allocation of requirements in accordance with Task 102 of MIL-STD-785 which will insure that products obtained from subcontractors will meet reliability requirements.

R.2.3 Reliability Design Reviews: The status of the reliability design shall be addressed at all internal and external design reviews. Task 103 of MIL-STD-785 shall be used as a guide.

R.2.4 Failure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action System (FRACAS): The contractor shall establish, conduct and document a closed loop failure reporting, analysis and corrective action system for all failures occurring during system debugging, checkout, engineering tests and contractor maintenance. Failure reports shall be retained by the contractor and failure summaries provided to the procuring activity thirty days after start of system engineering test and evaluation, and updated monthly thereafter. Failure reporting shall be to the piece part level.

R.2.5 Reliability Modeling: The contractor shall develop reliability models for all system configurations in accordance with Task 201 of MIL-STD-785 and Task 101 and 201 of MIL-STD-756. The specific mission parameters and operational constraints that must be considered are: ____ (or reference applicable SOW and specification paragraphs).

R.2.6 Reliability Allocations: Reliability requirements shall be allocated to the LRU level in accordance with Task 202 of MIL-STD-785.

R.2.7 Reliability Prediction: The contractor shall perform reliability predictions in accordance with *(Task 201 (basic reliability))* and/or *(Task 202 (mission reliability))* of MIL-STD-756. The specific technique to be used shall be method 2005 parts stress analysis of MIL-STD-756. Electronic part failure rates shall be used from MIL-HDBK-217 and nonelectronic part failure rates from RADC-TR-85-194. All other sources of part failure rate data shall require review and approval of the procuring activity prior to use. A ____ environmental factor, worst case operating conditions and duty cycles shall be used as a baseline for developing part failure rates. The results of the thermal analysis shall be included and shall provide the temperature basis for the predicted reliability. The part quality grade adjustment factor used shall be representative of the quality of the parts selected and applied for this system procurement.

R.2.8 Parts Program: The contractor shall establish and maintain a parts control program in accordance with Task 207 of MIL-STD-785 and Procedure 1 of MIL-STD-965. Requests for use of parts not on the government generated and

maintained PPSL shall be submitted in accordance with the CDRL. Amendments to the PPSL as a result of such requests, after procuring activity approval, shall be supplied to the contractor by the Program Contracting Officer not more often than once every 30 days.

Guidance: The level of detail of the FMECA must be specified (e.g., part, circuit card, etc.). The closer the program is to full scale engineering development, the greater the level of detail needed.

R.2.9 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA): The contractor shall perform a limited FMECA to the _____ level to identify design weaknesses and deficiencies. Potential failure modes shall be identified and evaluated to determine their effects on mission success. Critical failures shall be investigated to determine possible design improvements and elimination means. MIL-STD-785, Task 204 shall be used as a guide.

Guidance: Reliability critical items should be required where it's anticipated that the design will make use of custom VLSI, hybrids, microwave hybrids and other high technology nonstandard devices. See Topic D5 for a critical item checklist.

R.2.10 Reliability Critical Items: Task number 208 of MIL-STD-785 applies. The contractor shall prepare a list of critical items and present this list at all formal reviews. Critical items shall include: items having limited operating life or shelf life, items difficult to procure or manufacture, items with unsatisfactory operating history, items of new technology with little reliability data, single source items, parts exceeding derating limits, and items causing single points of failure.

R.2.11 Effects of Storage, Handling, Transportation: The contractor shall analyze the effects of storage, handling and transportation on the system reliability.

R.2.12 Reliability Qualification Test: The contractor shall demonstrate compliance with the quantitative reliability requirements in accordance with MIL-STD-785 Task 302. Test plans and reports shall be developed and submitted.

R.2.13 Reliability Development/Growth Test: Test plans that show data tracking growth, testing methods and data collection procedures shall be developed and submitted for the Growth Test Program.

Guidance: When specifying ESS, the level (circuit card, module, assembly, etc.) at which the screening is to be performed must be specified. Different levels of screening should be performed at different hardware assembly levels. See R&M 2000 guidelines in Section T for recommended screening as a function of hardware assembly level.

R.2.14 Environmental Stress Screening: Task number 301 of MIL-STD-785 applies. A burn-in test of _____ (specify the number of hours or temperature cycles) at _____ temperature and _____ vibration level extremes shall be performed at the _____ level. At least _____ (hours/cycles) of failure free operation shall be experienced before termination of the burn-in test for each unit. DOD-HDBK-344, ESS of Electronic Equipment, shall be used as a guide.

Example Maintainability Requirements for the System Specification

M.1 Maintainability Requirements

M.1.1 Maintainability Quantitative Requirements: The *(system name)* shall be designed to achieve a mean-corrective-maintenance-time (M_{CT}) of no greater than ____ minutes and a maximum-corrective maintenance-time (M_{MAXCT}) of no greater than ____ minutes (95th percentile) at the *(specify organization, intermediate or depot level)*, when repaired by an Air Force maintenance technician of skill level ____ or equivalent.

Guidance: Preventive maintenance requirements are considered an option to be implemented when items are used in the design that are subject to wearout, alignment, adjustment or have fault tolerance that must be renewed. If the option is exercised, then attach the paragraph below to M.1.1.

M.1.2 Preventive maintenance shall not exceed ____ minutes for each period and the period shall not be more frequent than every ____.

M.1.3 The mean time to restore system (MTTRS) following a system failure shall not be greater than ____. MTTRS includes all corrective maintenance time and logistics delay time.

M.1.4 The mean maintenance manhours (M-MMH) shall not be greater than ____ hours per year. M-MMH is defined as follows: (operating hours per year) _ (system MTBF) (system MTTR) (number of maintenance personnel required for corrective action).

Guidance: Above definition of M-MMH assumes that a repair is made when each failure occurs. If a delayed maintenance concept is anticipated through the use of fault tolerance, then MTBCF should be used (instead of MTBF) in the above definition. If only a limited number of site visits are allowed, then this value should be used in the above definition in place of "operating hours per year _ system MTBF."

M.1.5 Maintainability Design: The system design shall provide modularity, accessibility, built-in-test (BIT) and other maintainability features to provide installation simplicity, ease of maintenance and the attainment of the maintainability requirements (both corrective and preventive). Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) such as printed circuit boards or assemblies shall be replaceable without cutting or unsoldering connections. All plug-in modules shall be mechanically keyed/coded to prevent insertion of a wrong module.

M.1.5.1 Testability: The system design shall be partitioned based upon the ability to isolate faults. Each item shall have sufficient test points for the measurement or stimulus of internal circuit nodes to achieve the capability of detecting 100 percent of all permanent failures using full resources. Automatic monitoring and diagnostic capabilities shall be provided to show the system status (operable, inoperable, degraded) and to detect 90 percent of all permanent failures. The false alarm rate due to self-test circuitry shall be less than 1 percent of the series failure rate. Self-test circuitry shall be designed to correctly isolate the fault to a group of four (4) LRUs, or less, 95 percent of the time.

M.1.6 Maintainability Test and Evaluation: Maintainability requirements for the *(system name)* shall be verified by the following:

M.1.6.1 Maintainability Analysis. The results of the final maintainability prediction shall be compared to the quantitative requirements and achievement determined if the predicted parameters are less than or equal to the required parameters.

M.1.6.2 Maintainability Demonstration. A maintainability demonstration shall be performed in accordance with Test Method ____ (Test Method 9 is commonly specified, see Appendix 7 for further guidance) of MIL-STD-471. A minimum sample size of 50 tasks shall be demonstrated. The consumer's risk for the maintainability demonstration shall be equal to 10 percent. Fault detection and isolation requirements shall be demonstrated as part of the maintainability test.

M.1.6.3 Testability Demonstration. A testability demonstration shall be performed on the *(system name)* in accordance with Notice 2 of MIL-STD-471A.

Example Maintainability Requirements for the Statement of Work

M.2 Maintainability Program Tasks

M.2.1 Maintainability Program: The contractor shall conduct a maintainability program in accordance with MIL-STD-470 appropriately tailored for full scale development including the following tasks as a minimum to assure maintainability consistent with the requirements.

M.2.2 Testability Program: Testability characteristics and parameters are related to, and shall be treated as part of the maintainability program. The contractor shall conduct a testability program in accordance with MIL-STD-2165 appropriately tailored for FSD including the following tasks as a minimum to assure testability consistent with the requirements.

M.2.3 Maintainability Design Review: The status of the maintainability/testability design shall be addressed at all internal and external design reviews.

M.2.4 Subcontractor Control: The contractor shall specify maintainability requirements to all subcontractors to insure that *(equipment/system name)* requirements of this program are attained. Task 102 of MIL-STD-470 shall be used as a guide.

M.2.5 Maintainability/Testability Modeling: The contractor shall establish a maintainability model using MIL-STD-470, Task 201 which reflects the construction and configuration of the FSD design. Linkages with MIL-STD-2165, Task 201 to relate testability/diagnostic design characteristics to maintainability parameters shall be provided.

M.2.6 Maintainability Prediction: The contractor shall predict maintainability figures of merit using Procedure V of MIL-HDBK-472 (Notice 1) at the on equipment level. MIL-STD-470, Task 203 shall be used as a guide.

M.2.7 Maintainability/Testability Design Criteria: The contractor shall develop design criteria to be used in the design process to achieve the specified maintainability and testability requirements. In addition, a design analysis showing failure modes, failure rates, ease of access, modularity and the capability to achieve the fault detection/isolation requirement shall be provided. RADC-TR-74-308 "Maintainability Engineering Design Handbook," RADC-TR-82-189 "RADC Testability Notebook," Task 202 of MIL-STD-2165 and Task 206 of MIL-STD-470A shall be used as a guide.

Guidance: Maintainability demonstration reports are only necessary if a maintainability test is specified in the maintainability specification requirements.

M.2.8 Maintainability/Testability Demonstration: A test plan and test report shall be submitted by the contractor. Task 301 of MIL-STD-470 and Task 301 of MIL-STD-2165 shall be used as guides.

Several hundred R&M software tools exist throughout Government, industry and academia. Table 3-1 lists software tool types with associated supplier reference numbers. The numbered list of suppliers follows. The list includes addresses and telephone numbers confirmed to be accurate as of Aug 92. The Rome Laboratory doesn't in any way endorse or encourage use of any specific supplier's tools listed. Potential software tool users should thoroughly research any claims made by software suppliers and carefully study their own needs before obtaining any software. Further information on R&M software tools can be obtained in the reports referenced below. The reports contain data relative to software tool's hardware requirements, claimed capabilities, interface capabilities, demonstration package availability and price.

R&M Software Tool References

RL-TR-91-87   "A Survey of Reliability, Maintainability, Supportability and
                         Testability Software Tools"

RMST 91   "R&M Software Tools," Reliability Analysis Center

Table 3-1: Software Tool Type/Supplier Reference Number Listing

Software Tool Type	Supplier Reference Numbers
1. Reliability Prediction	
1a. Component Prediction Tools (e.g. MIL-HDBK-217, Bellcore, etc.)	1,5,9,10,15,16,17,19,20,21,27, 28,32,34, 36,38,39
1b. System Modeling (e.g. Markov, Monte Carlo, Availability)	1,5,6,17,19,20,22,32,33,35,36
1c. Mechanical Component Data	15,27,31
2. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)	1,5,19,20,21,27
3. Fault Tree Analysis	1,5,14,16,17,18,21,22,32,33
4. Reliability Testing (e.g. MIL-HDBK-781, ESS, etc.)	13,16,18,25,32
5. Reliability Management	32,35
6. Maintainability Prediction	5,10,17,19,21,27,32
7. Testability Analysis	2,3,4,5,7,19,21,23,24,30,32
8. Thermal Analysis	26,32,38
9. Finite Element Analysis	8,26,32,37
10. Statistical Analysis (e.g. Weibull)	11,12,16,25,29,40,41
11. Sneak Circuit Analysis	32,35
12. Design of Experiments	25
13. Logistics	1,5,17,20,21,38

R&M Software Tool Supplier Listing

1. Advanced Logistics Developments
   PO Box 232
   College Point NY 11356
   (718)463-6939

2. ARINC Research Corp
   2551 Riva Road
   Annapolis MD 21401
   (301)266-4650

3. Automated Technology Systems Corp
   25 Davids Drive
   Hauppauge NY 11788
   (516)231-7777

4. CINA, Inc.
   PO Box 4872
   Mountain View CA 94040
   (415)940-1723

5. COSMIC
   382 East Broad St
   Athens GA 30602
   (404)542-3265

6. Decision Systems Assoc
   746 Crompton
   Redwood City CA 94061
   (415)369-0501

7. DETEX Systems, Inc.
   1574 N. Batavia, Suite 4
   Orange CA 92667
   (714)637-9325

8. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp
   PO Box 696
   Troy MI 48099
   (313)689-0077

9. Evaluation Associates Inc.
   GSB Building, 1 Belmont Ave
   Bala Cynwyd PA 19004
   (215)667-3761

10. Evaluation Software
    2310 Claassen Ranch Lane
    Paso Robles CA 93446
    (805)239-4516

11. Fulton Findings
    1251 W. Sepulveda Blvd #800
    Torrance CA 90502
    (310)548-6358

12. G.R. Technologies (Pister Grp)
    PO Box 38042
    550 Eglinton Ave, West
    Toronto Ontario, M5N 3A8
    (416)886-9470

13. H&H Servicco
    PO Box 9340
    North St. Paul MN 55109
    (612)777-0152

14. Idaho National Engineering Lab
    EG&G Idaho, Inc.
    Idaho Falls ID 83415
    (208)526-9592

15. Innovative Software Designs, Inc.
    Two English Elm Court
    Baltimore MD 21228
    (410)788-9000

16. Innovative Timely Solutions
    6401 Lakerest Court
    Raleigh NC 27612
    (919)846-7705

17. Item Software Ltd
    3031 E. LaJolla St
    Anaheim CA 92806
    (714)666-8000

18. JBF Associates
    1000 Technology Park Ctr
    Knoxville TN 37932
    (615)966-5232

19. JORI Corp
    4619 Fontana St
    Orlando FL 32807
    (407)658-8337

20. Logistic Engineering Assoc
    2700 Navajo Rd, Suite A
    El Cajon CA 92020
    (619)697-1238

21. Management Sciences Inc.
     6022 Constitution Ave, N.E.
     Albuquerque NM 87110
     (505)255-8611

22. Energy Science & Technology
     Software Ctr
     PO Box 1020
     Oak Ridge TN 37831
     (615)576-2606

23. Naval Air Warefare Ctr/AD, ATE
     Software Center
     Code PD22
     Lakehurst NJ 08733
     (908)323-2414

24. NAVSEA
     Code 04 D52
     Washington DC 20362
     (703)602-2765

25. Nutek, Inc.
     30400 Telegraph Rd, Suite #380
     Birmingham MI 48010
     (313)642-4560

26. Pacific Numerix Corporation
     1200 Prospect St, Suite 300
     La Jolla CA 92037
     (619)587-0500

27. Powertronic Systems, Inc.
     13700 Chef Menteur Hwy
     New Orleans LA 70129
     (504)254-0383

28. Prompt Software Co
     393 Englert Court
     San Jose CA 95133
     (408)258-8800

29. Pritsker Corporation
     8910 Perdue Rd, Suite 500
     Indianapolis IN 46286
     (317)879-1011

30. RACAL-REDAC
     1000 Wyckoff Ave
     Mahwah NJ 07430
     (201)848-8000

31. Reliability Analysis Center (RAC)
     PO Box 4700, 201 Mill St
     Rome NY 13440
     (315)337-0900

32. Rome Laboratory/ERS
     525 Brooks Rd
     Griffiss AFB NY 13441-4505
     (315)330-4205

33. SAIC
     5150 El Camino Real, Suite C-31
     Los Altos CA 94022
     (415)960-5946

34. Sendrian Resources Corp (SRC)
     42 San Lucas Ave
     Newbury Lake CA 91320
     (805)499-7991

35. SoHaR Incorporated
     8421 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 201
     Beverly Hills CA 90211
     (213)653-4717

36. Spentech Company
     2627 Greyling Drive
     San Diego CA 92123
     (619)268-3742

37. Swanson Analysis Systems Inc.
     Johnson Rd, PO Box 65
     Houston PA 15342
     (412)746-3304

38. Systems Effectiveness Assoc
     20 Vernon Street
     Norwood MA 02062
     (617)762-9252

39. T-Cubed Systems, Inc.
     31220 La Baya Dr, Suite 110
     Westlake Village CA 91362
     (818)991-0057

40. Team Graph Papers
     Box 25
     Tamworth NH 03886
     (603)323-8843

41. Teque, Inc.
     11686 N. Daniels Dr.
     Germantown WI 53022
     (414)255-7210

Appendix 4
Example Design Guidelines

This Appendix contains an example set of design guidelines structured to include verification methods. These guidelines are an example only and don't apply to all situations.

a. Thermal Design

(1) Integrated Circuit Junction Temperatures

Design Guidelines: The design of the environmental cooling system (ECS) should be capable of maintaining an average integrated circuit junction temperature of 55°C or less under typical operating conditions. Under worst case steady state conditions, components should operate at least 50°C below their rated maximum junction temperature.

Analysis Recommendation: Thermal finite element analysis should be performed to project operating temperatures under specified environmental conditions. The analysis should consider ECS performance, environmental impacts, and system thermal design. Average junction temperatures should include all integrated circuits within the system. Average temperature rise should include all components on an individual module.

Test Recommendations: Thermally instrumented observations should be made of components under specified environmental conditions. Instrumentation can be by direct contact measurement or by infrared photography.

(2) Thermal Gradients

Design Guideline: The maximum allowable temperature rise from any junction to the nearest heat sink should be 25°C. The average temperature rise from integrated circuit junctions to the heat sink should be no greater than 15°C. To minimize gradients, more complex and power-intensive devices should be placed to minimize their operating temperature.

Analysis Recommendation: Automated design tools that perform component placement should be programmed to produce this result. A thermal finite element analysis should be used to evaluate the projected thermal gradient under the specified environmental conditions.

Test Recommendation: Thermally instrumented observation of components under specified environmental conditions. Instrumentation can be by direct contact measurement or by infrared photography.

(3) Thermal Expansion Characteristics

Design Guideline: Component and board materials should be selected with compatible thermal coefficients of expansion (TCE). Additionally, coldplate materials should be selected for TCE compatibility with the attached printed wiring board. TCE mismatch results in warpage of the laminated assembly, which can reduce module clearances and stress circuit board component leads and solder joints.

Analysis Recommendation: A finite element analysis should be performed to identify the stress patterns in the solder joints attaching the components to the board. TCE compatibility should be evaluated for the components, circuit board, and coldplate.

Test Recommendation: Environmental stress tests should be utilized in the development phase to verify the design analysis and environmental stress screening should be used in production to ensure consistency throughout the production cycle.

(4)   Heat Transport Media

Design Guideline: The design should use a thermal conduction medium that is integral to the mechanical design of the board or module. Heat pipes, metal rails or internal planes are examples of thermally conductive media. The unit should meet temperature design requirements by cooling through the integral thermal conduction medium without depending on any other heat loss.

Analysis Recommendation: Thermal finite element analysis should be used to project heat flow under specified environmental conditions. Modules employing heat pipes for cooling should meet operating temperature requirements when the module heat sink is inclined at an angle of 90 degrees from the horizontal.

Test Recommendation: Thermally instrumented observation should be made of components under specified environmental conditions. Instrumentation can be by direct contact measurement or by infrared photography.

(5)   Component Attachment

Design Guideline: Surface contact should be maximized between the component and the heat transport media. This can be achieved by direct pressure thermal compounds or solder. The technique used should be reversible for component removal during board repairs such that damage is not induced to nearby devices. If a thermal compound is used, it should not migrate or react with other components during testing or service use.

Analysis Recommendation: Specialized stress analyses should be performed to quantify thermal and mechanical stresses involved in removing the component from the board after production installation.

Test Recommendation: Demonstration of repair techniques should be performed early in the development phase.

(6)   Thermal Cycling

Design Guideline: The unit should be designed to dampen its thermal response to the thermal excursions required by the specification. This can be achieved by using a large thermal mass or by using the cooling medium to insulate the unit from its environment to the maximum extent possible.

Analysis Recommendation: Thermal finite element analysis to project heat flow and temperature excursions under specified environmental conditions.

Test Recommendation: Thermally instrumented observation of components under specified environmental excursions. Instrumentation can be by direct contact measurement or by infrared photography.

b. Testability Design

(1) Bottom-up Fault Reporting

Design Guideline: Incorporate autonomous self-testing at the lowest levels that are technically feasible. Utilize positive indication to report chip, module and subsystem status. The design should not depend upon external stimuli to perform fault detection or isolation to a replaceable element.

Analysis Recommendation: As soon as automated testability analysis tools become available, they should be used for the applicable engineering design workstations.

Test Recommendation: Hardware demonstration should be conducted early in the development phase to verify simulation results through the insertion of faults using the currently available version of the operational program, firmware and microcode.

(2) Fault Logging

Design Guideline: Modules should contain a non-volatile fault log that can be accessed by a system maintenance controller or by test equipment. The use of the fault log will improve reliability by reducing depot "Cannot Duplicates." Failure of the fault log should not cause a critical system failure, but should be observable to the maintenance controller.

Analysis Recommendation: Compliance should be verified by inspection. Operation should be verified by simulation.

Test Recommendation: Not applicable.

(3) Start-up Built-in-Test (BIT)

Design Guideline: The module should execute a BIT internal diagnostic routine immediately after power-up or receipt of an "Execute BIT" command. BIT should provide a complete functional test of the module to the maximum extent possible without transmitting any signals on external interface media. BIT should provide a complete functional test of the module and should include:

(1) Verification of internal data paths

(2) Verify station physical address

(3)   Verify message identification process from system

(4)   Verify proper functioning of all internal memory and other components

Any failure encountered during execution of BIT should be retried at lease once to confirm the response. Any confirmed failures should prevent the module from becoming enabled. A failed module should respond only to "RESET," "Execute BIT," and "Report Status" commands.

Analysis Recommendation: System design simulation tools should be used to verify operation of the BIT. These tools should include fault simulations as well as operational simulation.

Test Recommendation: Hardware demonstration should be conducted early in the development phase to verify simulation results through insertion of faults using currently available versions of the operational program, firmware and microcode.

(4)   Background Diagnostics

Design Guideline: During normal operation, the module should continuously monitor itself through a background diagnostic test. The background diagnostic should provide coverage to the maximum extent possible without interfering with normal station operation. Failure of any test in the background diagnostic should cause the module to re-execute the failed test to screen out transient anomalous responses. If the failure is confirmed, the module should become immediately disabled.

Analysis Recommendation: System design simulation tools should be used to verify operation of the BIT. These tools should include fault simulations as well as operational simulation.

Test Recommendation: Hardware demonstration should be conducted early in the development phase to verify simulation results through insertion of faults using currently available versions of the operational program, firmware and microcode. Hardware demonstration may be performed by physically inserting faults in a module or by instrumenting a module to allow insertion of faults through external methods.

c.   Mechanical Packaging Design

(1)   Mechanical Insertion/Extraction-Induced Stresses

Design Guideline: Each module should withstand, without damage or separation, a minimum force equal to at least 100 pounds on insertion and four ounces per contact on extraction. Additionally, the backplane for the assembly should withstand the same forces at all module positions applied repeatedly in any sequence with any combination of modules present or missing.

Analysis Recommendation: A mechanical loads analysis should be performed to verify compliance with the mechanical requirements.

Test Recommendation: The total computed force should be applied to simulate module insertion and extraction. The force should be applied in 2 seconds and maintained for 15 seconds.

(2) Insertion/Extraction Durability

Design Guideline: Modules should be capable of withstanding 500 cycles of mating and unmating with no degradation of module performance. The module should also be capable of withstanding 500 cycles of lateral displacement to simulate the use of thermal clamping devices. The backplane of the module's host assembly should be capable of withstanding 500 of the same cycles on each of its module positions.

Analysis Recommendation: A mechanical loads analysis should be performed to verify compliance with the mechanical requirements.

Test Recommendation: Each module/backplane position should be subjected to 500 cycles of insertion/extraction. The maximum specified insertion and extraction forces should be applied in 2 seconds and maintained for 15 seconds. Five hundred lateral displacement cycles should be applied to the module.

(3) Mechanical Vibration-Induced Stresses

Design Guideline: The larger components are more susceptible to mechanical stresses because they have a larger mass and because they are more constrained by the high number of pin-outs that act as attachment points. Module stiffness should be maximized to prevent board flexing resulting in stress fractures at the solder joints or component leadframe.

Analysis Recommendation: Mechanical finite element analysis should be performed to identify module characteristics throughout the specified vibrational environment.

Test Recommendation: Developmental units should be specially instrumented with accelerometers early in the development program. These units could use dummy masses attached using the intended production technique. Standard endurance and qualification tests should be performed in accordance with MIL-STD-810, "Environmental Test Methods and Engineering Guidelines."

(4) Module Torque Stresses

Design Guidelines: The module should be capable of withstanding a 6 inch-pound torque applied in 2 seconds and maintained for 15 seconds in both directions along the header in a direction perpendicular to the plane of the header without detrimental effect to the mechanical or electrical properties of the module.

Analysis Recommendation: A mechanical loads analysis should be performed to verify compliance with the mechanical requirements.

Test Recommendation: The required torque should be applied in 2 seconds and maintained for 15 seconds. During the time the torque is applied, the module should be rigidly supported with a zone between the interface plane and 0.5 inch above the interface panel.

(5)   Module Cantilever Load

Design Guideline: The module should be capable of withstanding a force of 2 pounds applied perpendicular to the header height along the center line midway between the two extractor holes.

Analysis Recommendation: A mechanical loads analysis should be performed to verify compliance with the mechanical requirements.

Test Recommendation: The required force should be applied in two directions and should be applied in 2 to 10 seconds and maintained for 10 to 15 seconds without detrimental effect to the header structure.

(6)   Module Retention

Design Guideline: Module retention techniques must be carefully designed to integrate the insertion mechanism, required connector insertion force, thermal contact area, and extraction mechanism. Conventional electronics have required the same considerations, but to a lesser degree because of their more conventional housings.

Analysis Recommendation: Specialized analyses should be used to quantify torque requirements and limitations of the wedge-clamping device, lever moments of insertion or extraction devices, tolerance buildups of the module slot and connector placement and mechanical deflections of the backplane.

Test Recommendations: Standard endurance and qualification tests in accordance with MIL-STD-810, "Environmental Test Methods and Engineering Guidelines."

(7)   Connector Contact Integrity

Design Guideline: Each contact pin, as mounted in the connector, should withstand a minimum axial force of 20 ounces.

Analysis Recommendation: A mechanical loads analysis should be performed to verify compliance with the mechanical requirements.

Test Recommendation: The required force should be applied in 2 seconds along the length of the contact in either direction and maintained for 15 seconds.

(8)   Connector Float

Design Guideline: The connector-to-module interface should be sufficiently flexible to compensate for specified misalignments or tolerance buildup between the module and the backplane connector shells.

Analysis Recommendation: Tolerance review should be performed early in design process.

Test Recommendation: Demonstration testing can be performed easily during the initial mechanical design phase.

(9)   Keying Pin Integrity

Design Guideline: When installed in the module, the keying pins should meet the following integrity requirements. Each keying pin should withstand a:

- Torque of 20 inch-ounces

- Pullout force of 9 pounds

- Pushout force of 40 pounds

- Cantilever load of 10 pounds

Analysis Recommendation: A mechanical loads analysis should be performed to verify compliance with the mechanical requirements.

Test Recommendation: The required forces should be applied to the keying pin in 2 seconds and maintained for 15 seconds.

d.   Power Supply Design

(1)   Overcurrent Protection

Design Guideline: The power supply should supply 125 percent of its rated output for 2 ± 0.25 seconds, after which the power supply will shut down (shut down is defined as all outputs at less than 1 mv and 1 ma current, but all status and control lines still operating). Operation should not resume until the power supply is reset. In addition, the power supply outputs should be short circuit protected.

Analysis Recommendation: Compliance with the specified operation should be verified throughout the design process.

Test Recommendation: Specified operation of the protective device should be induced by application of the anomalous condition protected against. Correct operation of the protective device should be observed. Normal specified power supply operation should be verified after removal of the anomalous condition.

(2)   Overvoltage Protection

Design Guideline: The output should be sensed for overvoltage. An overvoltage on the output should immediately shut down the power supply. Operation should not resume until the power supply is reset. The overvoltage limits should be compatible with device logic absolute maximum limits. The overvoltage protection and sense circuits should be constructed such that an overvoltage on a failed power supply will not cause any other paralleled power supply to also shut down.

Analysis Recommendation: Compliance with the specified operation should be verified throughout the design process.

Test Recommendation: Specified operation of the protective device should be induced by application of the anomalous condition protected against. Correct operation of the protective device should be observed. Normal specified power supply operation should be verified after removal of the anomalous condition.

(3)   Abnormal Thermal Operation

Design Guideline: In the event of an above-normal internal temperature, the power supply should be capable of continued operation at a reduced power output. Thermal sense circuits should regulate the output to the extent necessary to keep semiconductor junctions at or below specified levels. The power supply should resume operation at rated output if internal temperatures return to normal.

Analysis Recommendation: Compliance with the specified operation should be verified throughout the design process.

Test Recommendation: Specified operation of the protective device should be induced by application of the anomalous condition protected against. Correct operation of the protective device should be observed. Normal specified power supply operation should be verified after removal of the anomalous condition.

(4)   Thermal Shutdown

Design Guideline: When thermal limiting is no longer capable of maintaining internal temperature at an acceptable level, the power supply should automatically shut down. Operation should not resume until the power supply is reset. Temperature sense circuits should remain active during shut down.

Analysis Recommendation: Compliance with the specified operation should be verified throughout the design process.

Test Recommendation: Specified operation of the protective device should be induced by application of the anomalous condition protected against. Correct operation of the protective device should be observed. Normal specified power supply operation should be verified after removal of the anomalous condition.

(5)   Power Supply Status Reporting

Design Guideline: There should be an interface on each power supply module that will allow data communication between the power supply and a CPU located on a separate module. Each power supply module will be addressed individually. The data and control lines should interface to the power supply module through the backplane connector. The following power supply parameters should be read by the CPU:

- Overcurrent status

- Overvoltage status

- Thermal limiting mode status

- Thermal shutdown status

- Percentage of full output power available

The following commands should be issued by the CPU to the power supply module:

- Reset

- Percentage of full output power required

Analysis Recommendation: Compliance with the specified operation should be verified throughout the design process.

Test Recommendation: Specified operation of the protective device (i.e., monitoring mechanism and control) should be induced by application of the anomalous condition protected against. Correct operation of the protective device should be observed. Normal specified power supply operation should be verified after removal of the anomalous condition.

(6)   Power Supply Input Protection

Design Guideline: The power supply should automatically shut down if the input voltage is not within the specified allowable range, and at any time when the control circuits in the power supply do not have adequate voltage to regulate the outputs. This should include the time during normal start-up when generators are not producing their normal output voltage.

Analysis Recommendation: Compliance with the specified operation should be verified throughout the design process.

Test Recommendation: Specified operation of the protective device should be induced by application of the anomalous condition protected against. Correct operation of the protective device should be observed. Normal specified power supply operation should be verified after removal of the anomalous condition.

(7)   Backplane Conditions

Design Guideline: A sufficient number of connector pins should be paralleled so that no backplane connector pin carries more than 5 amps of current.

Analysis Recommendation: Compliance with the specified operation should be verified throughout the design process.

Test Recommendation: Not applicable.

(8)   M-of-N Power Supply Redundancy

Design Guideline: The quantity of power supplies for a system of functional elements should be determined to allow uninterrupted operation if one of the power supplies fails. When all power supplies are functional, they should share the system load equally by operating at reduced output. If the system power requirement is less than that available from one power supply, redundancy should not be used unless a critical function is involved.

Analysis Recommendation: Compliance should be verified by electrical loads analysis.

Test Recommendation: Not applicable.

(9)   Current Sharing

Design Guideline: The power supplies should be constructed so that units which have the same output voltage may operate in parallel. The design should be such that power supply failures will not cause degradation of parallel power supplies. Each power supply should provide its proportional share (±10%) of the total electric load required at the configured output voltage.

Analysis Recommendation: Compliance with the specified operation should be verified as a part of the design process.

Test Recommendation: A demonstration should be conducted under load to verify that the parallel power supplies power up and power down in unison. Failure and reset of one of the power supplies should be simulated or induced to demonstrate proper operation of the remaining units through the transition.

(10)   Protective Device Operation

Design Guideline: During parallel operation, each power supply protective device should be capable of sensing and operating independently of the other power supplies.   Master-slave type operation should not be permitted under any circumstances.

Analysis Recommendation: Compliance with the specified operation should be verified as a part of the design process.

Test Recommendation: A demonstration should be conducted under load to verify proper operation of each protective device during parallel operation.

e. Memory Fault Tolerance

(1) Block Masking

Design Guideline: Known locations of defective memory should be mapped out of the memory directories. In this manner, permanently failed cells can be prevented from contributing to double error occurrences in combination with soft errors. At power-up or reinitialization, BIT should perform a memory test routine and leave a memory map of all good blocks. At the conclusion of the memory test routine, all words contained in the memory blocks marked good should have been initialized in an error free data pattern. Program loader software should make use of the good memory block map, the process memory mapping registers, and information stored in program file headers to load distributed operating systems and application programs into the remaining good areas of main memory. Repair or replacement of the module should not be required until the number of remaining good blocks of memory are insufficient to meet operational requirements.

Analysis Recommendation: An analysis should be performed to identify the optimum combination of component/bit mapping, hardware control and software control.

Test Recommendation: Not applicable.

(2) Error Detection/Correction

Design Guideline: As a minimum, single error correct/double error detect code should be used in large bulk semiconductor memories. It should be considered in any application involving large amounts of semiconductor memory, but may impose unacceptable speed and complexity penalties in some applications (e.g., CPU).

Analysis Recommendation: A detailed timing analysis should be conducted to determine the impact of this technique on the specific application.

Test Recommendation: System bench testing should be used to insert faults and confirm expected system operation.

Appendix 5
Reliability Demonstration Testing

1.0   Reliability Demonstration Testing: This appendix presents tables and examples which summarize the following:

- MIL-HDBK-781 "Reliability Test Methods, Plans and Environments for Engineering Development, Qualification and Production"

- Confidence Interval Calculations

- Poisson's Exponential Binomial Limits

2.0   MIL-HDBK-781 Test Plans: Tables 5-1 and 5-2 summarize standard test plans as defined in MIL-HDBK-781. These plans assume an exponential failure distribution. For nonexponential situations the risks are different.

The fixed length test plans (Table 5-1) must be used when the exact length and cost of the test must be known beforehand and when it is necessary to demonstrate a specific MTBF to a predetermined confidence level by the test as well as reach an accept/reject decision.

The probability ratio sequential test (PRST) plans (Table 5-2) will accept material with a high MTBF or reject material with a very low MTBF more quickly than fixed length test plans having similar risks and discrimination ratios. However, different MTBF's may be demonstrated by different accept decision points for the same test plan and the total test time may vary significantly.

Additional guidance on test plan selection is provided in Section T, Topic T5.

2.1   Fixed Length Test Plan Example: If the design goal MTBF (θ_0) for a system is specified as 750 hours and Test Plan XID is chosen, the following statements can be made:

a. There is a 20 percent probability of rejecting a system whose true MTBF is 750 hours (producers risk).

b. There is a 20 percent probability of accepting a system whose true MTBF is 500 hours (consumers risk).

c. The lower test MTBF (θ_1) is 500 hours (750/1.5).

d. The duration of the test is 10,750 hours (21.5 x 500).

e. The test will reject any system which experiences 18 or more failures.

f. The test will accept any system which experiences 17 or less failures.

Table 5-1: Fixed Length MIL-HDBK-781 Reliability Demonstration Test Plans

Test Plan	Nominal Decision Risks α	Nominal Decision Risks β	Discrimination Ratio θ_0/θ_1	Test Duration (Multiples of θ_1)	Test Duration (Multiples of θ_0)	Accept-Reject Failures Reject (Equal or More)	Accept-Reject Failures Accept (Equal or Less)
IXD	10%	10%	1.5	45.0	30.0	37	36
XD	10%	20%	1.5	29.9	19.93	26	25
XID	10%	20%	1.5	21.5	14.33	18	17
XIID	10%	10%	2.0	18.8	9.4	14	13
XIIID	10%	20%	2.0	12.4	6.2	10	9
XIVD	20%	20%	2.0	7.8	3.9	6	5
XVD	10%	10%	3.0	9.3	3.1	6	5
XVID	10%	20%	3.0	5.4	1.8	4	3
XVIID	20%	20%	3.0	4.3	1.43	3	2
XIXD*	30%	30%	1.5	8.0	5.33	7	6
XXD*	30%	30%	2.0	3.7	1.85	3	2
XXID*	30%	30%	3.0	1.1	.37	1	0

*Short Run High Risk Test Plans.

Notes:

1. Lower Test MTBF (θ_1) is that value of MTBF which is *unacceptable* and will result in a high probability of equipment rejections using MIL-HDBK-781 test plans.

2. Upper Test MTBF (θ_0) is that value of MTBF which is *acceptable* and will result in a high probability of equipment acceptance using MIL-HDBK-781 test plans.

3. Consumers Risk (β) is the probability of accepting equipment with a true MTBF equal to the lower test MTBF (θ_1) (probability of accepting a bad equipment).

4. Producers Risk (α) is the probability of rejecting equipment with a true MTBF equal to the upper test MTBF (θ_0) (probability of rejecting a good equipment).

5. Discrimination Ratio ($d = \theta_0/\theta_1$) is one of the test plan parameters which is a measure of the power of the test in reaching an accept/reject decision quickly. In general, the higher the discrimination ratio, the shorter the test.

Table 5-2: MIL-HDBK-781 PRST Reliability Demonstration Test Plan Summary

Test Plan	Nominal Decision Risks		Discrimination Ratio θ_0/θ_1	Time to Accept Decision in MTBF (θ_1 Multiples)			Time to Accept Decision in MTBF (θ_0 Multiples)		
	α	β		Min	Exp[1]	Max	Min	Exp[1]	Max
ID	10%	10%	1.5	6.6	25.95	49.5	4.4	17.3	33.0
IID	20%	20%	1.5	4.19	11.4	21.9	2.79	7.6	14.6
IIID	10%	10%	2.0	4.40	10.2	20.6	2.2	5.1	10.3
IVD	20%	20%	2.0	2.80	4.8	9.74	1.4	2.4	4.87
VD	10%	10%	3.0	3.75	6.0	10.35	1.25	2.0	3.45
VID	20%	20%	3.0	2.67	3.42	4.5	.89	1.14	1.5
VIID	30%	30%	1.5	3.15	5.1	6.8	2.1	3.4	4.53
VIIID	30%	30%	2.0	1.72	2.6	4.5	.86	1.3	2.25

Notes:

1. Expected test time assumes a true MTBF is equal to θ_0.

2. Test length should be assumed to be the maximum test time for planning purposes.

3. Lower Test MTBF (θ_1) is that value of MTBF which is *unacceptable* and will result in a high probability of equipment rejections using MIL-HDBK-781 test plans.

4. Upper Test MTBF (θ_0) is that value of MTBF which is *acceptable* and will result in a high probability of equipment acceptance using MIL-HDBK-781 test plans.

5. Consumers Risk (β) is the probability of accepting equipment with a true MTBF equal to the lower test MTBF (θ_1) (probability of accepting a bad equipment).

6. Producers Risk (α) is the probability of rejecting equipment with a true MTBF equal to the upper test MTBF (θ_0) (probability of rejecting a good equipment).

7. Discrimination Ratio ($d = \theta_0/\theta_1$) is one of the test plan parameters which is a measure of the power of the test in reaching an accept/reject decision quickly. In general, the higher the discrimination ratio, the shorter the test.

2.2   PRST Test Plan Example: If the design goal MTBF (θ_0) for a system is specified as 750 hours and Test Plan IID is chosen, the following statements can be made:

a. There is a 20 percent probability of rejecting a system whose true MTBF is 750 hours (producers risk).

b. There is a 20 percent probability of accepting a system whose true MTBF is 500 hours (consumers risk).

c. The lower test MTBF (θ_1) is 500 hours (750/1.5).

d. The minimum time to an accept decision is 2095 hours (4.19 x 500).

e. The expected time to an accept decision is 5700 hours (11.4 x 500). (Expected time to decision based on assumption of a true MTBF equal to θ_0).

f. The maximum time to reach an accept decision is 10950 hours (21.9 x 500).

3.0   Confidence Level Calculation (Exponential Distribution): There are two ways to end a reliability test, either on a specified number of failures occurring (failure truncated), or on a set period of time (time truncated). There are usually two types of confidence calculations of interest, either one sided (giving the confidence that an MTBF is above a certain value) or two sided (giving the confidence that an MTBF is between an upper and lower limit). Table 5-4 provides a simple means to estimate one or two sided confidence limits. Multiply the appropriate factor by the observed total life (T) to obtain the desired confidence interval.

Example 1 - Failure Truncated Test with Replacement: Twenty items are tested and replaced until 10 failures are observed. The tenth failure occurs at 80 hours. Determine the mean life of the items and the one-sided and two-sided 95% confidence intervals for the MTBF.

Solution: The mean life is (20 items) (80 hours/items) / 10 failures = 160 hours. From Table 5-4, Note 2 applies, d = (2)(10) = 20.   The following factors are obtained from the table:

> 95% two-sided lower factor = .0585
> 95% two-sided upper factor = .208
> 95% one-sided lower factor = .0635

Multipling these factors by 1600 total part hours (i.e., (20 items) (80 hours/item)) results in a 95% confidence that the MTBF is between 94 hours and 333 hours, or a 95% confidence that the MTBF is at least 102 hours.

Table 5-4: Factors for Calculation of Mean Life Confidence Intervals from Test Data

(Assumption of Exponential Distribution)

Confidence level pairs (Two-Sided / One-Sided):
- 99% Two-Sided / 99-1/2% One-Sided
- 98% One-Sided / 99% One-Sided
- 95% Two-Sided / 97-1/2% One-Sided
- 90% Two-Sided / 95% One-Sided
- 80% Two-Sided / 90% One-Sided
- 60% Two-Sided / 80% One-Sided

d	Lower Limit						Upper Limit					
	99% 2S / 99-1/2% 1S	98% 1S / 99% 1S	95% 2S / 97-1/2% 1S	90% 2S / 95% 1S	80% 2S / 90% 1S	60% 2S / 80% 1S	60% 2S / 80% 1S	80% 2S / 90% 1S	90% 2S / 95% 1S	95% 2S / 97-1/2% 1S	98% 1S / 99% 1S	99% 2S / 99-1/2% 1S
2	.185	.217	.272	.333	.433	.619	4.47	9.462	19.388	39.58	100.0	200.0
4	.135	.151	.180	.210	.257	.334	1.21	1.882	2.826	4.102	6.667	10.00
6	.108	.119	.139	.159	.188	.234	.652	.909	1.221	1.613	2.3077	3.007
8	.0909	.100	.114	.129	.150	.181	.437	.573	0.733	.921	1.212	1.481
10	.0800	.0857	.0976	.109	.125	.149	.324	.411	.508	.600	.789	.909
12	.0702	.0759	.0856	.0952	.107	.126	.256	.317	.383	.454	.555	.645
14	.0635	.0690	.0765	.0843	.0948	.109	.211	.257	.305	.355	.431	.500
16	.0588	.0625	.0693	.0760	.0848	.0976	.179	.215	.251	.290	.345	.385
18	.0536	.0571	.0633	.0693	.0769	.0878	.156	.184	.213	.243	.286	.322
20	.0500	.0531	.0585	.0635	.0703	.0799	.137	.158	.184	.208	.242	.270
22	.0465	.0495	.0543	.0589	.0648	.0732	.123	.142	.162	.182	.208	.232
24	.0439	.0463	.0507	.0548	.0601	.0676	.111	.128	.144	.161	.185	.200
26	.0417	.0438	.0476	.0513	.0561	.0629	.101	.116	.130	.144	.164	.178
28	.0392	.0413	.0449	.0483	.0527	.0588	.0927	.106	.118	.131	.147	.161
30	.0373	.0393	.0425	.0456	.0496	.0551	.0856	.0971	.108	.119	.133	.145
32	.0355	.0374	.0404	.0433	.0469	.0519	.0795	.0899	.0997	.109	.122	.131
34	.0339	.0357	.0385	.0411	.0445	.0491	.0742	.0834	.0925	.101	.113	.122
36	.0325	.0342	.0367	.0392	.0423	.0466	.0696	.0781	.0899	.0939	.104	.111
38	.0311	.0327	.0351	.0375	.0404	.0443	.0656	.0732	.0804	.0874	.0971	.103
40	.0299	.0314	.0337	.0359	.0386	.0423	.0619	.0689	.0756	.0820	.0901	.0968

Notes: 1. Multiply value shown by total part hours to get MTBF figures in hours.
2. d = 2 (# of failures accumulated at test termination).
3. For the lower limit on tests truncated at a fixed time where the number of failures occurring is less than the total number of items placed on test initially, use: d = 2 (# of failures accumulated at test termination +1).

Example 2 - Time Terminated Test without Replacement: Twenty items are placed on test for 100 hours with seven failures occuring at the 10, 16, 17, 25, 31, 46 and 65 hour points. Determine the one-sided lower 90% confidence interval.

Solution: The total number of part hours accumulated is:

10 + 16 + 17 + 25 + 31 + 46 + 65 + (13 non-failed items) (100 hours) = 1510 hrs.

The MTBF is 1510 hours/7 failures = 216 hrs.

From Table 5-4, Note 3 applies, d = 2(7+1) = 16.

The factor from the table is .0848 for the 90% one-sided lower limit. Therefore, we are 90% confident that the MTBF is greater than (.0848)(1510 hours) = 128 hours.

4.0   Poisson Distribution: The Poisson distribution is useful in calculating the probability that a certain number of failures will occur over a certain length of time for systems exhibiting exponential failure distributions (e.g., non-redundant electronic systems). The Poisson model can be stated as follows:

$$P(r) = \frac{e^{-\lambda t}(\lambda t)^r}{r!}$$

where

P(r) =   probability of *exactly* r failures occurring

λ =   the true failure rate per hour (i.e., the failure rate which would be exhibited over an infinite period)

t =   the test time

r =   the number of failure occurrences

e =   2.71828 . . . ,

! =   factorial symbol (e.g., 4! = 4 x 3 x 2 x 1 = 24, 0! = 1, 1! = 1)

The probability of exactly 0 failures results in the exponential form of this distribution which is used to calculate the probability of success for a given period of time (i.e., P(0) = $e^{-\lambda t}$). The probability of more than one failure occurring is the sum of the probabilities of individual failures occurring. For example, the probability of two or less failures occurring is P(0) + P(1) + P(2). Table 5-5 is a tabulation of exact probabilities used to find the probability of an exact number of failures occurring. Table 5-6 is a tabulation of *cumulative* probabilities used to find the probability of a specific number of failures, or less, occurring.

4.1   Poisson Example 1: If the true MTBF of a system is 200 hours and a reliability demonstration test is conducted for 1000 hours, what is the probability of accepting the system if three or less failures are allowed?

Solution: Expected number of failures = $\lambda t = \dfrac{t}{\text{MTBF}} = \dfrac{1000}{200} = 5$

From Table 5-6, the probability of three or less failures (probability of acceptance) given that five are expected is .265. Therefore, there is only a 26.5 percent chance that this system will be accepted if subjected to this test.

4.2   Poisson Example 2: A system has an MTBF of 50 hours. What is the probability of two or more failures during a 10 hour mission?

Solution: Expected number of failures $= \dfrac{t}{\text{MTBF}} = \dfrac{10}{50} = .2$

The probability of two or more failures is one minus the probability of one or less failures. From Table 5-6, P(r _1) when .2 are expected is .982.

P(r _ 2) = 1 - P(r _ 1)

1 - .982 = .018

Therefore, there is a very remote chance (1.8 percent) that a system with a 50 hour MTBF will experience two or more failures during a 10 hour mission.

4.3   Poisson Example 3: A system has an MTBF of 50 hours. What is the probability of experiencing two failures during a 10 hour mission?

Solution: Expected number of failures = $\dfrac{t}{\text{MTBF}} = \dfrac{10}{50} = .2$

From Table 5-5, the probability of experiencing *exactly two* failures when .2 are expected is .017 or 1.7 percent. It should be noted that the probability of experiencing two or more failures, as determined in the last example, can also be determined from this table by adding P(r = 2) + P(r = 3) when .2 are expected.

Table 5-5: Summation of Terms of Poisson's Exponential Binomial Limit

1000 times the probability of **exactly r** failure occurrences given an average number of occurrences equal to λt.

Exp Fail λt	r=0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
0.02	980	020						
0.04	961	038	001					
0.06	942	056	002					
0.08	923	074	003					
0.10	905	090	005					
0.15	861	129	009	001				
0.20	819	163	017	001				
0.25	779	195	024	002				
0.30	741	222	033	004				
0.35	705	246	043	006				
0.40	670	268	054	007	001			
0.45	638	287	064	010	001			
0.50	607	303	076	012	002			
0.55	577	317	088	016	002	001		
0.60	549	329	099	020	003	001		
0.65	522	339	111	024	003	001		
0.70	497	347	122	028	005	001		
0.75	472	355	132	034	006	001		
0.80	449	360	144	038	008	001		
0.85	427	364	154	044	009	002		
0.90	407	365	165	050	011	002	001	
0.95	387	367	175	055	013	002	001	
1.00	368	368	184	061	015	003	001	
1.1	333	366	201	074	021	004	001	
1.2	301	362	216	087	026	006	002	
1.3	273	354	230	100	032	009	002	001
1.4	247	345	241	113	040	011	003	001
1.5	223	335	251	125	047	015	003	001
1.6	202	322	258	138	055	018	005	001
1.7	183	310	264	150	063	022	006	002

Exp Fail λt	r																					
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
1.8	165	298	268	160	073	026	007	002	001													
1.9	150	284	270	171	081	031	010	002	001													
2.0	135	271	271	180	090	036	013	004	001													
2.2	111	244	268	196	109	047	018	005	002													
2.4	091	217	262	209	125	060	024	009	002	001												
2.6	074	193	251	218	141	074	032	012	004	001												
2.8	061	170	238	223	156	087	041	016	006	001	001											
3.0	050	149	224	224	168	101	050	022	008	003	001											
3.2	041	130	209	223	178	114	060	028	011	004	002											
3.4	033	114	193	218	186	127	071	035	015	005	002											
3.6	027	099	177	212	191	138	083	042	019	008	003	001										
3.8	022	085	162	204	195	148	093	051	024	010	004	001	001									
4.0	018	073	147	195	195	156	104	060	030	013	005	002	001									
4.2	015	063	132	185	194	163	114	069	036	017	007	003	001									
4.4	012	054	119	174	192	169	124	078	043	021	009	004	001									
4.6	010	046	106	163	188	173	132	087	050	026	012	005	002	001								
4.8	008	040	095	152	182	175	140	096	058	031	015	006	003	001								
5.0	007	034	084	140	175	175	146	104	065	036	018	008	003	001								
5.2	005	029	074	130	168	175	151	112	073	042	022	010	004	002	001							
5.4	004	024	066	119	160	173	155	120	081	048	026	013	006	002	001							
5.6	004	021	058	108	151	170	158	127	089	055	030	016	007	003	001	001						
5.8	003	017	051	098	143	165	160	133	096	062	036	019	009	004	001	001						
6.0	002	015	045	089	134	161	161	138	103	069	041	022	011	005	002	001						
6.2	002	012	039	081	125	155	160	142	110	076	047	026	014	006	003	001						
6.4	002	011	034	072	116	149	158	145	116	082	052	031	016	008	004	002	001					
6.6	001	009	030	065	107	142	156	147	121	089	059	035	019	010	005	002	001					
6.8	001	007	026	058	099	135	153	149	126	095	064	040	023	012	006	003	001					
7.0	001	006	022	052	091	128	149	149	130	101	070	045	026	014	007	003	001	001				
7.2	001	005	019	046	083	120	144	148	134	107	077	050	030	017	009	004	002	001				

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Exp Fail λt	r=0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
7.4	001	005	017	041	076	113	139	147	136	112	083	056	034	020	010	005	002	001				
7.6	001	003	014	037	070	106	134	145	138	117	089	061	039	023	012	006	003	001	001			
7.8	000	003	012	032	063	099	128	143	139	121	094	067	043	026	014	007	004	002	001			
8.0	000	002	010	029	057	092	122	139	139	124	099	072	048	029	017	009	004	002	001			
8.2	000	002	009	025	051	084	115	136	139	127	104	077	052	033	019	010	005	003	001			
8.4	000	002	008	022	047	078	109	131	138	129	108	082	058	037	022	013	006	003	002	001		
8.6	000	002	007	019	042	072	103	127	137	130	112	088	063	042	025	015	008	004	002	001		
8.8	000	001	006	017	038	066	097	122	134	131	116	092	068	046	029	017	009	005	002	001		
9.0	000	001	005	015	034	061	091	117	132	132	118	098	072	050	032	019	011	006	003	001	001	
9.2	000	001	004	013	030	055	085	111	128	131	120	101	077	055	036	022	013	007	003	002	001	
9.4	000	001	004	011	027	050	080	106	125	131	123	105	082	059	040	025	014	008	004	002	001	
9.6	000	001	003	009	023	045	073	101	121	129	124	108	087	064	044	028	017	009	005	002	001	001
9.8	000	000	002	009	021	041	068	095	117	127	125	111	091	068	048	031	019	011	006	003	001	001
10.0	000	000	002	007	018	037	063	090	112	125	125	114	094	073	052	035	022	013	007	004	002	001

Table 5-6: Summary of Terms of Poisson's Exponential Binomial Limit

1000 times the probability of **r or less** failure occurrences given an average number of occurrences equal to λt.

Exp Fail λt	r=0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
0.02	980	1000								
0.04	961	999	1000							
0.06	942	998	1000							
0.08	923	997	1000							
0.10	905	995	1000							
0.15	861	990	999	1000						
0.20	819	982	999	1000						
0.25	779	974	998	1000						
0.30	741	963	996	1000						
0.35	705	951	994	1000	1000					
0.40	670	938	992	999	1000					
0.45	638	925	989	999	1000					
0.50	607	910	986	998	1000					
0.55	577	894	982	998	1000					
0.60	549	878	977	997	1000					
0.65	522	861	972	996	999	1000				
0.70	497	844	966	994	999	1000				
0.75	472	827	959	993	999	1000				
0.80	449	809	953	991	999	1000				
0.85	427	791	945	989	998	1000				
0.90	407	772	937	987	998	1000				
0.95	387	754	929	984	997	1000				
1.00	368	736	920	981	996	999	1000			
1.1	333	699	900	974	995	999	1000			
1.2	301	663	879	966	992	998	1000			
1.3	273	627	857	957	989	998	1000			
1.4	247	592	833	946	986	997	999	1000		
1.5	223	558	809	934	981	996	999	1000		
1.6	202	525	783	921	976	994	999	1000		
1.7	183	493	757	907	970	992	998	1000		
1.8	165	463	731	891	964	990	998	1000		
1.9	150	434	704	875	956	987	997	999	1000	
2.0	135	406	677	857	947	983	996	999	1000	
2.2	111	355	623	819	928	975	993	998	1000	
2.4	091	308	570	779	904	964	988	997	999	1000
2.6	074	267	518	736	877	951	983	995	999	1000

Exp Fail λt	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
2.8	061	231	469	692	848	935	976	992	998	999	1000												
3.0	050	199	423	647	815	916	966	988	996	999	1000												
3.2	041	171	380	603	781	895	955	983	994	998	1000												
3.4	033	147	340	558	744	871	942	977	992	997	999	1000											
3.6	027	126	303	515	706	844	927	969	988	996	999	1000											
3.8	022	107	269	473	668	816	909	960	984	994	998	999	1000										
4.0	018	092	238	433	629	785	889	949	979	992	997	999	1000										
4.2	015	078	210	395	590	753	867	936	972	989	996	999	1000										
4.4	012	066	185	359	551	720	844	921	964	985	994	998	999	1000									
4.6	010	056	163	326	513	686	818	905	955	980	992	997	999	1000									
4.8	008	048	143	294	476	651	791	887	944	975	990	996	999	1000									
5.0	007	040	125	265	440	616	762	867	932	968	986	995	998	999	1000								
5.2	006	034	109	238	406	581	732	845	918	960	982	993	997	999	1000								
5.4	005	029	095	213	373	546	702	822	903	951	977	990	996	999	1000								
5.6	004	024	082	191	342	512	670	797	886	941	972	988	995	998	999	1000							
5.8	003	021	072	170	313	478	638	771	867	929	965	984	993	997	999	1000							
6.0	002	017	062	151	285	446	606	744	847	916	957	980	991	996	999	999	1000						
6.2	002	015	054	134	259	414	574	716	826	902	949	975	989	995	998	999	1000						
6.4	002	012	046	119	235	384	542	687	803	886	939	969	986	994	997	999	1000						
6.6	001	010	040	105	213	355	511	658	780	869	927	963	982	992	997	999	999	1000					
6.8	001	009	034	093	192	327	480	628	755	850	915	955	978	990	996	998	999	1000					
7.0	001	007	030	082	173	301	450	599	729	830	901	947	973	987	994	998	999	1000					
7.2	001	006	025	072	156	276	420	569	703	810	887	937	967	984	993	997	999	999	1000				
7.4	001	005	022	063	140	253	392	539	676	788	871	926	961	980	991	996	998	999	1000				
7.6	001	004	019	055	125	231	365	510	648	765	854	915	954	976	989	995	998	999	1000				
7.8	000	004	016	048	112	210	338	481	620	741	835	902	945	971	986	993	997	999	1000				
8.0	000	003	014	042	100	191	313	453	593	717	816	888	936	966	983	992	996	998	999	1000			
8.5	000	002	009	030	074	150	256	386	523	653	763	849	909	949	973	986	993	997	999	999	1000		
9.0	000	001	006	021	055	116	207	324	456	587	706	803	876	926	959	978	989	995	998	999	1000		
9.5	000	001	004	015	040	089	165	269	392	522	645	752	836	898	940	967	982	991	996	998	999	1000	
10.0	000	000	003	003	029	067	130	220	333	458	583	697	792	864	917	951	973	986	993	997	998	999	1000

Reliability Growth Testing

1.0   RGT Definition: MIL-STD-785 distinguishes reliability growth testing (RGT) from reliability qualification testing (RQT) as follows:

Reliability Growth Test (RGT): A series of tests conducted to disclose deficiencies and to verify that corrective actions will prevent recurrence in the operational inventory. (Also known as "TAAF" testing).

Reliability Qualification Test (RQT): A test conducted under specified conditions, by, or on behalf of, the government, using items representative of the approved production configuration, to determine compliance with specified reliability requirements as a basis for production approval. (Also known as a "Reliability Demonstration," or "Design Approval" test.)

2.0   RGT Application Effectiveness: An effective way to explain the concept of RGT is by addressing the most frequently asked questions relative to its use as summarized from "Reliability Growth Testing Effectiveness" (RADC-TR-84-20). For more information consult this reference and MIL-HDBK-189, "Reliability Growth Management."

Who pays for the RGT? Does the government end up paying more? The usual case is that the government pays for the RGT as an additional reliability program cost and in stretching out the schedule. The savings in support costs (recurring logistics costs) exceed the additional initial acquisition cost, resulting in a net savings in Life Cycle Cost (LCC). The amount of these savings is dependent on the quantity to be fielded, the maintenance concept, the sensitivity of LCC to reliability and the level of development required. It is the old "pay me now or pay me later situation" which in many cases makes a program manager's situation difficult because his or her performance is mainly based on the "now" performance of cost and schedule.

Does RGT allow contractors to "get away with" a sloppy initial design because they can fix it later at the government's expense? It has been shown that unforeseen problems account for 75% of the failures due to the complexity of today's equipment. Too low an initial reliability (resulting from an inadequate contractor design process) will necessitate an unrealistic growth rate in order to attain an acceptable level of reliability in the allocated amount of test time. The growth test should be considered as an organized search and correction system for reliability problems that allows problems to be fixed when it is least expensive. It is oriented towards the efficient determination of corrective action. Solutions are emphasized rather than excuses. It can give a nontechnical person
an appreciation of reliability and a way to measure its status.

Should all development programs have some sort of growth program? The answer to this question is yes in that all programs should analyze and correct failures when they occur in prequalification testing. A distinction should be in the level of formality of the growth program. The less challenge there is to the state-of-the-art, the less formal (or rigorous) a reliability growth program should be. An extreme example would be the case of procuring off-the-shelf equipment to be part of a military system. In this situation, which really isn't a development, design flexibility to correct reliability problems is mainly constrained to newly developed

interfaces between the "boxes" making up the system. A rigorous growth program would be inappropriate but a failure reporting and corrective action system (FRACAS) should still be implemented. The other extreme is a developmental program applying technology that challenges the state-of-the-art. In this situation a much greater amount of design flexibility to correct unforeseen problems exists. Because the technology is so new and challenging, it can be expected that a greater number of unforeseen problems will be surfaced by growth testing. All programs can benefit from testing to find reliability problems and correcting them prior to deployment, but the number of problems likely to be corrected and the cost effectiveness of fixing them is greater for designs which are more complex and challenging to the state-of-the-art.

How does the applicability of reliability growth testing vary with the following points of a development program?

(1) **Complexity of equipment and challenge to state-of-the-art?** The more complex or challenging the equipment design is, the more likely there will be unforeseen reliability problems which can be surfaced by a growth program. However, depending on the operational scenario, the number of equipments to be deployed and the maintenance concept, there may be a high LCC payoff in using a reliability growth program to fine tune a relatively simple design to maximize its reliability. This would apply in situations where the equipments have extremely high usage rates and LCC is highly sensitive to MTBF.

(2) **Operational environment?** All other factors being equal, the more severe the environment, the higher the payoff from growth testing. This is because severe environments are more likely to inflict unforeseen stress associated with reliability problems that need to be corrected.

(3) **Quantity of equipment to be produced?** The greater the quantities of equipment, the more impact on LCC by reliability improvement through a reliability growth effort.

What reliability growth model(s) should be used? The model to be used, as MIL-HDBK-189 says, is the simplest one that does the job. Certainly, the Duane is most common, probably with the AMSAA developed by Dr. Larry H. Crow of the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity second. They both have advantages; the Duane being simple with parameters having an easily recognizable physical interpretation, and the AMSAA having rigorous statistical procedures associated with it. MIL-HDBK-189 suggests the Duane for planning and the AMSAA for assessment and tracking. When an RQT is required, the RGT should be planned and tracked using the Duane model; otherwise, the AMSAA model is recommended for tracking because it allows for the calculation of confidence limits around the data.

Should there be an accept/reject criteria? The purpose of reliability growth testing is to uncover failures and take corrective actions to prevent their recurrence. Having an accept/reject criteria is a negative contractor incentive towards this purpose. Monitoring the contractor's progress and loosely defined

thresholds are needed but placing accept/reject criteria, or using a growth test as a demonstration, defeat the purpose of running them. A degree of progress monitoring is necessary even when the contractor knows that following the reliability growth test he will be held accountable by a final RQT. Tight thresholds make the test an RQT in disguise. Reliability growth can be incentivized but shouldn't be. To reward a contractor for meeting a certain threshold in a shorter time or by indicating "if the RGT results are good, the RQT will be waived," the contractor's incentive to "find and fix" is diminished. The growth test's primary purpose is to improve the design, not to evaluate the design.

What is the relationship between an RQT and RGT? The RQT is an "accounting task" used to measure the reliability of a fixed design configuration. It has the benefit of holding the contractor accountable some day down the road from his initial design process. As such, he is encouraged to seriously carry out the other design related reliability tasks. The RGT is an "engineering task" designed to improve the design reliability. It recognizes that the drawing board design of a complex system cannot be perfect from a reliability point of view and allocates the necessary time to fine tune the design by finding problems and designing them out. Monitoring, tracking and assessing the resulting data gives insight into the efficiency of the process and provides nonreliability persons with a tool for evaluating the development's reliability status and for reallocating resources when necessary. The forms of testing serve very different purposes and complement each other in development of systems and equipments. **An RGT is not a substitute for an RQT or any other reliability design tasks.**

How much validity/confidence should be placed on the numerical results of RGT? Associating a hard reliability estimate from a growth process, while mathematically practical, has the tone of an assessment process rather than an improvement process, especially if an RQT assessment will not follow the RGT. In an ideal situation, where contractors are not driven by profit motives, a reliability growth test could serve as an improvement and assessment vehicle. Since this is not the real world, the best that can be done if meaningful quantitative results are needed without an RQT, is to closely monitor the contractor RGT. Use of the AMSAA model provides the necessary statistical procedures for associating confidence levels with reliability results. In doing so, closer control over the operating conditions and failure determinations of the RGT must be exercised than if the test is for improvement purposes only. A better approach is to use a less closely controlled growth test as an improvement technique (or a structured extension of FRACAS, with greater emphasis on corrective action) to fine tune the design as insurance of an accept decision in an RQT. With this approach, monitoring an improvement trend is more appropriate than development of hard reliability estimates. Then use a closely controlled RQT to determine acceptance and predict operational results.

3.0 Duane Model: Because the Duane model is the one most commonly used, it will be further explained. The model assumes that the plot of MTBF versus time is a straight line when plotted on log-log paper. The main advantage of this model is that it is easy to use. The disadvantage of the model is it assumes that a fix is incorporated immediately after a failure occurs (before further test time is accumulated). Because fixes are not developed and implemented that easily in real

life, this is rarely the case. Despite this problem, it is still considered a useful planning tool. Below is a brief summary of the Duane model.

a. Growth Rate

$$\alpha = \frac{\Delta MTBF}{\Delta TIME}$$

b. Cumulative MTBF

$$MTBF_C = \frac{1}{K} T^{\alpha}$$

c. Instantaneous MTBF

$$MTBF_1 = \frac{MTBF_C}{1 - \alpha}$$

d. Test Time

$$T = \left[(MTBF_1)(K)(1-\alpha) \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}$$

e. Preconditioning period at which system will realize an initial MTBF of $MTBF_C$

$$T_{pc} = \frac{1}{2} (MTBF_{PRED})$$

where
 k = a constant which is a function of the initial MTBF
 α = the growth rate
 T = the test time

The instantaneous MTBF is the model's mathematical representation of the MTBF if all previous failure occurrences are corrected. Therefore, there is no need to selectively purge corrected failures from the data.

The scope of the up-front reliability program, severity of the use environment and system state-of-the-art can have a large effect on the initial MTBF and, therefore, the test time required. The aggressiveness of the test team and program office in ensuring that fixes are developed and implemented can have a substantial effect on the growth rate and, therefore, test time. Other important considerations for planning a growth test are provided in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1: RGT Planning Considerations

● To account for down time, calendar time should be estimated to be roughly twice the number of test hours.

● A minimum test length of 5 times the predicted MTBF should always be used (if the Duane Model estimates less time). Literature commonly quotes typical test lengths of from 5 to 25 times the predicted MTBF

● For large MTBF systems (e.g., greater than 1000 hours), the preconditioning period equation does not hold; 250 hours is commonly used.

● The upper limit on the growth rate is .6 (growth rates above .5 are rare).

4.0 Prediction of Reliability Growth Expected: It is possible to estimate the increase in reliability that can be expected for an equipment undergoing a reliability growth development program. The methodology to do this is documented in RADC-TR-86-148 "Reliability Growth Prediction."

4.1 Terms Explained:

λ_p = MIL-HDBK-217 predicted equipment failure rate (failures per hour).

F_m = Equipment maturity factor. Estimated as the percentage of the design which is new.

K_1 = Number of failures in the equipment prior to test.

K_1 = 30,000 x F_m x λ_p

F_A = Test acceleration factor, based on the degree to which the test environment cycle represents the operational environmental cycle.

$$F_A = \frac{T_{OPERATIONAL}}{T_{TEST}} = \frac{\text{Length of operational life}}{\text{Length of test cycle}}$$

$$K_2 = \frac{0.0005}{6.5}(F_A)$$

4.2 Prediction Procedure:

a. Calculate the equipment MTBF prior to test, MTBF(o):

$$MTBF(o) = \left[\lambda_p + \frac{0.0005K_1}{6.5}\right]^{-1}$$

b. Calculate the equipment MTBF after "t" hours of growth testing:

$$MTBF(t) = \frac{F_A}{(F_A)(\lambda_p) + K_1 K_2 e^{-K_2 t}}$$

c. Percent MTBF Improvement = $\dfrac{MTBF(t)}{MTBF(o)}$ x 100

4.3 Example:

To illustrate application of the reliability growth prediction procedure, consider the following hypothetical example of an avionics equipment to be subjected to reliability growth testing during full-scale development. The following assumptions are made:

- 40 percent of the equipment is new design; the remainder is comprised of mature, off-the-shelf items.

- The MIL-HDBK-217 MTBF prediction is 300 hours (λ_p = 1/300).

- An RGT program is to be conducted during which 3000 hours will be accumulated on the equipment.

- The operational cycle for the equipment is a ten-hour aircraft mission.

- The test profile eliminates the period of operation in a relatively benign environment (e.g., the cruise portion of the mission) resulting in a test cycle of two hours.

The predicted number of failures in the equipment prior to testing is:

K_1 = 30,000 x (0.4) x (1/300) = 40

The initial MTBF is:

$$\text{MTBF(o)} = \left[\frac{1}{300} + \frac{0.005(40)}{6.5} \right]^{-1} = 156 \text{ hours}$$

The test acceleration factor is:

$$F_A = \frac{10}{2} = 5$$

The rate of surfacing failures during the test is:

$$K_2 = \left(\frac{0.0005}{6.5} \right) \times 5 = 0.0003846$$

The equipment MTBF after incorporation of corrective actions to eliminate those failures identified in the RGT program is:

$$\text{MTBF(3000)} = \frac{5}{(5 \times \frac{1}{300} + 40 \times 0.0003846 \, e^{0.0003846 \times 3000})} = 232 \text{ hours}$$

Hence, the predicted reliability growth is from an initial MTBF of 156 hours to an improved MTBF of 232 hours, approximately a 50 percent improvement.

Maintainability/Testability
Demonstration Testing

1.0   Testing: This appendix presents a listing of the possible maintainability demonstration plans as determined from MIL-STD-471 "Maintainability Verification Demonstration/Evaluation" and general plans for testability demonstrations. In most circumstances, maintainability and testability demonstrations are linked together and tested concurrently. Concurrent testing is cost effective and reduces the total number of tasks that must be demonstrated.

2.0 Maintainability: For maintainability there are two general classes of demonstration: tests that use naturally occurring failures, and tests that require induced failures. Natural failure testing requires a long test period, while induced testing is only limited to the time to find fix the fault. To run a thirty task test using induced faults, the test time should be less than a week while a natural failure test could require six months or more depending on the failure frequency.

2.1   Maintainability Test Recommendations (See Table 7-1 for complete MIL-STD-471 Test Plan listing.)

- Test plan eight should be used if dual requirements of the mean and either 90th or 95th percentile of maintenance times are specified and a lognormal distribution is expected.

- Test plan nine should be used for mean corrective maintenance, mean preventive maintenance or combination of corrective and preventive maintenance testing. Any underlying distribution can be used in this test plan.

- The sample size of the tasks to be demonstrated should exceed 400 to reduce the risk of biasing the test results.

- The task samples must be based on the failure rate distribution of the equipment to be tested.

- Final selection of the tasks to be demonstrated must be performed by the procuring activity just prior to test.

3.0   Testability: Three parameters which are usually tested in a testability demonstration are: the fault detection capability, the fault isolation capability, and the false alarm rate. Fault detection and isolation parameters are demonstrated using induced faults, while false alarm demonstrations are based on naturally occurring events. (See Table 7-2 for more information on testability demonstration.)

3.1   Testability Test Recommendations:

- Fault detection and isolation testing should be combined.

- Test samples should exceed 400 to reduce any bias.

- The test samples should be based on the failure rate distribution of the equipment to be tested.

- False alarm demonstration should be a data collection effort using all the contractor planned tests such as acceptance testing and initial operating tests (IOT).

Table 7-1: Maintainability Demonstration Test Plan Summary

MIL-STD-471 Test Method	Test Variable	Distribution Assumptions	Sample Size	Repair Sample Selection	Confidence Level
1-A	Mean	• Log Normal Distribution • Prior Knowledge of Variance	Note 1	Natural Occurring Failures or Stratified Random Sampling	Note 3
1-B	Mean	• No Distribution Assumption • Prior Knowledge of Variance	Note 1	Natural Occurring Failures or Stratified Random Sampling	Note 3
2	Critical Percentile	• Log Normal Distribution • Prior Knowledge of Variance	Note 2	Natural Occurring Failures or Stratified Random Sampling	Note 3
3	Critical Maintenance Time or Manhours	• None	Note 2	Natural Occurring Failures or Stratified Random Sampling	Note 3
4	Median	• A Specific Variance • Log Normal Distribution	20	Natural Occurring Failures or Stratified Random Sampling	Note 3
5	Chargeable Maintenance Downtime per Flight	• None	Variable, 50 Minimum	Natural Occurring Failures	.90 (Note 5)
6	Man-hour Rate	• None	Variable	Natural Occurring Failures	Note 3
7	Man-hour Rate	• None	30 Minimum	Natural Occurring Failures or Stratified Random Sampling	Note 3

MIL-STD-471 Test Method	Test Variable	Distribution Assumptions	Sample Size	Repair Sample Selection	Confidence Level
8	Mean and Percentile Dual Percentile	• Log Normal • None	Variable (Sequential Test Plan)	Natural Occurring or Simple Random Sampling	Moderate to High
9	Mean (Corrective Task Time, Prev Maint. Time, Downtime) M_{max} (90 or 95 percentile)	• None	30 Minimum	Natural Occurring or Stratified Random Sampling	Note 3
10	Median (Corrective Task Time, Prev. Maint. Task Time) M_{max} (95 Percentile) Corrective Maint. Task Time, Prev. Maint. Task Time	• None	50 Minimum	Natural Occurring Failures or Stratified Random Sampling	Note 3
11	Mean (Prev. Maint. Task Time) M_{max} (Prev. Maint. Task Time, at any Percentile)	• None	All possible tasks	All	NA

Notes:
1. 30 minimum, depends on confidence interval required.
2. Depends on confidence interval required.
3. Must be defined as part of requirement.
4. See Topic T6 for Maintainability Demonstration Plan Selection.
5. Based on empirical data over 25 years old.

Table 7-2: Testability Demonstration Plans

Test Variable	Distribution Assumptions	Sample Size	Procedure	Consumer/Producer Risks
Fraction of Faults Detectable (FFD)	None	Same as maint. demonstration (4 times sample size required)	Failure modes and effects analysis on maint. demonstration samples selected	10% producer 30-40% consumer
Fraction of Faults Isolatable (FFI) to given level of ambiguity	None	Same as maint. demonstration (4 times sample size required)	Failure modes and effects analysis on maint. demonstration samples selected	10% producer 30-40% consumer
False Alarm Rate (FAR)	None	Actual occurring false alarms over given period of operating time	Collect data on false alarms during maint. demonstration	25% consumer risk producer risk sample size dependent

Notes:
1. Since each plan demonstrates a different testability parameter, usually all three plans are used.
2. See MIL-STD-471A (page 78) for specific demonstration procedures.

Appendix 8
Reliability and Maintainability
Data Sources

1.0 Air Force Databases

G063: Maintenance and Operational Data Access System (MODAS): MODAS is an on-line data storage and access system to track field maintenance events for purposes of product improvement, monitoring product performance and enhancing reliability and maintainability. The data base is menu driven and contains data on both ground and airborne equipment. Data can be sorted and accessed in several ways. For example, data on the top 50 most maintained subsystems on an aircraft can be viewed for a specific geographical area or for a specific aircraft platform. Mean-time-between-maintenance actions (MTBMA) can be calculated from the data on airborne systems because flight hours are also provided with the number of maintenance actions.

> Air Force Materiel Command/ENIT
> Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-5001
> (513) 257-6021
> DSN: 787-6021

Reliability and Maintainability Information System (REMIS): REMIS is a central source on-line data access system containing all unclassified maintenance, operational, configuration and selected supply information for USAF weapon systems. REMIS, when completed, will be a conglomeration of almost all of the Air Force databases.

> Air Force Materiel Command/MSC/SR
> Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-5001
> (513) 429-5076
> DSN: 787-5076

D041: Requirements Computation System: This system contains part failure rates and data assets for recoverable items.

> Air Force Materiel Command/XRII
> Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-5001
> (513) 257-5361
> DSN: 787-5361

Tactical Interim CAMMS and REMIS Reporting System (TICARRS): This system reports on F-15 and F-16 aircraft inventory, utilization and maintenance.

> Dynamics Research Corporation
> 60 Frontage Rd
> Andover MA 01810
> (800) 522-4321, x2612

G021: Product Quality Deficiency Reporting (PQDR): This system provides procedures for assuring that the quality deficiency data generated by using activities are effective and appropriate management levels are apprised of quality problems. Also, it provides tracking to assure that corrective and preventive actions are carried out to alleviate future quality problems.

Air Force Materiel Command/ENI
Wright Patterson AFB OH 45433-5001
(513) 257-6021
DSN: 787-6021

Systems Effectiveness Data System (SEDS): This system contains R&M test data obtained during test and evaluation of new systems at Eglin AFB FL.

Aeronautical Systems Center /ENM
Eglin AFB FL 32542
(904) 882-8652
DSN: 872-8652

Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs Program (VAMOSC): This system contains operating and support cost for parts used in over 100 aircraft.

Air Force Cost Analysis Agency/ISM
Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433
(513) 257-4963
DSN: 787-4963

Reliability, Availability, Maintainability of Pods (RAMPOD)

Warner Robins Air Logistics Center/LNXA
RAMPOD Program Office
Robins AFB GA
(912) 926-5404
DSN: 468-5404

2.0   Navy Databases

3M: Maintenance, Material, Management System: 3M is a mass-data collection system which tracks maintenance information at the organizational and intermediate levels on all types of equipments and assemblies used on Navy ships, submarines and aircraft.

Naval Sea Logistics Center
5450 Carlisle Pike
PO Box 2060, Code 44
Mechanicsburg PA 17055-0795
(717) 790-2953 (Ships & Submarines)
DSN: 430-2953
(717) 790-2031 (Avionics)
DSN: 430-2031

Naval Aviation Logistics Data Analysis System (NALDA): NALDA contains data similar to the 3M Avionics database.

> Naval Aviation Maintenance Office
> NAVAIR Air Station, Code 424
> Patuxent River MD 20670
> (800) 624-6621
> (301) 863-4454
> DSN: 326-4454

Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System (MIMMS): MIMMS contains maintenance information at all levels for all types of equipment and assemblies used in Marine Corps vehicles and aircraft.

> Headquarters, US Marine Corps, HQBN
> Code LPP-3
> Washington DC 20380-0001
> (703) 696-1060
> DSN: 226-1060

3.0 Army Databases

Troop Support Sample Data Collection (TSSDC): TSSDC is a sample data collection system which contains maintenance times, maintenance actions and operating hours of various equipment.

> US Army Aviation Troop Command
> Attn: AMSAT-I-MDC
> 4300 Goodfellow Blvd.
> St Louis MO 63120-1798
> (314) 263-2734
> DSN: 693-2734

Work Order Logistics File (WOLF): WOLF is a maintenance database containing repair part consumption data on fielded systems.

> Commander
> USAMC Materiel Readiness Support Activity
> Attn: AMXMD-RA
> Lexington KY 40511-5101
> (606) 293-4110
> DSN: 745-4110

Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Logistics Data Base (RAM/LOG):
RAM/LOG contains testing data on Aircraft.

> US Army Aviation Troop Command
> 4300 Goodfellow Blvd
> St Louis MO 63120-1798
> (314) 263-1791
> DSN: 693-1791

USAMC Materiel Readiness Support Activity Deficiency Reporting System

This system tracks equipment and component deficiencies for all equipments.

> Commander
> USAMC Materiel Readiness Support Activity
> ATTN: AMXMD-RS
> Lexington KY 40511-5101
> (606) 293-3577
> DSN: 745-3577

4.0   Other Government Databases

Reliability Analysis Center (RAC): RAC is a Department of Defense Information Analysis Center sponsored by the Defense Technical Information Center, managed by the Rome Laboratory, and currently operated by IIT Research Institute (IITRI). RAC is chartered to collect, analyze and disseminate reliability information pertaining to electronic systems and parts used therein. The present scope includes integrated circuits, hybrids, discrete semiconductors, microwave devices, opto-electronics and nonelectronic parts employed in military, space and commercial applications.

Data is collected on a continuous basis from a broad range of sources, including testing laboratories, device and equipment manufacturers, government laboratories and equipment users (government and non-government). Automatic distribution lists, voluntary data submittals and field failure reporting systems supplement an intensive data solicitation program.

Reliability data and analysis documents covering most of the device types mentioned above are available from the RAC. Also, RAC provides reliability consulting, training, technical and bibliographic inquiry services.

For further technical assistance and information on available RAC Services, contact:

> Reliability Analysis Center
> 201 Mill Street
> Rome NY 13440-6916
> Technical Inquiries: (315) 337-9933
> Non-technical Inquiries: (315) 337-0900
> DSN: 587-4151

All Other Requests Should Be Directed To:

> Rome Laboratory
> ERSS/Duane A. Gilmour
> Griffiss AFB NY 13441-5700
> Telephone: (315) 330-2660
> DSN: 587-2660

Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP): The GIDEP program is a cooperative activity between government and industry participants for the purpose of compiling and exchanging technical data. It provides an on-line menu driven means of searching for desired information. Table 8-1 summarizes several separate GIDEP data banks which contain R&M related information.

Table 8-1: GIDEP Data Bank Summary

Data Bank	Content
Engineering	Test reports, nonstandard part justification data, failure analysis data, manufacturing processes data.
Reliability and Maintainability	Failure mode and replacement rate data on parts, reports on theories, methods, techniques and procedures related to reliability and maintainability practices.
Failure Experience	Failure information generated on significant problems on parts, processes, materials, etc. Includes ALERTS and failure analysis information.

GIDEP provides special services such as the ALERT system which notifies all participants of significant problem areas and the Urgent Data Request System which allows all participants queried for information to solve a specific problem. The current information found on-line is usually a brief summary of a report or collected data which provides a reference for further detailed information found on microfilm; however, GIDEP is working on a new system which will provide full text reports and ALERTS on-line.

> GIDEP Operations Center
> Corona CA 91720-5000
> (714) 273-4677
> DSN: 933-4677

5.0 Electronic Bulletin Boards

DOD Field Failure Return Program (FFRP) Reliability Bulletin Board: This Bulletin Board provides information concerning the DOD FFRP program as well as providing a vehicle for both commercial and government users to exchange ideas and information on component and system problems.

Reliability Analysis Center	Technical Data:
201 Mill Street	1200 Baud or less
Rome NY 13440-6916	8 Data bits
(315) 339-7120, Access	No Parity
(315) 339-7043, Questions	1 stop bit
DSN: 587-4151	

DESC Engineering Standardization Bulletin Board: This service provides information on standard military drawings (SMD) parts as well as information on MIL-M-38510 microcircuits. Examples include downloadable self-extracting files of standard military drawing microcircuits (MIL-BUL-103) and MIL-STD-1562, a listing of standard microcircuits cross-referenced to commercial part numbers. Many files are available in both ASCI text format and formats compatible with popular commerical data base programs.

Defense Electronics Supply Center	Technical Data:
Dayton OH 45444	2400 Baud or less
(513) 296-6046, Access	8 Data bits
(513) 296-6879, Questions	No Parity
DSN: 986-6879	1 stop bit

IEEE Reliability Society Bulletin Board

Los Angeles Chapter	Technical Data:
PO Box 1285	2400 Baud or less
Pacific Palisades CA 90272	8 Data bits
(818) 768-7644, Access	No Parity
(213)454-1667, Questions	1 stop bit

Statistics Applications Board System

Statistical Applications Institute	Technical Data:
(316) 265-3036	1200 - 2400 Baud
	8 Data bits
	No Parity
	1 stop bit

1.0 R&M Education Sources

The following is a list of organizations that offer various types of R&M training (Academic Offerings, short courses, home study, etc.). This is in no way a complete listing of all the R&M education sources. For further information on the individual sources, call or write to the address provided.

DOD Programs

Air Force Institute of Technology/LS
Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433
DSN 785-6336
(513) 255-6336

Army Management Engineering
   College
AMXOM/QSAT
Rock Island IL 61299-7040
DSN: 793-0503
(309) 782-0503

Private Institution Academic Programs

University of Arizona
Aerospace & Mechanical Eng Dept
Bldg 16, Rm 200B
Tucson AZ 85721
(602) 621-2495

University of Maryland
Center for Reliability Engineering
Chemical & Nuclear Engineering
College Park MD 20742

New Jersey Institute of Technology
Electrical Engineering Dept
Newark NJ 07102
(201) 596-3511

Individual courses on R&M subjects have been included in the curricula of many schools, including Pennsylvania State University, VPI, USC, Virginia Tech, SMU and Syracuse University.

Short Course/Home Study Programs

Reliability Analysis Center
201 Mill Street
Rome NY 13440-6916
(315) 337-0900

American Society for Quality Control
611 E. Wisconsin Avenue
PO Box 3005
Milwaukee WI 53201-3005
(800) 248-1946

Society of Automotive Engineers
400 Commonwealth Drive
Warrendale PA 15096-0001
(412) 772-7148

The Continuing Engineering
   Education Center
George Washington University
Washington DC 20052
(800) 424-9773

The following schools also offer individual short courses: University of Albany, Georgia Institute of Technology, University of Wisconsin-Madison and Milwaukee Campuses and Clemson University.

2.0 R&M Periodicals

IEEE Transactions on Reliability
IEEE Reliability Society
PO Box 1331
Piscataway NJ 08855-1331
(908) 981-0060
(quarterly)

Reliability Review
American Society for Quality Control
310 West Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee WI 53203
(800) 248-1946
(quarterly)

Quality and Reliability Engineering
    International
John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Subscription Dept C
605 Third Avenue
New York NY 10158
(bimonthly)

Reliability/Maintainability Technology
    Transition-Fact Sheet
RL/ERS
525 Brooks Rd
Griffiss AFB NY 13441-4505
(315) 330-4921
(biannually)

RAC Newsletter
201 Mill Street
Rome NY 13440-6916
(315) 330-0900
(quarterly)

RAC Quarterly
201 Mill Street
Rome NY 13440-6916
(315) 330-0900

3.0 R&M Symposia and Workshops

IEEE Reliability & Maintainability
    Symposium
    Contact: IEEE Reliability Society
        345 E. 47th St
        New York NY 10017
        (212) 705-7484

International Reliability Physics
    Symposium
    Contact: Intel Corp.
        Richard C. Blish II,
        MS SCI-03
        3065 Bowers Avenue
        Santa Clara CA 95052-8126
        (408) 765-2321

IES Annual Technical Meeting & Exposition
    Contact: IES National Office
        940 E. Northwest Highway
        Mount Prospect IL 60056
        (708) 255-1561

Government Microcircuit Applications
  Conference
Contact: Jay Morreale
Palisades Institute for
Research Services, Inc.
201 Varick St, Suite 1140
New York NY 10014
(212) 620-3371

SAE Annual International RMS
  Workshop
Contact: SAE International
400 Commonwealth Dr
Warrendale PA 15096-0001
(412) 776-4841

4.0 R&M Textbooks

There are too many textbooks on R&M to list all of them here. A broad coverage can
be found in MIL-HDBK-338, "Electronic Reliability Design Handbook." A short list of
representative texts follows:

Ascher, H. and Feingold H., *Repairable Systems Reliability,* Marcel Dekker (1984).

Barlow, R. and F. Proschan, *Mathematical Theory of Reliability,* Wiley (1965).

Bazovsky, I., *Reliability Theory and Practice,* Prentice Hall (1961).

Billinton, R. and Allan, R., *Reliability Evaluation of Engineering Systems: Concepts
and Techniques*, Plenum (1987).

Fuqua, N., *Reliability Engineering for Electronic Design*, Dekker (1987).

Kececioglu, D., *Reliability Engineering Handbook,* Prentice Hall (1991).

Klion, J., *Practical Electronic Reliability Engineering*, Van Nostrand Reinhold
(1992).

Mann, N., Schafer, R., and Singpurwalla, N., *Methods for Statistical Analysis of
Reliability and Life Data*, Wiley (1974).

Nelson, W., *Applied Life Data Analysis,* Wiley (1982).

O'Connor, P., *Practical Reliability Engineering*, Wiley (1991).

Shooman, M., *Probabilistic Reliability, An Engineering Approach*, McGraw-Hill
(1968).

Siewiorek, D. and Swarz, R., *The Theory and Practice of Reliable System Design,*
Digital Press (1982).

Appendix 10
R&M Specifications, Standards, Handbooks and Rome Laboratory Technical Reports

1.0 Specifications, Standards and Handbooks

This appendix provides a summary of military documents related to the R&M discipline. Table 10-1 lists reliability standards and handbooks along with an abbreviation to cross-reference the custodial agencies which are listed in Table 10-3. Table 10-2 lists maintainability standards and handbooks along with abbreviations of custodial agencies which are listed in Table 10-3. Table 10-4 lists other R&M related standards, specifications, pamphlets and regulations. Department of Defense Directives and Instructions may be obtained from the National Technical Information Service at the address shown at the bottom of this page. Copies of military specifications, standards and handbooks may be ordered from:

> Standardization Document Order Desk
> 700 Robbins Ave.
> Building 4, Section D
> Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094
> (215) 697-2667, -2179

2.0 Rome Laboratory Technical Reports

Table 10-5 summarizes Rome Laboratory (formerly RADC) Technical Reports related to R&M design. Documents with a prefix of "A" in the AD number may be ordered by the general public from the National Technical Information Center. All others are available to DoD contractors from the Defense Technical Information Center.

National Technical Information Service (NTIS)
Department of Commerce
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161-2171
(703) 487-4650

Defense Technical Information Center
DTIC-FDAC
Cameron Station, Bldg. 5
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
(703) 274-7633 DSN: 284-7633

Table 10-1: Reliability Standards and Handbooks

	Date	Title	Preparing Activity	Custodians Army	Custodians Navy	Custodians Air Force
Standards						
DOD-STD-1686A	8 Aug 88	Electrostatic Discharge Control Program for Protection of Electrical & Electronic Parts, Assemblies & Equipment (Excluding Electrically Initiated Explosive Devices) (Metric)	SH		SH	17
MIL-STD-690B Notice 3	28 Apr 87	Failure Rate Sampling Plans & Procedures	ER	ER	EC	11
MIL-STD-721C	12 Jun 81	Definition of Terms for R&M	AS	CR	AS	17
MIL-STD-756B Notice 1	31 Aug 82	Reliability Modeling & Prediction	AS	CR	AS	17
MIL-STD-781D	17 Oct 86	Reliability Testing for Engineering Development, Qualification & Production	EC	CR	EC	11
MIL-STD-785B Notice 2	5 Aug 88	Reliability Program for Systems & Equipment Development & Production	11	CR	AS	11
MIL-STD-790E Notice 1	27 Jul 90	Product Assurance Program for Electronic and Fiber Optic Parts Specifications	EC	CR	EC	11
MIL-STD-1543B (USAF)	25 Oct 88	Reliability Program Requirements for Space & Missile Systems	19	—	—	19
MIL-STD-1629A Notice 2	28 Nov 84	Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects & Criticality Analysis	AS	CR	AS	17
MIL-STD-2074(AS)	15 Feb 78	Failure Classification for Reliability Testing	AS	—	AS	—
MIL-STD-2155(AS)	24 Jul 85	Failure Reporting, Analysis & Corrective Action System (FRACAS)	AS	—	AS	—
MIL-STD-2164(EC)	5 Apr 85	Environmental Stress Screening Process for Electronic Equipment	EC	—	EC	—

	Date	Title	Preparing Activity	Custodians		
				Army	Navy	Air Force
Handbooks						
DOD-HDBK-344	20 Oct 86	Environmental Stress Screening of Electronic Equipment	17	CR	EC	17
MIL-HDBK-189	13 Feb 81	Reliability Growth Management	CR	CR	EC	17
MIL-HDBK-217F Notice 1	10 Jul 92	Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment	17	CR	EC	17
MIL-HDBK-251	19 Jan 78	Reliability/Design Thermal Applications	EC	CR	EC	11
DOD-HDBK-263A	22 Feb 91	Electrostatic Discharge Control Handbook for Protection of Electrical & Electronic Parts, Assemblies & Equipment (Excluding Electrically Initiated Explosive Devices) (Metric)	SH	ER	SH	17
MIL-HDBK-338 Vols I&II	15 Oct 84	Electronic Reliability Design Handbook	17	CR	EC	17
MIL-HDBK-781	14 Jul 87	Reliability Test Methods, Plans and Environments for Engineering Development, Qualification & Production	EC	CR	EC	11

Table 10-2: Maintainability Standards and Handbooks

| | Date | Title | Preparing Activity | Custodians | | |
				Army	Navy	Air Force
Standards						
MIL-STD-470B	30 May 89	Maintainability Program for Systems & Equipment	17	MI	AS	17
MIL-STD-471A Notice 2	8 Dec 78	Maintainability Verification/ Demonstration/ Evaluation	17	MI	AS	17
MIL-STD-1591	3 Jan 77	On-Aircraft, Fault Diagnosis, Subsystems Analysis/Synthesis of	17	AV	AS	17
MIL-STD-001591A (USAF)	8 Dec 78	Command, Control & Communication (C3) System Component Fault Diagnosis, Subsystem Analysis/Synthesis of	17	—	—	17
MIL-STD-2084(AS) Notice 2	12 Jul 91	Maintainability of Avionic & Electronic Systems & Equipment	AS	—	AS	—
MIL-STD-2165	26 Jan 85	Testability Programs for Electronic Systems & Equipment	EC	CR	EC	17
Handbooks						
MIL-HDBK-472 Notice 1	12 Jan 84	Maintainability Prediction	AS	MI	AS	17

Table 10-3: Custodial Agencies for R&M Documents

Army	Navy	Air Force
CR Commander US Army Comm-Elect Command Attn: AMSEL-ED-TM Fort Monmouth NJ 07703-5000 (201)532-5851	**AS** Commanding Officer Naval Air Engineering Center Sys Engrg & Standardization Department (SESD) Code 531 Lakehurst NJ 08733-5100 (201)323-2326	**11** Air Force Material Command Command Standardization Office/ENES Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-6503 (513)255-6295
ER Commander US Army Laboratory Command Industrial Engrg & Dev Division Attn: SLCET-RS Fort Monmouth NJ 07703-5302 (201)544-2882	**SH** Commander Naval Sea Sys Command (SEA 55Z3) DoD Standardization Prog & Doc Div Dept of Navy Washington DC 20362-5101 (202)692-0160	**17** Rome Laboratory Standardization Office/ERSS 525 Brooks Road Griffiss AFB NY 13441-4505 (315)330-2101
AV Commander US Army Aviation Sys Command Attn: AMSAV-EDS 4300 Goodfellow Blvd St Louis MO 63120-1798 (314)263-1675	**EC** Commander Space & Naval Warfare Sys Command Attn: SPAWAR 211C Crystal Park #5 2451 Crystal Drive Arlington VA 22202 (703)602-3535	
MI Commander US Army Missile Command Attn: AMSMI-RD-SE-TD-ST Redstone Arsenal AL 35898-5270 (205)876-1335		

Table 10-4: Other R&M Related Standards, Specifications, Pamphlets and Regulations

Document	Date	Title
MIL-STD-454M Notice 3	30 Oct 91	Standard General Requirements for Electronic Equipment
MIL-STD-883D	16 Nov 91	Test Methods and Procedures for Microcircuits
MIL-STD-965A	13 Dec 85	Parts Control Program
MIL-STD-1309D	12 Feb 92	Definition of Terms for Testing Measurement and Diagnostics
MIL-STD-1388/1A Notice 3	28 Mar 91	Logistics Support Analysis
MIL-STD-1388/2B	28 Mar 90	Logistics Support Analysis Record, DoD Requirements for a
MIL-STD-1547A	1 Dec 87	Electronic Parts, Materials and Processes for Space and Launch Vehicles
MIL-STD-1562W	25 Sep 91	List of Standard Microcircuits
MIL-BUL-103J	31 Oct 91	List of Standardized Military Drawings (SMDs)
MIL-STD-2165	26 Jan 85	Testability Program for Electronic Systems and Equipment
MIL-E-5400T	14 May 90	Electronic Equipment, Aerospace, General Specification for
MIL-M-38510J	15 Nov 91	Microcircuits, General Specification for
MIL-H-38534	22 Aug 90	Hybrid Microcircuits, General Specification for
MIL-I-38535A	29 Nov 91	Integrated Circuits (Microcircuits) Manufacturing, General Specification for
MIL-STD-1772B	22 Aug 90	Hybrid Microcircuit, General Specification for
MIL-S-19500H Supplement 1 Amendment 2	30 Apr 90 28 Sep 90 30 Jul 91	Semiconductor Devices, General Specification for

Document	Date	Title
ESD-TR-85-148	Mar 85	Derating Application of Parts for ESD System Development
RELI	24 Apr 87	DoD Reliability Standardization Document Program Plan, Revision 4
MNTY	Dec 89	DoD Maintainability Standardization Document Program Plan, Revision 3
MIL-HDBK-H108	29 Apr 60	Sampling Procedures and Tables for Life & Reliability Testing (Based on Exponential Distribution)
MIL-HDBK-978B	1 Sep 89	NASA Parts Application Handbook
DoD Dir. 5000.1	23 Feb 91	Defense Acquisition
DoD Inst. 5000.2	23 Feb 91	Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures
MIL-STD-810E Notice 1	9 Feb 90	Environmental Test Methods and Engineering Guidelines

Table 10-5: Rome Laboratory Reliability & Maintainability Technical Reports

RL-TR	AD No.	Title
RL-TR-92-95 Apr 1992	ADB164722	Signal Processing Systems Packaging - 1
RL-TR-92-96 Apr 1992	ABD165167	Signal Processing Systems Packaging - 2
RL-TR-91-29 Mar 1991	ADA233855	A Rome Laboratory Guide to Basic Training in TQM Analysis Techniques
RL-TR-91-39 Apr 1991	ADA236585	Reliability Design for Fault Tolerant Power Supplies
RL-TR-91-48	ADA235354	Measuring the Quality of Knowledge Work
RL-TR-91-87 Apr 1991	ADA236148	A Survey of Reliability, Maintainability, Supportability, and Testability Software Tools
RL-TR-91-121 Jul 1991	ADB157688	Electronic Equipment Readiness Testing Marginal Checking
RL-TR-91-122 Jun 1991	ADB156175	Reliability Analysis of an Ultra Lightweight Mirror
RL-TR-91-155 Jul 1991	ADA241476	Computer Aided Assessment of Reliability Using Finite Element Methods
RL-TR-91-180 Aug 1991	ADA2418621	Analysis and Demonstration of Diagnostic Performance in Modern Electronic Systems
RL-TR-91-200 Sept 1991	ADA241865	Automated Testability Decision Tool
RL-TR-91-220 Sept 1991	ADB159584	Integration of Simulated and Measured Vibration Response of Microelectronics
RL-TR-91-251 Oct 1991	ADB160138	Reliability Assessment of Wafer Scale Integration Using Finite Element Analysis
RL-TR-91-300 Nov 1991	ADA245735	Evaluation of Quantitative Environmental Stress Screening (ESS) Methods
RL-TR-91-305 Sept 1991	ADA242594	Total Quality Management (TQM), An Overview
RL-TR-91-353 Dec 1991	ADA247192	SMART BIT/TSMD Integration
RL-TR-91-402 Dec 1991	ADA251921	Mission/Maintenance/Cycling Effects of Reliability

RADC-TR	AD No.	Title
RADC-TR-90-31	ADA222733	A Contractor Program Manager's Testability Diagnostics Guide
RADC-TR-90-64	ADA221325	Personal Computer (PC) Thermal Analyzer
RADC-TR-90-72	ADA223647	Reliability Analysis Assessment of Advanced Technologies
RADC-TR-90-109 Vol. I Vol. II	ADA226902 ADA226820	Integration of Sneak Analysis with Design
RADC-TR-90-120	ADA226820	Reliability/Maintainability/Logistics Support Analysis Computer Aided Tailoring Software Program (R/M/L CATSOP)
RADC-TR-90-239	ADA230067	Testability/Diagnostics Design Encyclopedia
RADC-TR-90-269	ADB150948	Quantitative Reliability Growth Factors for ESS
RADC-TR-89-45	ADA208917	A Government Program Manager's Testability/Diagnostics Guide
RADC-TR-89-160	ADB138156L	Environmental Extreme Recorder
RADC-TR-89-165	ADA215298	RADC Fault Tolerant System Reliability Evaluation Facility
RADC-TR-89-209 Vol. I Vol. II Vol. III	ADA215737 ADA215738 ADA215739	Computer-Aided Design for Built-in-Test (CADBIT) - Technical Issues (CADBIT) - BIT Library (CADBIT) - Software Specification
RADC-TR-89-223	ADA215275	Sneak Circuit Analysis for the Common Man
RADC-TR-89-276	ADB140924L	Dormant Missile Test Effectiveness
RADC-TR-89-277	ADB141826L	SMART BIT-2
RADC-TR-89-281	ADA216907	Reliability Assessment Using Finite Element Techniques
RADC-TR-89-299 Vol. I Vol. II	ADB141960L ADB141961L	Reliability and Maintainability Operational Parameter Translation II
RADC-TR-89-363	ADA219941	FASTER: The Fault Tolerant Architecture Simulation Tool for Evaluating Reliability, Introduction and Application

RADC-TR	AD No.	Title
RADC-TR-88-13	ADB122629L	VHSIC Impact on System Reliability
RADC-TR-88-69		
Vol. I	ADA200204	R/M/T Design for Fault Tolerance, Program Manager's Guide
Vol. II	ADA215531	R/M/T Design for Fault Tolerance, Design Implementation Guide
RADC-TR-88-72	ADA193759	Reliability Assessment of Surface Mount Technology
RADC-TR-88-97	ADA200529	Reliability Prediction Models for Discrete Semiconductor Devices
RADC-TR-88-110	ADA202704	Reliability/Maintainability/Testability Design for Dormancy
RADC-TR-88-118	ADA201346	Operational and Logistics Impact on System Readiness
RADC-TR-88-124	ADA201946	Impact of Fiber Optics on System Reliability/Maintainability
RADC-TR-88-124	ADA201946	Impact of Fiber Optics on System Reliability/Maintainability
RADC-TR-88-211	ADA205346	Testability/Diagnostics Encyclopedia Program (Part I)
RADC-TR-88-304		
Vol. I, Part A	ADB132720L	Reliability Design Criteria for High Power Tubes
Vol. II, Part B	ADB132721L	Review of Tube and Tube Related Technology
RADC-TM-87-11	ADA189472	Availability Equations For Redundant Systems, Both Single and Multiple Repair
RADC-TR-87-13	ADB119216L	Maintenance Concepts for VHSIC
RADC-TR-87-55	ADA183142	Predictors of Organizational-Level Testability Attributes
RADC-TR-87-92	ADB117765L	Large Scale Memory Error Detection and Correction
RADC-TR-87-177	ADA189488	Reliability Analyses of a Surface Mounted Package Using Finite Element Simulation
RADC-TR-87- 225	ADA193788	Improved Readiness Thru Environmental Stress Screening

RADC-TR	AD No.	Title
RADC-TR-86-138	ADA174333	RADC Guide to Environmental Stress Screening
RADC-TR-86-148	ADA176128	Reliability Growth Prediction
RADC-TR-86-149	ADA176847	Environmental Stress Screening
RADC-TR-86-195 Vol. I Vol. II	ADB110761 ADB111438L	Tools For Integrated Diagnostics
RADC-TR-86-241	ADA182335	Built-In-Test Verification Techniques
RADC-TR-85-66	ADA157242	Study and Investigation to Update the Nonelectronic Reliability Notebook
RADC-TR-85-91	ADA158843	Impact of Nonoperating Periods on Equipment Reliability
RADC-TR-85-148	ADB098377L	Smart BIT
RADC-TR-85-150	ADA162617	A Rationale and Approach for Defining and Structuring Testability Requirements
RADC-TR-85-194	ADA163900	RADC Nonelectronic Reliability Notebook
RADC-TR-85-228 Vol. I Vol. II	ADA165231 ADA165232	Impact of Hardware/Software Faults on System Reliability - Study Results Procedures for Use of Methodology
RADC-TR-85-229	ADA164747	Reliability Prediction for Spacecraft
RADC-TR-85-268	ADA167959	Prediction and Analysis of Testability Attributes: Organizational Level Testability Prediction
RL-TR-84-20	ADA141232	Reliability Growth Testing Effectiveness
RADC-TR-84-25 Vol. I Vol. II	ADB087426 ADB087507L	Reliability/Maintainability Operational Parameter Translation
RADC-TR-84-83	ADA145971	Ballpark Reliability Estimation Techniques
RADC-TR-84-100	ADB086478L	Thermal Stress Analysis of Integrated Circuits Using Finite Element Methods

RADC-TR	AD No.	Title
RADC-TR-84-165	ADA149684	Maintainability Time Standards for Electronic Equipment
RADC-TR-84-182	ADA153268	VLSI Device Reliability Models
RADC-TR-84-203	ADA150694	Artificial Intelligence Applications to Testability
RADC-TR-84-244	ADA154161	Automated FMEA Techniques
RADC-TR-84-254	ADA153744	Reliability Derating Procedures
RADC-TR-84-268	ADA153761	Prediction of Scheduled and Preventive Maintenance Workload
RADC-TR-83-2	ADA127546	Study of Causes of Unnecessary Removals of Avionic Equipment
RADC-TR-83-4	ADA126167	Analytical Procedures for Testability
RADC-TR-83-13	ADB075924L	Testability Task Traceability
RADC-TR-83-29 Vol. I Vol. II	ADA129596 ADA129597	Reliability, Maintainability and Life Cycle Costs Effects of Using Commercial-Off-the-Shelf Equipment
RADC-TR-83-36	ADA129438	Fault Tolerance, Reliability and Testability of Distributed Systems
RADC-TR-83-49	ADA130465	Guide to Government Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance Organizations
RADC-TR-83-72	ADA13158	The Evolution and Practical Applications of Failure Modes and Effects Analyses
RADC-TR-83-85 Vol. I Vol. II	ADA133624 ADA133625	Reliability Programs for Nonelectronic Parts
RADC-TR-83-108	ADA135705	Reliability Modeling of Critical Electronic Devices
RADC-TR-83-172	ADB077240L	ORACLE and Predictor Computerized Reliability Prediction Programs
RADC-TR-83-180	ADA138576	Condition Monitoring Techniques for Electromechanical Equipment Used in AF Ground C^3I Systems
RADC-TR-83-257	ADA149683	Computer Aided Testability Design Analysis

RADC-TR	AD No.	Title
RADC-TR-83-291	ADA141147	Advanced Applications of the Printed Circuit Board Testability Design and Rating System
RADC-TR-83-316	ADB083630L	Hardware/Software Tradeoffs for Test Systems
RADC-TR-82-172	ADA118839	RADC Thermal Guide for Reliability Engineers
RADC-TR-82-179	ADA118479	Sneak Analysis Application Guidelines
RADC-TR-81-106	ADA108150	"Bayesian" Reliability Tests Made Practical
RADC-TR-80-30	ADA083009	Bayesian Reliability Theory for Repairable Equipment
RADC-TR-79-200	ADA073299	Reliability and Maintainability Management Manual

μ	Repair Rate (1/Mean-Corrective-Maintenance Time)	AFPRO	Air Force Plant Representative Office
λ	Failure Rate (1/Mean-Time-Between-Failure)	AFR	Air Force Regulation
		AFSC	Air Force Systems Command
α	Producer's Risk	AFTO	Air Force Technical Order
β	Consumer's Risk	AGS	Ambiguity Group Size
θ_{c-a}	Case to Ambient Thermal Resistance	AI	Artificial Intelligence
		AJ	Antijam
θ_{j-c}	Junction to Case Thermal Resistance	ALC	Air Logistics Center
		ALU	Arithmetic Logic Unit
θ_{j-a}	Junction to Ambient Thermal Resistance	AMGS	Automatic Microcode Generation System
$\bar{\theta}$	Observed Point Estimate Mean-Time-Between-Failure	AMSDL	Acquisition Management Systems and Data Control List
θ_0	Upper Test (Design Goal) Mean-Time-Between-Failure	AP	Array Processor
		APD	Avalanche Photo Diode
θ_1	Lower Test (Unacceptable) Mean-Time-Between-Failure	APTE	Automatic Programmed Test Equipment
		APU	Auxiliary Power Unit
θ_p	Predicted Mean-Time-Between-Failure	ARM	Antiradiation Missile
		ASA	Advanced Systems Architecture
Ai	Inherent Availability	ASC	Aeronautical Systems Center
Ao	Operational Availability		
AAA	Allocations Assessment and Analysis (Report)	ASIC	Application Specific Integrated Circuit
ACO	Administrative Contracting Officer	ASTM	American Society for Testing and Materials
ADAS	Architecture Design and Assessment Systems	ATC	Air Training Command
		ATE	Automatic/Automated Test Equipment
ADM	Advanced Development Model	ATF	Advanced Tactical Fighter
ADP	Automatic Data Processing	ATG	Automatic Test Generation
ADPE	Automatic Data Processing Equipment	ATP	Acceptance Test Procedure
AFAE	Air Force Acquisition Executive	ATTD	Advanced Technology Transition Demonstration
AFALC	Air Force Acquisition Logistics Centers	AVIP	Avionics Integrity Program
		b	BIT
AFCC	Air Force Communication Command	BAFO	Best and Final Offer
		BB, B/B	Brass Board
AFFTC	Air Force Flight Test Center	BCC	Block Check-Sum Character
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command	BCS	Bench Check Serviceable
AFMC	Air Force Materiel Command	BCWP	Budget Cost of Work Performed
AFOTEC	Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center		

BCWS	Budget Cost of Work Scheduled	CDRL	Contract Data Requirements List
BEA	Budget Estimate Agreement	CFAR	Constant False Alarm Rate
BES	Budget Estimate Submission	CFE	Contractor Furnished Equipment
BIMOS	Bipolar/Metal Oxide Semiconductor	CFSR	Contract Fund Status Report
BIST	Built-in Self Test	CGA	Configurable Gate Array
BIT	Built-In-Test	CI	Configuration Item
BITE	Built-In-Test Equipment	CIM	Computer Integrated Manufacturing
BIU	Bus Interface Unit		
BJT	Bipolar Junction Transistor	CINC	Commander-in-Chief
BLER	Block Error Rate	CISC	Complex Instruction Set Computer
BPPBS	Biennial Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System	CIU	Control Interface Unit
		CLCC	Ceramic Leaded Chip Carrier
B/S or bps	Bits Per Second	CLIN	Contract Line Item Number
C	Centigrade	CM	Centimeter
C-ROM	Control Read Only Memory	CM	Configuration Manager or Management
C^3	Command, Control and Communications		
C^3CM	Command, Control, Communications and Countermeasures	CML	Current Mode Logic
		CMOS	Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor
C^3I	Command, Control, Communications Intelligence	CND	Can Not Duplicate
		CNI	Communications, Navigation, and Identification
CA	Contracting Activity		
CAD	Computer Aided Design	CO	Contracting Officer
CADBIT	Computer Aided Design for Built-In Test	CODEC	Coder Decoder
		COMM	Communications
CAE	Computer Aided Engineering	COMSEC	Communications Security
		COPS	Complex Operations Per Second
CALS	Computer Aided Acquisition Logistics & Support		
		CPCI	Computer Program Configuration Item
CAM	Content Addressable Memory		
		CPFF	Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee
CAS	Column Address Strobe	CPIF	Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee
CASS	Computer Aided Schematic System	CPM	Control Processor Module
		CPU	Central Processing Unit
CAT	Computer Aided Test	CRC	Cyclic Redundancy Check
CB	Chip Boundary	CS	Chip Select
CCB	Capacitive Coupled Bit	CSC	Computer Software Component
CCB	Configuration Control Board		
CCC	Ceramic Chip Carrier		
CCD	Charged Coupled Device		
CDF	Cumulative Density Function		
CDIP	Ceramic Dual In-Line Package		
CDR	Critical Design Review		

CSCI	Computer Software Configuration Item	Ea	Activation Energy in Electron Volts
CSP	Common Signal Processor	Eox	Electronic Field Strength in Oxide
CSR	Control Status Register		
CTE	Coefficient of Thermal Expansion	EAROM	Electrically Alterable Read Only Memory
CTR	Current Transfer Ratio	ECC	Error Checking and Correction
CV	Capacitance-Voltage		
dB	Decibel	ECCM	Electronic Counter Countermeasures
dc	Direct Current	ECL	Emitter Coupled Logic
D/A	Digital-to-Analog	ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
DAB	Defense Acquisition Board		
DC	Duty Cycle	ECP	Engineering Change Proposal
DECTED	Double Error Correcting, Triple Error Detecting	ECU	Environmental Control Unit
DED	Double Error Detection	EDA	Electronic Design Automation
DEM/VAL	Demonstration and Validation	EDAC	Error Detection and Correction
DESC	Defense Electronics Supply Center	EDM	Engineering Development Model
DID	Data Item Description	EEPROM	Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
DIP	Dual In-Line Package		
DISC	Defense Industrial Supply Center		
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency	EGC	Electronic Gate Count
D Level	Depot Level	EGS	Electronic Ground System
DID	Data Item Description	EGSE	Electronic Ground Support Equipment
DMR	Defense Management Review	EM	Electromigration
DOD	Department of Defense	EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
DOS	Disk Operating System		
DOX	Design of Experiments	EMD	Engineering and Manufacturing Development
DP	Data Processor		
DPA	Destructive Physical Analysis	EMI	Electromagnetic Interface
		EMP	Electronic Magnetic Pulse
DRAM	Dynamic Random Access Memory	EO	Electro-optical
		EOS	Electrical Overstress
DRS	Deficiency Reporting System	EP	Electrical Parameter
		EPROM	Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
DSP	Digital Signal Processing		
DT&E	Development Test & Evaluation	ER Part	Established Reliability Part
		ERC	Electrical Rule Check
DTIC	Defense Technical Information Center	ESC	Electronic System Center
		ESD	Electrostatic Discharge
DUT	Device Under Test	ESM	Electronics Support Measure
DoD	Department of Defense		
DoD-ADL	Department of Defense Authorized Data List		
eV	Electron Volt		

ESS	Environmental Stress Screening	FPAP	Floating Point Array Processor
ETE	Electronic or External Test Equipment	FPLA	Field Programmable Logic Array
EW	Electronic Warfare	FPMFH	Failure Per Million Flight Hours
EXP	Exponent		
FA	False Alarm	FPMH	Failures Per Million Hours
F/W	Firmware	FPPE	Floating Point Processing Element
FAB	Fabrication		
FAR	False Alarm Rate	FQR	Formal Qualification Review
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation	FQT	Final Qualification Test
		FR	Failure Rate
FARR	Forward Area Alerting Radar Receiver	FRACAS	Failure Reporting and Corrective Action System
FAT	First Article Testing	FRB	Failure Review Board
FBT	Functional Board Test	FS	Full Scale
FCA	Functional Configuration Audit	FSD	Full Scale Development
		FSED	Full Scale Engineering Development
FD	Fault Detection		
FDI	Fault Detection and Isolation	FT	Fourier Transform
		FTTL	Fast Transistor - Transistor Logic
FET	Field Effect Transistor		
FFD	Fraction of Faults Detected	FY	Fiscal Year
FFI	Fraction of Faults Isolated	GAO	General Accounting Office
FFP	Firm Fixed Price	GD	Global Defect
FFRP	Field Failure Return Program	GFE	Government Furnished Equipment
FFT	Fast Fourier Transform	GFP	Government Furnished Property
FFTAU	Fast Fourier Transform Arithmetic Unit	GIDEP	Government Industry Data Exchange Program
FFTCU	Fast Fourier Transform Control Unit	GIMADS	Generic Integrated Maintenance Diagnostic
FI	Fault Isolation		
FIFO	First In First Out	GM	Global Memory
FILO	First In Last Out	GOCO	Government Owned Contractor Operated
FIR	Fault Isolation Resolution		
FITS	Failure Per 10^9 Hours	GOMAC	Government Microcircuit Applications Conference
FIT	Fault Isolation Test		
FLIR	Forward Looking Infrared	GSE	Ground Support Equipment
FLOTOX	Floating Gate Tunnel - Oxide	GSPA	Generic Signal Processor Architecture
FMC	Full Mission Capability	GaAs	Gallium Arsenide
FMEA	Failure Modes and Effects Analysis	Hz	Hertz
		HDL	Hardware Description Language
FMECA	Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis	HDS	Hierarchical Design System
FOM	Figure of Merit	HEMT	High Electron Mobility Transistor
FOV	Field of View		
FP	Floating Point		
FPA	Focal Plane Array		

HFTA	Hardware Fault Tree Analysis	IR&D	Independent Research & Development
HHDL	Hierarchical Hardware Description Language	IRPS	International Reliability Physics Symposium
HMOS	High Performance Metal Oxide Semiconductor	ISA	Instruction Set Architecture
HOL	Higher Order Language	ISPS	Instruction Set Processor Specification
H/W	Hardware	ITAR	International Traffic In Arms Regulation
HWCI	Hardware Configuration Item	ITM	Integrated Test and Maintenance
I	Current	IWSM	Integrated Weapons Systems Management
Id	Drain Current	J	Current Density
Isub	Substrate Current	JAN	Joint Army Navy
ID	Integrated Diagnostics	JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
IF	Interface	JEDEC	Joint Electron Device Engineering Council
IAC	Information Analysis Center	JFET	Junction Field Effect Transistor
IAW	In Accordance With	JTAG	Joint Test Action Group
IC	Integrated Circuit	K	Thousand
ICD	Interface Control Document	k	Boltzman's Constant (8.65 x 10^{-5} electron volts/°Kelvin)
ICNIA	Integrated Communications, Navigation and Identification Avionics	KOPS	Thousands of Operations Per Second
ICT	In Circuit Testing	LAN	Local Area Network
ICWG	Interface Control Working Group	LCC	Life Cycle Cost
IDAS	Integrated Design Automation System	LCC	Leadless Chip Carrier
IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System	LCCC	Leadless Ceramic Chip Carrier
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers	LED	Light Emitting Dioide
IES	Institute of Environmental Sciencies	LFR	Launch and Flight Reliability
IFB	Invitation for Bid	LHR	Low Hop Rate
IFF	Identification Friend or Foe	LIF	Low Insertion Force
IFFT	Inverse Fast Fourier Transform	LIFO	Last In First Out
IG	Inspector General	LISP	List Processing
I Level	Intermediate Level	LRM	Line Replaceable Module
ILD	Injection Laser Diode	LRU	Line Replaceable Unit
ILS	Integrated Logistics Support	LSA	Logistics Support Analysis
ILSM	Integrated Logistics Support Manager	LSAR	Logistics Support Analysis Record
IMPATT	Impact Avalanche and Transit Time	LSB	Least Significant Bit
INEWS	Integrated Electronic Warfare System		
I/O	Input/Output		
IOC	Initial Operational Capability		
IOT&E	Initial Operational Test & Evaluation		

LSE	Lead System Engineer
LSI	Large Scale Integration
LSSD	Level Sensitive Scan Design
LSTTL	Low Power Schottky Transistor Transistor Logic
LUT	Look Up Table
mm	Millimeter
mA	Milliampere
ms	Millisecond
mW	Milliwatt
M	Maintainability
m	Million
Mb	Megabit
Mct	Mean Corrective Maintenance Time
Mil	1000th of an Inch
M-MM	Mean Maintenance Manhours
MAC	Multiplier Accumulator Chip
MAJCOM	Major Command
MAP	Modular Avionics Package
MBPS	Million Bits Per Second
MCCR	Mission Critical Computer Resources
MCFOS	Military Computer Family Operating System
MCOPS	Million Complex Operations Per Second
MCTL	Military Critical Technology List
MCU	Microcontrol Unit
MD	Maintainability Demonstration
MDCS	Maintenance Data Collection System
MDM	Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
MDR	Microcircuit Device Reliability
MDT	Mean Down Time
MELF	Metal Electrode Face
MENS	Mission Element Needs Statement
MENS	Mission Equipment Needs Statement
MFLOPS	Million Floating Point Operations Per Second
MHz	Megahertz
MIL-STD	Military Standard

MIMIC	Microwave Millimeter Wave Monolithic Integrated Circuit
MIN	Maintenance Interface Network
MIPS	Million Instructions Per Second
MISD	Multiple Instructions Single Data
MLB	Multilayer Board
MLIPS	Million Logic Inferences/Instructions Per Second
MMBF	Mean Miles Between Failure
MMD	Mean Mission Duration
MMH/FH	Maintenance Manhours Per Flight Hour
MMH/PH	Mean Manhours Per Possessed Hour
MMIC	Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit
MMM	Mass Memory Module
MMPS	Million Multiples Per Second
MMR	Multimode Radar
MMS	Mass Memory Superchip
MMW	Millimeter Wave
MN	Maintenance Node
MNN	Maintenance Network Node
MNS	Mission Need Statement
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MODEM	Modulator Demodulator
MOPS	Million Operations Per Second
MOS	Metal Oxide Semiconductor
MOSFET	Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Transistor
MP	Maintenance Processor
MPCAG	Military Parts Control Advisory Group
MRAP	Microcircuit Reliability Assessment Program
MSB	Most Significant Bit
MSI	Medium Scale Integration
MTBCF	Mean Time Between Critical Failures
MTBD	Mean Time Between Demand
MTBDE	Mean Time Between Downing Events

MTBF	Mean Time Between Failure	OTS	Off-The-Shelf
MTBFF	Mean Time Between Functional Failure	P	Power
		Poly	Polycrystalline Silicon
MTBM-IND	Mean Time Between Maintenance-Induced (Type 2 Failure)	PtSi	Platinum Silicide
		PAL	Programmable Array Logic
		PAT	Programmable Alarm Thresholds
MTBM-INH	Mean Time Between Maintenance-Inherent (Type 1 Failure)	PC	Printed Circuit
		PCA	Physical Configuration Audit
MTBM-ND	Mean Time Between Maintenance-No Defect (Type 6 failure)	PCB	Printed Circuit Board
		PCO	Procuring Contracting Officer
MTBM-P	Mean Time Between Maintenance-Preventive	PD	Power Dissipation
		PDF	Probability Density Function
MTBM-TOT	Mean Time Between Maintenance-Total	PDL	Program Design Language
		PDR	Preliminary Design Review
MTBMA	Mean Time Between Maintenance Actions	PEM	Program Element Monitor
		PGA	Pin Grid Array
MTBR	Mean Time Between Removals	PIN	Positive Intrinsic Negative
		PLA	Programmable Logic Array
MTBUMA	Mean Time Between Unscheduled Maintenance Actions	PLCC	Plastic Leadless Chip Carrier
		PLD	Programmable Logic Device
MTE	Multipurpose Test Equipment	PM	Program Manager
		PMD	Program Management Directive
MTE	Minimal Test Equipment		
MTI	Moving Target Indicator	PMOS	P-Channel Metal Oxide Semiconductor
MTTE	Mean Time to Error		
MTTF	Mean Time To Failure	PMP	Program Management Plan
MUX	Multiplexer	PMP	Parts, Materials and Processes
MV	Mega Volt (Million Volt)		
MWPS	Million Words Per Second	PMR	Program Management Review
NDI	Nondevelopmental Items		
NDT	Nondestructive Testing	PMRT	Program Management Responsibility Transfer
NMOS	N-Channel Metal Oxide Semiconductor		
		PPM	Parts Per Million
ns	Nanosecond	PPSL	Preferred Parts Selection List
O-Level	Organizational Level		
O&M	Operation and Maintenance	PO	Program Office
OMB	Office of Management and Budget	PROM	Programmable Read Only Memory
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility	PRR	Production Readiness Review
OPS	Operations Per Second		
ORD	Operational Requirements Document	PRST	Probability Ratio Sequential Test
OROM	Optical Read Only Memory		
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense		
OT&E	Operational Test & Evaluation		

PS	Power Supply		SBIR	Small Business Innovative Research
PTH	Plated Through Hole		SC	Space Center
PW	Pulse Width		SCA	Sneak Circuit Analysis
PWB	Printed Wiring Board		SCARLET	Sneak Circuit Analysis Rome Laboratory Engineering Tool
QA	Quality Assurance			
QC	Quality Control		SCD	Specification Control Drawing
QDR	Quality Deficiency Report			
QML	Qualified Manufacturers List		SCR	Silicon Control Rectifier
QPL	Qualified Parts List		SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
QT&E	Qualification Test and Evaluation		SDL	System Description Language
QUMR	Quality Unsatisfactory Material Report		SDR	System Design Review
			SDS	Structured Design System
R	Reliability		SE	Support Equipment
R&M	Reliability and Maintainability		SECDED	Single Error Correction, Double Error Detection
RAD	Radiation		SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
RAM	Random Access Memory		SED	Single Error Detection
RAMS	Reliability and Maintainability Symposium		SEDS	System Engineering Detailed Schedule
RD	Random Defect		SEM	Standard Electronic Module
RDGD	Reliability Development Growth Test		SEMP	Systems Engineering Management Plan
RDT	Reliability Demonstration Test		SER	Soft Error Rate
REG	Register		SERD	Support Equipment Recommended Data
RF	Radio Frequency			
RFP	Request for Proposal		SEU	Single Event Upset
RH	Relative Humidity		SIP	Single In-Line Package
RISA	Reduced Instruction Set Architecture		SMD	Standard Military Drawing
			SMD	Surface Mounted Device
RISC	Reduced Instruction Set Computer		SMT	Surface Mounted Technology
RIW	Reliability Improvement Warranty		S/N	Signal to Noise Ratio
RL	Rome Laboratory		SOA	Safe Operating Area
RMS	Root Mean Square		SOI	Silicon On Insulator
ROC	Required Operational Capability		SOIC	Small Outline Integrated Circuit
ROM	Read Only Memory		SON	Statement of Need
ROM	Rough Order of Magnitude		SORD	Systems Operational Requirements Document
RQT	Reliability Qualification Test			
RSA	Rapid Simulation Aids		SOS	Silicon On Sapphire
RSR	Runtime Status Register		SOW	Statement of Work
RTL	Register Transfer Language		SPAD	Scratch Pad Memory
RTOK	Retest Okay			
RTQC	Real Time Quality Control			
SAF	Secretary of the Air Force			
SAR	Synthetic Aperture Radar			
SAW	Surface Acoustic Wave			

SPC	Statistical Process Control		T&E	Test and Evaluation
SPO	System Program Office		TEMP	Test & Evaluation Master Plan
SQC	Statistical Quality Control		TET	Technical Evaluation Team
SR	Slew Rate		TM	Test Modules
SRA	Shop Replaceable Assembly		TM	Technical Manuals
SRD	System Requirement Document		TMDE	Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment
SRAM	Static Random Access Memory		TMP	Test and Maintenance Processor
SRAP	Semiconductor Reliability Assessment Program		TO	Technical Orders
SRL	Shift Register Latch		TPS	Test Program Set
SRR	Systems Requirement Review		TPWG	Test Plan Working Group
SRU	Shop Replaceable Unit		TQM	Total Quality Management
SSA	Source Selection Authority		TRD	Test Requirements Document
SSAC	Source Selection Advisory Council		TRR	Test Readiness Review
SSEB	Source Selections Evaluation Board		TSMD	Time Stress Measurement Device
SSI	Small Scale Integration		TTL	Transistor-Transistor Logic
SSP	Source Selection Plan		UHF	Ultra High Frequency
SSPA	Submicron Signal Processor Architecture		ULSI	Ultra Large Scale Integration
SSR	Software Specification Review		UMF	Universal Matched Filter
ST	Self Test		UUT	Unit Under Test
STD	Standard		UVPROM	Ultra-Violet Programmable Read Only Memory
STE	Special Test Equipment		V	Volt
STINFO	Scientific and Technical Information		VCP	Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Communications Processor
STV	Steerable Television Set		VHDL	Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Hardware Description Language
S/W	Software			
t	Time		VHSIC	Very High Speed Integrated Circuit
T	Temperature		VIM	Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Insertion Module
Ta	Ambient Temperature			
Tc	Case Temperature		VLSI	Very Large Scale Integration
Tj	Junction Temperature			
Tstg	Storage Temperature		VSM	Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Submicron
TAC	Tactical Air Command			
TBD	To Be Determined		VSP	Variable Site Parameters
TC	Temperature Coefficient		VTB	Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Technology Brassboard
TCE	Thermal Coefficient of Expansion			
TCR	Temperature Coefficient of Resistance			
TDDB	Time Dependent Dielectric Breakdown			
TDM	Time Division Multiplexing			

WAM	Window Addressable Memory
WBS	Work Breakdown Structure
WRSK	War Readiness Spares Kit
WSI	Wafer-Scale Integration
WSIC	Wafer-Scale Integrated Circuit
X	Reactance
XCVR	Transceiver
Y	Admittance
Z	Impedance
ZIF	Zero Insertion Force